BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

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In the Matter of Arbitration :
Between: :
RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,:
Claimant, :
and

THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA, :

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HEARING ON MERITS

Friday, December 16, 2011
1818 H Street, N.W.
MC Building
Conference Room 4-800
Washington, D.C.

The hearing in the above-entitled matter came on, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. before:

DR. ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, President PROF. JAMES CRAWFORD, SC, Arbitrator

HON. STUART E. EIZENSTAT, Arbitrator

| ```PAGE 1903 \\ Also Present: \\ MS. NATALI SEQUEIRA, Secretary to the Tribunal \\ MR. ALEX BERENGAUT, Assistant to the Tribunal \\ Court Reporter: \\ MR. DAVID A. KASDAN Registered Diplomate Reporter (RDR) Certified Realtime Reporter (CRR) \\ B\&B Reporters \\ 529 14th Street, S.E. \\ Washington, D.C. 20003 \\ (202) 544-1903 \\ SRA. ANDREA VERÓNICA AMOR \\ D.R. Esteno \\ Colombres 566 \\ Buenos Aires 1218ABE \\ Argentina \\ (5411) 4957-0083 \\ Interpreters: \\ MS. SILVIA COLLA \\ MR. DANIEL GIGLIO \\ MR. CHARLES ROBERTS``` | APPEARANCES: (Continued) <br> On behalf of the Respondent: <br> MR. GUILLERMO PORRAS OVALLE <br> Attorney General <br> MR. ESTUARDO SAÚL OLIVA FIGUEROA <br> MS. SILVIA CABRERA ESTRADA <br> Attorney General's Office <br> MR. ANÍBAL SAMOYOA SALAZAR <br> Deputy Secretary General of the Presidency <br> MR. LUIS VELÁSQUEZ QUIROA <br> MR. MYNOR RENE CASTILLO <br> MR. ROMEO LÓPEZ <br> Ministry of Economy <br> MR. FERNANDO de la CERDA <br> MR. JOSÉ LAMBOUR, <br> Embassy of Guatemala, Washington, D.C. <br> MR. DAVID M. ORTA <br> MR. WHITNEY DEBEVOISE <br> MR. DANIEL SALINAS-SERRANO <br> MS. MARGARITA R. SÁNCHEZ <br> MS. GISELLE K. FUENTES <br> MS. DAWN Y. YAMANE HEWETT <br> MS. MALLORY B. SILBERMAN <br> MR. JOSÉ ANTONIO RIVAS <br> MR. JOSÉ BERNARD PALLAIS H. <br> MS. CAMILA VALENZUELA <br> MR. KELBY BALLENA <br> MS. AMY ENDICOTT <br> MR. PEDRO SOTO <br> MS. NICOLE ANN AARONSON <br> Arnold \& Porter, LLP <br> 555 Twelfth Street, N.W. <br> Washington, D.C. 20004 <br> (202) 942-5000 |
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| APPEARANCES : <br> On behalf of the Claimant: <br> MR. C. ALLEN FOSTER <br> MR. KEVIN E. STERN <br> MS. RUTH ESPEY-ROMERO <br> MS. REGINA VARGO <br> MR. P. NICHOLAS CALDWELL <br> MS. PRECIOUS MURCHISON <br> MR. ADRIAN F. SNEAD <br> Greenberg Traurig, LLP <br> 2101 L street, N.W. <br> Suite 1000 <br> Washington, D.C. 20006 <br> (202) 331-3100 <br> MR. JUAN PABLO CARRASCO DE GROOTE <br> Diaz-Durán $y$ Asociados Central-Law <br> 15 Avenida 18-28, Zona 13 <br> Guatemala City, Guatemala C.A. <br> Representing Railroad Development Corporation and Ferrovías Guatemala: <br> MR. ROBERT PIETRANDREA <br> MR. ANDREW BILLER <br> MR. PABLO ALONZO <br> Also Present: <br> MR. MARIO ESTUARDO JOSÉ FUENTES SÁNCHEZ <br> DR. EDUARDO A. MAYORGA |  |



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| PAGE 1911 <br> 1911 <br> 09:02:52 1 Q. Mr. Marroguin, I take it from your Witness <br> 2 Statements that at one point you were asked to preside <br> at a High-Level Commission that would address certain issues that existed between FeGUA and Ferrovías. <br> A. Towards the end of the first quarter of 2006 . <br> Q. Can you tell the Tribunal what the origin of that Commission was. <br> A. After the petition from the President for me g to take charge of that Commission, the Parties and Ferrovías had had dealings at high level; and as a result of the exchange, they asked me to follow up on 2 the issues. <br> Q. When you say that Ferrovías had had contacts at the highest level, can you tell the Tribunal what you mean by that. <br> A. Yes, I understand that Ferrovías had had meetings with the Presidency and other important positions in the Government; and, given what was discussed in those meetings in which I did not participate but I understand that they were carried out, I was asked to take charge of the High-Level Commission to make viable the whole question of the |  |
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| PAGE 1912 <br> 09:04:11 1 railway. <br> Q. Now, sir, is it your recollection that those meetings happened between March and May of 2006? <br> A. The meetings of the Commission? (Overlapping interpretation.) <br> Q. Wait after my question just a few seconds to answer so that the interpretation can get in there. We'd appreciate it. <br> A. Yes, I'd be pleased to do so. <br> Q. I asked whether it was your recollection that <br> the High-Level Commission meetings happened between March and May of 2006? <br> A. That's right. <br> Q. In these meetings, sir, there's been some testimony at this hearing that there were many issues discussed, not just a single issue. Can you explain to the Tribunal why there were a number of issues discussed during the meetings and what the purpose of those discussions were. <br> 20 SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: I'm going to interrupt <br> 21 you once again. There are some--can you please repeat 22 the answer once again. | 09:06:40 1 you tell the Tribunal if during the meetings that you 2 were present and during the Commission that you chaired, was there ever or did you ever receive an instruction from anyone in the Government to negotiate 5 or settle only if all points could be negotiated and 6 settled, or did the--was the Government, as 7 represented by you and others in that Commission, free to negotiate whatever issues could be resolved at any given time? <br> A. In terms of the first question, I did not <br> have instructions to resolve everything all together in a comprehensive package. The purpose was to make viable rail operations. <br> I don't know if this answers your second <br> question. <br> Q. I believe it does, sir. <br> Now, when you say that the purpose was to <br> make the viable rail operations, what do you mean by <br> that? What was your understanding of the issues that the Parties were facing at that time? <br> A. I understand that there was an absence of rail operations in the country that would have enabled |

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| 09:07:52 1 the economy to have an alternative for ritualistic 2 transportation. I understand that that was precisely what was sought--that was my understanding--that what the counterpart at the High-Level Commission thought. $5 \quad$ That is to say that such operations could 6 been an alternative for transportation in Guatemala and, therefore, all of the time we were trying to come up with a formula or a work plan or a revised operational plan that would make it possible to reach that point. <br> 11 Q. Now, sir, I'm drawing your attention and your 12 recollection to the meeting, the High-Level Commission <br> 13 meeting that took place in 11 May 2006. Are you sort 14 of placed in time? <br> 15 A. Yes, I do remember it. <br> 16 Q. Thank you, sir. <br> 17 There has been some testimony that the <br> 18 Government wielded in its negotiations with Ferrovías <br> 19 the Declaration of Lesivo of the Equipment Contract, <br> 20 the Usufruct Equipment Contract, as a pressure <br> 21 mechanism, as a pressure tool to get concessions or <br> 22 further negotiations on other issues with Ferrovías. | 09:10:28 1 could turn off the microphone, and every time he asks 2 you, you can then put it back--turn it back on. 3 MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: I have the same 4 problem. I think it's the issue of understanding and 5 then trying to respond, and I appreciate that. <br> 6 BY MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: <br> 7 Q. I was saying you mentioned that you hadn't <br> 8 found out until thereabout the meeting of May 11 , <br> 9 2006. How did you find out and how was the issue <br> 10 dealt with during that meeting? <br> 11 A. In effect, at that meeting I took note of <br> 12 this process of lesividad at the time that we were put <br> 13 on notice by the other Party, Ferrovías. And this <br> 14 made it such that I suspended the meeting at a certain <br> 15 point in time, and I went out to look into that matter <br> 16 with the Competitiveness Commissioner, Miguel <br> 17 Fernández, who confirmed it for me, but for the sake <br> 18 of maintaining goodwill or framework for negotiation, <br> 19 Commissioner Fernández suggested and offered that he <br> 20 would make an effort to suspend the lesividad process <br> 21 so that we could continue at the high-level <br> 22 negotiating table working. |
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| PAGE 1916 <br> 09:09:21 1 <br> 2 What can you say about that in the context of your <br> 3 negotiations within the High-Level Commission meeting? <br> 3 A. Yes, in the context of the High-Level <br> 4 Commission under my responsibility--oh, I'm sorry. I <br> 5 need to wait. Sorry. <br> 6 SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: You can answer. <br> 7 A. Thank you. <br> 8 In the context of the High-Level Commission <br> 9 under my responsibility, first, I didn't have any <br> 10 knowledge of the question of lesividad until that <br> 11 meeting; and, second, it wasn't my instruction nor my <br> 12 way of negotiating to have--to be pressuring or to <br> 13 anticipating or conditioning aspects of negotiation <br> 14 based on one issue, and that wasn't my instruction. <br> 15 It wasn't how I had intended to go about the <br> 16 negotiation. <br> 17 Q. Now, sir, you say that you didn't know until <br> 18 that point, meaning the May $11, ~ 2006, ~ m e e t i n g ; ~ i s ~ t h a t ~$ <br> 19 correct? <br> 20 A. That is correct. <br> 21 Q. How did you find out-- <br> 22 SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: If you would like, you | 09:11:43 $1 \quad$ Q. Do you know, sir, what was Ferrovías's <br> 2 reaction to that offer and statement from Commissioner <br> 3 Fernández at that point? <br> A. Could you explain the question a bit further. <br> Q. How did Ferrovías react to Commissioner <br> Fernández's offer to put the lesivo process on hold so that negotiations could continue? <br> 8 A. Well, it was some time ago that we had this <br> 9 meeting, but first, obviously, there was an issue <br> 10 having to do with having learned that there was a <br> 11 lesividad process, but I would suppose that in the <br> 12 face of our offer there was at least some degree of <br> 13 appreciation that we at the High-Level Commission <br> 14 wanted to have clear and constructive negotiations. <br> 15 Q. Sir, after the High-Level Commission ceased <br> 16 its work, did you have occasion to again become <br> 17 involved somehow with the Ferrovías issue? <br> 18 A. Yes. In effect, in due course, the local <br> 19 partners of Ferrovías, I understand, asked for a <br> 20 study; and, when that study had results, I was asked <br> 21 to attend a presentation of them. <br> 22 . When you say "locality partners, " sir, do you |


| 09:13:16 1 know who asked for that study? <br> A. My understanding is that it was Cementos Progreso. <br> Q. And with regards to that study, sir, you say that you were given a presentation. Do you recall what the import of that presentation was? <br> A. Mesoamerica, which is the consulting firm that made that presentation, made a review, particularly the economic and financial considerations of rail operations, and finally made some suggestions about how one could render operations viable in those terms; that is to say, economic and financial terms. <br> But those economic and financial <br> considerations were based on premises that were quite weak or, in any event, that required additional efforts from the State, be it fiscal or efforts or subsidy. As I say, financial premises that really were not consistent with reality. <br> Q. Sir, do you know why Cementos Progreso asked for that study to be done? <br> 21 A. I would assume that it was to get more <br> 22 objective information on how to actually make rail | 09:16:07 1 whether rail operations would actually be viable or 2 profitable. <br> Q. Apologies that I take you back in time now that we've gone forward, but did you, while you were at the High-Level Commission, have occasion to discuss with Ferrovías their outlook--outlook of investment and profitability and request information of that sort and what was the result of those interactions? <br> A. Yes, the issue of the Ferrovías data was something that we sought out so as to be able to establish properly and technically what the realistic ways of rehabilitating rail operations would be. But in the course of the meetings, at least the ones that I chaired, the high-level meetings, we never had an opportunity to see those figures or those cash flows or other elements that might make it possible to establish an operational plan or a business plan that would be viable in the future. <br> Q. Sir, do you recall what the conclusion of that Mesoamerica Report was? <br> 21 A. In brief, Mesoamerica suggested that 22 financially, economically, what might be--what might |
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| 09:15:03 1 operations viable-- <br> 2 Mr. STERN: He's stating testimony based on 3 assumption, not based on personal knowledge. It's not competent testimony. <br> 5 MR. SALivas-SERRaivo: If he knows. That was 6 the question. <br> 7 <br> MR. STERN: If he knows, but he should not be assuming. <br> $9 \quad$ IR. SALiNAS-SERRANO: I believe counsel's <br> 10 objection is to the Witness's answer, not my question. <br> 11 PRESIDENT RIGO: Answer the question to the extent that you know. <br> By MR. SALivas-SERRanO: <br> Q. Mr. Marroquin, did you have occasion to speak <br> to anyone at Cementos Progreso about why they <br> commissioned this study? <br> A. Yes, I did have an opportunity to speak with them in due course, yes. <br> Q. And what did they tell you about why they commissioned that study? <br> A. Because they had an interest, as I say, in 22 coming up with an objective reference to establish | PAGE 1922 <br> 09:17:45 1 make rail operations viable would be either subsidized <br> 2 interest rates or physical efforts on the part of the <br> 3 Government in different forms. Those would be the two main conclusions. <br> 5 Consequently, there were certain conditioning <br> factors that were not very realistic from making rail operations viable. <br> 8 MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: Mr. President, I have 9 no further questions. <br> 10 PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you. <br> 11 Mr. Stern. <br> 12 MR. STERN: Thank you, Mr. President. <br> CROSS-EXAMINATION <br> BY MR. STERN: <br> Q. Good morning, Mr. Marroquin. <br> A. Good morning. <br> Q. I believe we talked to each other the last <br> time you were here last year. <br> A. Yes, I remember. <br> Q. Now, you were asked by your counsel on direct 21 examination questions about the Mesoamerica study, and 22 this study was conducted by Mesoamerica after the |

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| 09:18:41 1 Government had published the Lesivo Declaration; <br> 2 correct? <br> 3 A. I understand that that is the case. <br> 4 Q. So, it's fair to say that the conclusions of <br> 5 the study that you testified about could not have been <br> 6 a basis for the Declaration of the lesividad; correct? <br> 7 A. Could you repeat the question, please. <br> 8 Q. Sure. <br> 9 The conclusions of the Mesoamerica study--the <br> 10 study was conducted after the Declaration of <br> Lesividad; correct? <br> A. That's right. <br> Q. As a matter of logic, the Mesoamerica studies <br> conclusions could not have been a basis for the <br> Declaration of Lesividad that was issued in August of 2006; correct? <br> A. I would assume that that's the case. <br> Q. And as you testified, this study was not <br> conducted at the request of Ferrovías, but at the <br> request of Cementos Progreso; correct? <br> A. I would understand that it was asked for by Cementos Progreso as part of its partnership with | 09:21:02 $1 \quad$ Q. Okay. And at this meeting the <br> 2 representatives of Mesoamerica, according to your <br> 3 statement, gave an hour and a half PowerPoint <br> presentation on its study? <br> A. It was--the time more or less that, yes, that's right. <br> Q. And they gave a PowerPoint presentation; correct? <br> A. Yes, in effect they did give a PowerPoint presentation. <br> Q. Okay. And just to be clear, this presentation that you saw, this PowerPoint presentation occurred over five years ago; right? <br> A. Yes, November of 2006, five years. <br> Q. And there were no members--representatives of Ferrovías at this presentation; correct? <br> A. I imagine that in terms of Ferrovías, administrative counterparts at the higher level Commission, no. <br> Q. Well, my question was a little simpler--my question was simple or straightforward. <br> 22 Were there any representatives from Ferrovías |
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| 09:19:49 1 Ferrovías. <br> 2 Q. Did you speak with anyone from Ferrovías to 3 tell you that they had asked for Mesoamerica to 4 conduct this study? <br> A. With my apologies to the panel, but if <br> Cementos was a partner of Ferrovías, then I assumed <br> 7 that if I were speaking with Cementos, I was also <br> 8 speaking with Ferrovías. <br> 9 Q. But did you ever ask anyone from Ferrovías <br> 10 that they had asked for Cementos Progreso to request <br> 11 this study? <br> 12 A. Just to be clear on the question, the <br> 13 question is whether I had any awareness that Ferrovías <br> 14 was in agreement with Cementos Progreso in asking for <br> 15 the study. That, I don't know because I was invited <br> 16 in a meeting to establish the technical solidity of <br> 17 the results of Mesoamerica's work, but I don't know <br> 18 what else might have happened. <br> 19 Q. Okay. And so you went to this meeting with <br> 20 other Government officials sometime in November 2006 <br> 21 to see the presentation on the Mesoamerica study? <br> 22 A. That is correct. | PAGE 1926 <br> 09:22:16 1 present at the November 2006 meeting that you went to? <br> A. Not that I recall. <br> Q. Now, you were never provided a copy with of the Mesoamerica study? <br> SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: Excuse me, could he repeat the answer, please. <br> 7 THE WITNESS: Not that I recall. <br> 8 BY MR. STERN: <br> 9 Q. Let me repeat my next question. You were <br> 10 never provided a copy of the Mesoamerica study; <br> correct? <br> A. That is correct. <br> Q. And you weren't provided with a copy of the PowerPoint presentation that you saw on--in November 2006; correct? <br> A. Not personally. It wasn't given to me. <br> Q. And, in fact, isn't it true that you've never seen the actual written Mesoamerica study? <br> A. That is correct. <br> Q. What you have seen with regard to the Mesoamerica study is the PowerPoint presentation you 22 saw five years ago; correct? |

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| 09:23:27 1 A. Yes, it is correct. <br> Q. And do you know for a fact whether there actually is a written Mesoamerica study? <br> A. For a fact, yes, I do know, in fact, that there is a written Mesoamerica study. <br> Q. And the basis for that is because you saw the PowerPoint presentation; correct? <br> A. No. The basis of knowing that there is such a study is that in effect the counterparts of Cementos Progreso assert this or indicate this. <br> Q. So--but you have never actually seen the document that is the Mesoamerica study; correct? <br> A. I believe I already said that. I did not see the Report. <br> MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: I object to the <br> continued line because it's been asked and answered at least four times now. <br> BY MR. STERN: <br> Q. Okay. Now in your Second Statement you state that--and this is Paragraph 7 of your Second <br> 21 Statement--you state that, "Despite the fact I do not 22 have the study handy at this time, I perfectly | 09:26:00 1 the costs, neither the operating or the financial costs. <br> Q. Well, in terms of how many years are you referring to here? What was your understanding of how many years were not profitable, based on the study? <br> A. I don't understand the question. <br> Q. Well, you said the railroad was not profitable. <br> SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: Excuse me, can you <br> repeat again the answer, please. <br> THE WITNESS: Yes. <br> I did not understand or I don't understand the question. <br> BY MR. STERN: <br> Q. I'm trying to draw down on what you meant by "not profitable" in your statement. When you said, "not profitable," are you referring to the operations of the railway to date are not profitable or that the railway was not going to be profitable at any time over the remaining 42 years of the Usufruct? <br> 21 MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: Just to clarify, the 22 witness has testified about what the presentation of |
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| 09:24:37 1 remember that the conclusion of the study was that the Guatemalan railway was simply not profitable in the way Ferrovías planned to operate it." <br> Do you recall saying that in your second Statement? It's up there on the screen there. <br> A. Yes, I do remember having said this, and I remember that that was the conclusion that I reached from that presentation. <br> Do I need to repeat it? <br> Q. No. <br> Now, by "not profitable," the words you use <br> in your statement, are you talking about accounting <br> profits for Ferrovías? <br> A. An operation that is not profitable, not <br> viable, is an operation in general that's not viable. <br> But if you want a specification, perhaps you could <br> repeat the question in terms of just so that I can be clear on just what your specific doubt is. <br> Q. Well, I'm trying to understand what you mean by--what you meant by "not profitable" in your statement. Profitable in terms of what? <br> 22 A. That there wasn't sufficient revenue to cover | 09:26:58 1 the Mesoamerica Report was about, not what his opinion 2 on the profitability of the enterprise was. I just <br> 3 want to make sure that the record is clear. Because 4 counsel keeps saying when you say "not profitable," 5 did you mean over 42 years of the Usufruct--I just 6 want to make that clear. <br> 7 THE WITNESS: Based on what Mesoamerica <br> 8 presented, the railway was not profitable as of the <br> 9 date of operation, and it was likely that it was not <br> 10 going to be profitable unless the Government made the <br> 11 fiscal sacrifices or unless there was a subsidized <br> 12 financial rate in order to make it profitable, whether it's five, 10 , or 20 years. <br> I'm not a financial expert. I've worked in <br> 15 finance. I've worked in investment projects, and <br> 16 that's why I'm clear that if you don't have a <br> 17 subsidized rate, if there is not a physical effort on <br> 18 the Government, then there wasn't going to be <br> 19 profitability of the operation in the future, and <br> 20 certainly there wasn't profitability in terms of how <br> 21 it was being offered at that time, based on what I was 22 able to see and conclude. |

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| 09:28:20 1 <br> 2 Q. Now, I want to focus on, in your seventh <br> 3 paragraph, your Second Statement, you wrote that the <br> 4 conclusion--"I remember that the conclusion of the <br> 5 study was that in the manner as Ferrovías planned to <br> 6 operate the railway in Guatemala, the railroad was <br> simply not profitable." <br> Is it your understanding that the Mesoamerica <br> study only focused on the railway operations of the <br> Usufruct when they were referring to in the manner as <br> Ferrovías planned to operate the railway? <br> A. Could you repeat the question, please, so I <br> can be sure that I give you an appropriate answer. <br> Q. Sure. <br> In the manner as Ferrovías planned to operate <br> the railway--those words that you used in your <br> statement there--what was your understanding as to <br> what that was referring to? Was it referring to the <br> operation of the railway? <br> 20 A. In effect, we had a mandate to make rail <br> 21 operations viable, and I focused my attention on that. <br> 22 Q. And you don't know whether the Mesoamerica | 09:31:01 1 presented in its presentation. It based itself on a <br> 2 number of premises, and it reached a number of <br> 3 conclusions. It is a financial and technical study. <br> Q. Sitting here today, can you tell us what <br> those assumptions and inputs were in the Mesoamerica study? <br> 7 A. I don't know if you would like a full list, <br> 8 but as I said, I saw the study and I looked at it only <br> 9 in general terms; and the premises and the conjectures <br> 10 in which Mesoamerica included, I wouldn't be able to <br> 11 describe. These are things that are a bit more <br> 12 objective. I don't think I would have the possibility <br> 13 of describing them appropriately. <br> 14 Q. You can't describe them appropriately because <br> 15 you don't know, do you, sir, as you sit here today? <br> 16 A. I don't understand the kind of suggestion by <br> 17 you. If you were talking about a premise, for <br> 18 example, to work under a subsidized rate from the <br> 19 financial viewpoint, if by "assumption" or "premise" <br> 20 you are talking about making efforts by the <br> 21 Government, yes, I remember. Those were not so much <br> 22 the premises, but the conclusions of the study as far |
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| 09:29:35 1 study considered how Ferrovías could profit from the 2 real estate component of the Usufruct; correct? <br> 3 A. I couldn't say anything about that. It would be a bit speculative. I don't have any basis to properly make a statement on that issue. Though if the Tribunal would allow me, that was also just what we were trying to establish during the high-level meetings. What were the elements that Ferrovías had in general? That was an important issue, but we were never able to determine it. <br> Q. Now, you had no involvement in the preparation of the Mesoamerica study; correct? <br> A. I did not. <br> Q. And you have no idea of what assumptions or inputs went into the study, do you? <br> 16 A. I wouldn't know how to answer that question. Could you please repeat the question so that I'm able to answer the question more appropriately. <br> Q. Well, did you have any--do you know what assumptions or inputs were put into the Mesoamerica study? <br> 22 A. Of course. The ones that Mesoamerica | 09:32:38 1 as I can remember. <br> Q. Okay, but I'm asking you about not the conclusions which you testified to. I'm just asking you, as you sit here today--excuse me, let me finish the question--as you sit here today, can you tell us what were the assumptions--as you recall, what were the assumptions and inputs into the Mesoamerica study? <br> A. As far as I can remember, there were premises in connection with cargo volume, passengers, and projections of that nature in the business. <br> Q. Anything else you recall? <br> A. No, I would be speculating, and this is what I can say appropriately because that is the basis of the exercise of Mesoamerica, to establish the technical and financial viability of the railroad. <br> Q. Do you know where Mesoamerica obtained information from in order to prepare the study? <br> A. I would not be able to speak appropriately about that. I don't know where they got the information. <br> 21 Q. So, you don't know whether they got any information from Ferrovías; correct? |

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| 09:34:08 1 A. I would not be able to answer that question appropriately. <br> Q. And you don't know whether in the course of preparing the study they spoke to anyone from Ferrovías; correct? <br> Mr. SALiNAS-SERRAIO: Objection. Asked and answered. <br> MR. STRerN: I don't think I asked the question. <br> Mr. SALinias-SERRPAIO: You asked the broader <br> question, which is where they got the information, and he's already told you he doesn't know. <br> MR. STBRN: Right, but my question was <br> whether he spoke to anyone, not whether he got information from them. <br> PRESTDENT RIGO: Please answer the question. <br> THE WITNESS: I would not be able to say that <br> appropriately. <br> BY MR. STERN: <br> Q. Okay. Let's turn to the May 11, 2006, <br> Commission meeting, High-Level Commission meeting which you testified about. | PAGE 1937 <br> 09:36:04 $1 \quad$ Q. Well, sure. <br> In conducting what you describe in your <br> statements in good-faith negotiations with Ferrovías <br> during these meetings, you, as person chairing the meetings, certainly would have thought--you would have preferred to have known in advance of conducting those meetings that there was an ongoing lesividad process against one of Ferrovías's contracts, wouldn't you? <br> A. As a person responsible for High-Level <br> Commission, well, the more information one has the <br> better in order for one to be able to manage the responsibilities that were assigned to one. <br> We had worked for a few months, and we were <br> in this process of collecting information, but to answer your question, yes, it is something that surprised me, and it's something that I would have liked to know at the time, but I was then informed of it at that time. <br> Q. Were you upset about the fact that you hadn't been informed about it prior to the May 11 meeting? <br> A. I was at least surprised. <br> Q. But not upset? |
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| PAGE 1936 <br> As you state in your First Statement, and I <br> believe you stated in response to Mr. Salinas's <br> questions, at the May 11 meeting, that was the first <br> time you learned that there was an ongoing lesividad <br> process against one of Ferrovías's contracts; correct? <br> A. Yes, that's correct. <br> Q. And you were surprised-- <br> SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: Would you repeat the <br> answer. <br> THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. <br> BY MR. STERN: <br> Q. And you were quite surprised when you learned about this at this meeting; correct? <br> A. That is correct. <br> Q. And you were surprised because you as someone who is chairing the meetings on behalf of the Government, this would have been important information for you to know in conducting your discussions and negotiations with Ferrovías, wouldn't it? <br> A. I don't know how to answer your question. <br> Would you please clarify it so that I could give you a more appropriate answer to your question. | PAGE 1938 <br> 09:37:22 1 A. As a person responsible for negotiation, one 2 should not become emotional. One should try and find a solution to the problem. <br> Q. And after you found out about this information from someone from Ferrovías; correct? <br> A. Ferrovías informed me--informed me of this at the table, and then I corroborated all this with Commissioner Fernández, yes, that's the way it was. <br> Q. And when you talked about corroborating with Commissioner Fernández, that was done over the telephone in a private conversation with him; correct? It wasn't at the meeting in general? <br> A. Yes. Susan Pineda came with me. We left the meeting to talk to Commissioner Fernández to verify the information that had been given to us by the counterpart Ferrovías. <br> Q. And then you went to talk to Commissioner Fernández over the telephone to corroborate or confirm what you had learned at the meeting about the lesividad ongoing against one of Ferrovías's contracts; is that right? <br> 22 A. Yes, that is correct. |

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| 09:38:46 1 Q. And Arturo Gramajo was at this meeting; correct? <br> A. That is correct, yes. <br> Q. And when the representatives of Ferrovías <br> disclosed what they had learned about the lesividad <br> process ongoing against one of its contracts, <br> Dr. Gramajo didn't say anything about that at the meeting; correct? <br> A. I do not recall exactly that fact. <br> Q. Well, certainly Dr. Gramajo didn't confirm anything that Ferrovías said about what they had learned at the meeting. You had to go talk to Commissioner Fernández to confirm that; correct? <br> A. Yes. Susan Pineda and I went to confirm this with Commissioner Fernández. <br> 16 Q. Now, after your call with Mr. Fernández, <br> 17 didn't you tell Mr. Bill Duggan of Ferrovías that if <br> 18 what you had heard about the Lesividad Declaration <br> 19 against one of FVG's contracts was going on, then the <br> 20 Government was not--in your opinion, the Government <br> 21 was not negotiating in good faith, and you no longer <br> 22 wanted to be part of the Commission? | 09:41:53 1 those words to Mr. Duggan. <br> 2 Q. Okay, but did you say words to that effect to Mr. Duggan? <br> A. Not to Mr. Duggan. <br> Q. Did you say it to someone else? <br> A. We made comments about the meeting with other people, yes. <br> Q. But my questions were about those specific statements that Mr. Duggan said you made to him. Did you make those types of comments to anyone else? <br> A. I did not make any comments along those <br> lines, and I certainly did not make those comments to Mr. Duggan. <br> Q. Okay. But it's true, is it not, that after the May 11 meeting, according to your statement, you had nothing further to do at the High-Level Commission; correct? <br> A. After the May meeting, yes, indeed, I left the High-Level Commission. <br> 20 Q. And why did you leave the High-Level Commission? <br> 22 A. There were a number of reasons related to the |
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| 09:40:27 1 A. I did not say that in those words. <br> Q. What did you say to Mr. Duggan? <br> A. The official communication was that after the conversation with Mr. Fernández, Commissioner <br> 5 Fernández was going to make sure that he was going to 6 keep on hold lesividad so that our High-Level <br> 7 Commission could continue negotiating. As a <br> consequence, this is what I always suggested and that <br> I stated through a mandate that I was going to <br> 10 negotiate in good faith. And after confirming this <br> 11 with Mr. Fernández, that is to say, that there was a <br> 12 lesividad process that was ongoing, we had to continue <br> 13 upkeeping the negotiation, and Commissioner Fernández <br> 14 at our request was going to try to put that on hold, 15 or try to. <br> 16 Q. Okay. So, if Mr. Duggan testified that you <br> 17 told him after you had your conversation with <br> 18 Mr. Fernández that what you had learned from Ferrovías <br> 19 about lesividad was true, that in your opinion the <br> 20 Government was not negotiating in good faith and that <br> 21 you no longer wanted to be part of the Commission? <br> 22 A. I do not recall having made that comment in | 09:43:04 1 work plans of the Government Plan Presidential <br> 2 Commission. Amongst others at that time, we started <br> working on the task force on country qualification, <br> and I was the person responsible for that. And then <br> there were other issues that required my attention, <br> and there were a number of people involved with the <br> Commission as well, and my value added perhaps was better assigned to other duties. <br> Q. Okay. Now, you are aware, aren't you, that after the May 11 High-Level Commission meeting the next face-to-face negotiation meeting between <br> representatives of the Government and Ferrovías did not take place until August 24, 2006? <br> A. I wouldn't be able to talk with much <br> propriety after May because I was no longer the <br> primary responsible person for that process. <br> Q. And you were not at--and you were not at the August 24, 2006, meeting; correct? <br> A. To the best of my recollection and knowledge, 20 no. <br> 21 Q. And you have no knowledge about what the <br> 22 Government proposed or demanded from Ferrovías at that |

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| 09:44:27 1 meeting with regard to the issues between the Parties? <br> A. I would have no knowledge, nor would I have information about it-- <br> SECRETARY SEQUEIRA: Repeat it, please. <br> THE WITNESS: I would have no knowledge, nor <br> would I have any knowledge about that. <br> 7 <br> MR. STERN: I have no further questions at this time. <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: Mr. Salinas. <br> MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: Very briefly, <br> Mr. President. <br> REDIRECT EXAMINATION <br> BY MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: <br> Q. Mr. Marroquin, Mr. Stern asked you but the <br> May 11, 2006, High-Level Commission meetings. Do you <br> 16 recall those questions? <br> 17 A. Yes, in general I remember. <br> 18 Q. As you told Mr. Stern and as you told me, <br> 19 that you did not have any knowledge about the internal <br> 20 lesivo process that was being pursued at that time <br> 21 until you were informed by representatives of <br> 22 Ferrovías at that meeting; is that correct? | 09:46:50 1 for moving on to different duties within the--I <br> 2 struggled with what the word is, but the <br> 3 Commissioner's office that you worked at at that time, <br> and I just want to ask you straight on, did you move <br> on to other duties because of your opinions as to how <br> the Government proceeded internally to pursue the <br> lesivo process? <br> A. I had to adjust to decisions made by the Commissioner and to Government priorities. And, consequently, I left the High-Level Commission, and this was agreed with the other Commissioners and I became responsible of other duties. <br> Q. Did that have to do with your own opinions about how the lesivo process had been handled? <br> A. My opinion on lesividad was inconsequential. <br> MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: I have no further <br> questions. <br> QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL <br> ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Just a couple of very quick factual questions. <br> (Tribunal conferring.) <br> 22 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: I've just got one |
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| THE WITNESS: I am talking about the figures <br> 2 and the conclusions. I cannot comment about the <br> 3 willingness or attitude of Ferrovías. I was making a <br> 4 comment in connection with the numbers and the <br> 5 conclusions put forth in the Mesoamerica study. <br> 6 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: When you had your <br> 7 conversation on May 11th with Commissioner Fernández, <br> 8 and you learned about the lesividad process, did he <br> 9 tell you the specific reasons why lesividad was being <br> 10 sought, and did he ask you, in your responsibilities <br> 11 with the Commission, to focus on solving those <br> 12 specific problems. <br> 13 THE WITNESS: Commissioner Fernández did not <br> 14 give me many reasons related to the lesividad process, <br> 15 but he was supportive for us to have a constructive <br> 16 negotiation environment, and that is why he tried to <br> 17 put the Declaration on hold. He offered to do it, and <br> 18 that is what we were looking for at the Commission, to <br> 19 have an environment that would allow us to solve the <br> 20 problems that existed. <br> 21 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Did he give you the <br> 22 reasons why the Government was seeking that and ask to | 09:53:12 1 <br> 2 repeat the question so I'm able to answer your <br> question appropriately? <br> ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: If you had known about what the specific defects were that were giving rise to lesivo for the equipment process, Equipment <br> Contract, would that solution have been sufficient to re-establish railroad operations, or would you have also needed to solve the other issues? <br> THE WITNESS: It would not have been enough. <br> It would also have been necessary to address other issues. <br> ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Okay. Thank you. PRESIDENT RIGO: Mr. Salinas? <br> MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: Just one question, <br> Mr. President, on Secretary Eizenstat's last question. <br> FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION <br> BY MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: <br> Q. Mr. Marroquin, what is your understanding of where the or at least some of the concerns you've <br> 21 outlined in Paragraph 8 came from and why they came to 22 the attention of the Commission? |
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| PAGE 1948 09:51:36 1 you solve those? 2 $\quad$ THE WITNESS: Not at that time. | 09:54:21 1 A. These issues were being defined jointly by <br> Ferrovías and by the Government to establish the issues that should be addressed to make viable the operation of the railroad. <br> Q. So, for example, sir, the issue of the squatters, which is Point 2 in your Paragraph 8 and Issue Number 1, which was payments to the Trust Fund, were those payments that were of interest to Ferrovías or to Guatemala? <br> A. Yes, Items 1 and 2 were of the interest of Ferrovías, our counterpart. <br> MR. SALINAS-SERRANO: I have no further questions, Mr. President. <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you. <br> Mr. Stern? <br> MR. STERN: I have no further questions. <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you so much, Señor <br> Marroquin. Mr. Marroquin, thank you very much for being here this morning. <br> 20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. Thank you <br> 21 very much the Secretary for conducting these <br> 22 proceedings and helping with the translation. |

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|  | 10:13:33 1 to the positions of the Parties, and we look forward <br> 2 to your consideration of the evidence that you've 3 heard. <br> 4 I would like to begin by just addressing a <br> 5 few of the Respondent's contentions in their Opening <br> 6 Statement and try to draw your attention to what we <br> 7 believe are the overwhelming facts that refute their <br> 8 contentions. <br> 9 The first contention the Respondent made on <br> 10 its opening PowerPoint Slide Number 2 is that RDC did <br> 11 not keep its promise to invest. Respondent told you <br> 12 that Claimant never fulfilled its promise to invest. <br> 13 Respondent told you that after 13 --that 13 years after <br> 14 Claimant--after the bid was issued and won by RDC, <br> 15 there is no modernized rail system in Guatemala. The <br> 16 facts are starkly different. What Respondent didn't <br> 17 tell you was that as early as 1999, RDC's investment <br> 18 was significant, and the modernization was well under <br> 19 way. In fact, Claimant had invested over $\$ 9.2$ million <br> 20 by the end of 1999 , container traffic increased by <br> 2140.5 percent on average over the years that <br> 22 Respondent--each year, 40.5 percent increase on |
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|  | PAGE 1954 <br> 10:15:01 1 <br> 2 average over each year that Claimant operated the <br> 3 railroad. The first train ran in December of 1999. <br> 4 restored and operated 15 locomotives, 200 railcars, <br> 5 and had restored over 200 miles of previously <br> 6 abandoned railway. <br> 7 The following are some of the images that <br> 8 Respondent doesn't want you to pay attention to. The <br> 9 first, of course, is what this railroad looked like <br> 10 when FVG and RDC came into possession of it. It was <br> 11 literally in ruins. <br> 12 And in contrast, what RDC did was to install <br> 13 new crossties to rehabilitate the railway. The <br> 14 evidence is overwhelming. Hundreds and hundreds and <br> 15 hundreds of crossties. <br> 16 Bridges were restored. <br> 17 Heavy container traffic began. There had <br> 18 never been containers carried by this railroad before. <br> 19 Heavy steel transport began. <br> 20 RDC kept its promise. Now I'd just like to <br> 21 just show you a piece, unfortunately it would take too <br> 22 long to play the whole video, but just a piece of the |

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| 10:16:23 1 video concerning the train ride when Ferrovías had just restored the railroad. <br> (video played.) <br> MR. FOSTER: And I would like to draw your <br> attention to the terrain. RDC of course had <br> experience, of course, in operating precisely in this kind of terrain. <br> 8 You can judge for yourself the condition of the equipment and the condition of the railroad. <br> 10 I think that's Mr. Senn's car that's being transported on the flat car. <br> Does this look like the decrepit, <br> accident-prone railroad that the Respondent tried to <br> tell you was Ferrovías's product? <br> 15 More crossties on the side, more crossties <br> 16 that are being installed. <br> 17 Another restored bridge. Truly an engineering masterpiece. <br> 19 A retaining wall that was installed by 20 Ferrovías. <br> 21 (End of video.) <br> 22 MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Daniel. |  |
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| 10:22:14 1 Phase III was impossible, and, therefore, FVG was 2 excused, official Letter Number 0858a-2003. <br> 3 And as even Dr. Gramajo acknowledged when he <br> 4 testified before you yesterday, these official letters <br> 5 have never been revoked. As a result, they were in <br> 6 full force and effect the day Lesivo was declared. <br> 7 The day Lesivo was declared, FVG was in full <br> 8 compliance with its obligations under these Contracts. <br> 9 Dr. Gramajo, even before his testimony, <br> 10 repeatedly and publicly acknowledged that FVG was in <br> 11 compliance with its restoration obligations. As you <br> 12 see here, Gramajo acknowledges the existence and <br> 13 validity of said notes. That's referring to the <br> 14 letters that affirmed FVG's compliance with the <br> 15 Contract. He didn't like it, but he acknowledged <br> 16 FVG's compliance and never took any steps, as he <br> 17 testified to you, he never took any steps to revoke <br> 18 the letters, nor did he ever write FVG and contend FVG <br> 19 was not in compliance. <br> 20 Now, Respondent's third contention is that <br> 21 Claimant used this case as their golden parachute out <br> 22 of a failed investment. If that was the case, why did | 10:24:49 1 think if you read the press statement carefully, it is 2 our position that we were trying to pressure the <br> 3 Government to revoke the Lesivo Resolution. That was 4 the whole purpose of the press campaign and the legal 5 campaign that took place after the Lesivo Declaration. 6 We wanted--we were doing everything we could to get 7 them to take it back. <br> 8 Here you got an example of Claimant's efforts 9 to convince its suppliers to continue to do business <br> 10 relations with the FVG despite the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 11 The Respondent said these were perfunctory. They <br> 12 certainly weren't perfunctory. There we have the <br> 13 testimony of Mr. Jimenez is exactly what, so--on <br> 14 cross. So, they didn't really try to convince you in <br> 15 a hard way. If they did try to convince you, it was <br> 16 kind of perfunctory, and he said no, no, not at all. <br> 17 Respondent's contention number four. RDC <br> 18 made a risky investment on a bare bones budget. <br> 19 Respondent has told you that Claimant made a very <br> 20 risky investment in 1997 to operate and modernize the <br> 21 railway and that it did so at its own risk and <br> 22 expense. |
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| 10:23:43 1 Claimant try to convince customers and services to <br> 2 continue business relationships? If that was the <br> 3 case, why did Claimant operate regular service until <br> 4 mid 2007 when traffic decreases and financial <br> 5 difficulties forced, all caused by Lesivo, forced the 6 cessation of railroad operations? <br> 7 If that were the case, why did FVG continue <br> 8 to engage Mr. Cerny for bridge inspections after the <br> 9 Lesivo Declaration? <br> 10 If that were the case, why did fVG vigorously <br> 11 fight the Lesivo Declaration in the local Courts? <br> 12 Why did FVG challenge the Respondent in the <br> 13 press to reassure its customers and suppliers and try <br> 14 to influence the Government to rescind the resolution? <br> 15 Why did FVG participate in the negotiation <br> 16 sessions after Lesivo to try to discover and <br> 17 understand the alleged problems with Contracts 143 and <br> 18 158? <br> 19 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Is it your position <br> 20 that your press statement was a reassurance to <br> 21 customers or a dire warning to them? <br> 22 MR. FOSTER: No, it is our position, and I |  |

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| 10:27:25 1 the dialogue for making the large investment that was 2 required. Respondent cannot rely upon its own <br> 3 contractual breaches to argue that FVG was not 4 profitable. <br> 5 The fifth contention that they made, RDC knew 6 the Equipment Contract was illegal. They told you in <br> 7 their Opening Statement. Again, you don't have to 8 accept our word for it. They knew they were entering <br> 9 into an illegal Contract, and public International law <br> 10 tells us one cannot profit from their own misconduct. <br> 11 That's what they told you. <br> 12 But, in fact, FVG entered into Contracts 143 <br> 13 and 158 at FEGUA's request. There's no credible <br> 14 evidence that the time Contract 143 was entered into <br> 15 that FVG understood or believed that the Contract was <br> 16 illegal and void or was ever informed by FEGUA that it <br> 17 considered the Contract to be illegal and void. <br> 18 As Mr. Senn testified, FEGUA's lawyers were <br> 19 intimately involved in drafting both Contracts 143 and <br> 20 158. If you will remember when Dr. Gramajo testified, <br> 21 he was specifically asked, who drafted the Contracts? <br> 22 And I think you asked him, Secretary Eizenstat, and | 10:29:55 1 Contract 402. Look at the exhibits that we've cited 2 here. You will see, and as you just heard this <br> 3 morning, just heard this morning from the Witness, it 4 was a comprehensive deal. He said the contracts were 5 intimately intertwined. We were looking for a total 6 resolution. That's their testimony. <br> 7 Further, as you saw yesterday, when you saw <br> 8 the--Dr. Gramajo's notes on the draft--new contract <br> 9 for 143, his notes didn't have anything to do with <br> 10 obtaining Presidential approval or a new bidding <br> 11 process, and there is no documentary evidence that <br> 12 those notes were ever sent to FVG anyway. <br> 13 Indeed, the negotiations to amend the <br> 14 Contracts to remove so-called "technical <br> 15 irregularities" were a sham. The issues which <br> 16 ultimately prevented agreement had nothing to do with <br> 17 Presidential approval or a new bidding process. <br> 18 Remember Dr. Gramajo's testimony, when I showed him <br> 19 Paragraph 20 from his statement where he sets forth <br> 20 the items that prevented agreement, they were return <br> 21 of historical railway items, cannibalization of <br> 22 railroad equipment, and valuation of inventory. |
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| PAGE 1964 <br> $10: 28: 41$ 1 <br>  his response was "I don't know." Well, the only <br> 2 evidence on that subject is Mr. Senn's evidence, and <br> 3 he testified repeatedly that FEGUA's lawyers were <br> 4 intimately involved in the drafting of the Contract. <br> 5 Furthermore, both Mr. Franco and Dr. Mayora <br> 6 testified that because FeGua is an autonomous entity, <br> 7 Presidential approval and public bids were <br> 8 unnecessary. Why would RDC think there was something <br> 9 wrong with the Contracts when imminent lawyers don't <br> 10 believe that any of the Contracts needed Presidential <br> 11 approval or a public bidd? <br> 12 Any asserted technical illegalities were <br> 13 fully within the exclusive control of the Respondent <br> 14 to resolve. There was never anything really to <br> 15 negotiate. Claimant couldn't remedy the lack of <br> 16 Presidential signature. Claimant couldn't force the <br> 17 Respondent to hold further public bids for the <br> 18 Equipment Usufruct. These were all things within the <br> 19 control of the Respondent. <br> 20 FEGUA's negotiation points all deal with <br> 21 issues other than Presidential approval or a new <br> 22 bidding process and many involved issues under | 10:31:22 1 Nothing having anything to do with the purported 2 technical irregularities of the Contracts. <br> 3 Dr. Gramajo even testified that FEGUA did not <br> 4 pursue a new bidding process because it was afraid <br> 5 that someone other than FVG might win the bid. Do you <br> 6 really believe that? They didn't pursue a new bidding <br> 7 process because the entire issue was just the <br> 8 concocted claim to leverage Contract concessions from 9 FVG. <br> 10 At all times, FEGUA's Legal Department <br> 11 considered Contracts 143 and 158 to be in full force <br> 12 and effect, and Canon payments were made and accepted <br> 13 pursuant to that Contract. You saw yesterday during <br> 14 Dr . Gramajo's testimony, the FEGUA internal legal <br> 15 staff's Opinion where they said, Contract 143 as <br> 16 amended by Contract 158 is currently in effect. <br> 17 And extremely importantly, they said the <br> 18 Contract Number 143 which is currently in effect, it <br> 19 is under the terms of this Contract that the <br> 20 Usufructary is using the railway equipment. Their <br> 21 legal staff considered FVG's use of the railway <br> 22 equipment to be pursuant to Contract 143, which they |

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| 10:32:46 1 now try to tell you was--there was something wrong with it. <br> Furthermore, if you look at that same Legal <br> Opinion, you'll see where it says, FVG has delivered to FEGUA 596,000 quetzales; and, as a result, it renders the Opinion that Ferrovías is up to date for 7 the payment of fees for the use of railway equipment, which as we've just shown they were up to date in payment of fees for use under Contract 143 which their own Legal Department says was in full force and effect. <br> Respondent accepted FVG's performance under the Usufruct Contracts, including resumption of railway service and millions of quetzales in Canon payments without a hint of contention that FVG was in default. Both Mr. Carrillo and Dr. Gramajo testified that they took the Canon payments without reservation, without any hint that they were going to later contend that somehow or another those Contracts had not been in effect. <br> 21 Indeed, Respondent thus is estopped from 22 contending that FVG was in any way deficient in its |  |
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| 10:34:07 1 performance. Indeed, the Tribunal has already ruled, 2 and I quote from Paragraph 145 of your Second Decision 3 on Jurisdiction, where you say: "Who took the <br> 4 initiative to sign a new contract is irrelevant to the <br> 5 Tribunal's conclusion. FEGUA and FVG were faced with <br> 6 a de facto situation which they tried to reflect in <br> 7 Contract 143, and FEGUA benefited from a 25 percent <br> 8 increase in the Canon stipulated in Contract 41." <br> 9 Their contention number six: FVG would have <br> 10 never signed an additional commercial lease during the <br> 11 life of the Usufruct. As you know, when Dr. Spiller <br> 12 was testifying, he responded to Secretary Eizenstat's <br> 13 question: Are you assuming that there would have been <br> 14 no additional easement contracts and no additional <br> 15 commercial leases, and he said right. That's his <br> 16 assumption. Can anyone say that that is a reasonable <br> 17 assumption? I don't think so. And, indeed, the facts <br> 18 are industrial squatting is rampant post-Lesivo. <br> 19 Electricity companies have lined the entire right of <br> 20 way with power lines from coast to coast. To say this <br> 21 right of way is worthless is simply preposterous, and <br> 22 here are the pictures. You've seen these before. I'm | 10:36:50 1 just one second. <br> 2 You asked us, as you can see there's tons of 3 pictures of these power lines. <br> 4 Most of the power lines were installed after <br> 5 Lesivo. Remember Mr. MacSwain's testimony, he said he <br> 6 examined the entire right of way except Tecún Umán in <br> 7 mid-2007, and most of the power lines were not there. <br> 8 The pictures you have just seen were taken from 2009 <br> $g$ to 2011. So, the undisputed--and they offer no <br> 10 testimony to the contrary. Lord knows FEGUA has ample <br> 11 ability to offer contrary testimony. If it was <br> 12 possible to offer truthful contrary testimony, they <br> 13 didn't, because they know they can't. As these <br> 14 pictures prove in connection with Mr. MacSwain's <br> 15 testimony, these power lines went up after Lesivo. <br> 16 Now, you asked the question who are the <br> 17 industrial squatters? As you saw from the pictures, <br> 18 they're DEOCSA and DEORSA, who are subsidiaries of a <br> 19 Spanish company; EEGSA, formerly 100 percent <br> 20 Government-owned, now 14 percent Government-owned; <br> 21 EEMZA, the municipal electricity of Zacapa; and INDE, <br> 22 which is owned by the Government of Guatemala. Thus |

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| 10:38:18 1 the Government, through INDE and its partially owned <br> 2 company EEGSA is the principle industrial squatter. <br> 3 Second question: Can Lesivo be negotiated <br> 4 away? You heard yesterday possibly, from Mr. Mayora, <br> possibly, but not in this particular situation because <br> the Declaration of Lesivo has been predicated on <br> alleged illegalities in the Contract at issue; thus, <br> he concludes that the way in which this Declaration of <br> Lesivo was issued, this particular situation, the <br> possibility of entering into negotiations conducive to <br> a settlement became closed door, was made impossible. <br> And your third question: Can the President <br> be held personally liable for failing to declare <br> Lesivo? Dr. Mayora told you, neither the President <br> nor his Cabinet would be found liable for failing to <br> declare Lesivo because it was a discretionary act, not <br> a mandatory act. <br> 18 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Could I ask a question about that? <br> 20 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir. <br> 21 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: We've heard a great <br> 22 deal about the President's liability. In actual | 10:40:53 1 do business with on an ongoing basis. There was a <br> 2 dramatic decline in the use of the railroad for <br> 3 freight transportation. A 35 percent decline in the <br> first six months of 2007 as compared to the first <br> seven months of 2007 as compared to 2006. <br> 6 Reversal of market share gains versus <br> 7 trucking, withdrawal or denial of credits from suppliers. <br> 9 <br> Failure to be able to secure a single <br> 10 additional lease or easement on our right of way. <br> 11 Prospective commercial tenants consistently cited the <br> 12 Lesivo Resolution as the reason for backing out of <br> 13 negotiations, or Preliminary Agreements with FVG. <br> 14 While the print is roughly difficult to read <br> 15 at the bottom of the page, you will be able to go <br> 16 through and check the testimony to see where each of <br> 17 these elements is amply proven. <br> 18 Theft, vandalism, and squatters dramatically <br> 19 increased after the Government's repudiation of FVG's <br> 20 Usufruct, making it impossible to return to the status <br> 21 quo antsy. Just between the Lesivo Resolution and <br> 22 early 2009, 65 kilometers of rails and track |
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| 10:39:37 1 experience, how often have Guatemalan President's been held to be financially liable for decisions? <br> 3 MR. FOSTER: We're not aware of any ever, for any decision, whether it was Lesivo or any other decision that a Guatemalan President has made. I think some of them have had some more severe consequences for some of the decisions they've made, but liability hasn't been one of them. <br> 9 Now I would like to turn to the elements of proof. <br> 11 As you know from the discussion of the law in <br> 12 our Opening Statement, there is a substantial overlap <br> 13 of the elements of proof as to the specific claims, <br> 14 and here's a chart which depicts our contentions as to <br> 15 the nature of that overlap. Thus for purposes of this <br> 16 Closing, we have therefore organized the evidence <br> 17 around the elements of proof, which you, as a result, <br> 18 can use in your consideration of each of the various <br> 19 claims. <br> 20 The first element of proof is a substantial <br> 21 lasting economic harm to FVG; and, as you heard the <br> 22 evidence, the Lesivo Resolution made FVG too risky to | PAGE 1974 <br> 10:42:11 1 <br> 2 materials, along with cross members of three major <br> 3 bridges, have been stolen. They don't exist anymore. <br> 4 Lesivo Declaration. <br> 5 Furthermore, the Contencioso Administrativo <br> 6 Proceedings that are used by the Government to confirm <br> 7 Lesividad offered no reasonable prospects of a ruling <br> 8 within any reasonable timeframe. of 17 known cases in <br> 9 two decades, only two have ever been decided, one of <br> 10 which was conveniently released just prior to this <br> 11 hearing. <br> 12 In October 2011, you heard Mr. Franco, FVG's <br> 13 lawyer, say he went to Court, and a Court official <br> 14 told him that the Court had been instructed by the <br> 15 Government not to issue a ruling while this <br> 16 arbitration was pending. <br> 17 MR. ORTA: I'm sorry, that misstates the <br> 18 evidence. I've refrained myself, but Mr. Franco never <br> 19 said that there was instruction by the Government. <br> 20 That is simply not in the record. <br> 21 MR. FOSreR: Well, you can check and see <br> 22 whether I've misrepresented. I'm telling you I |

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| PAGE 1975 <br> 1975 <br> 10:43:21 1 haven't. In fact, I think we're going to see the 2 quota another slide, so we'll see exactly what he said. <br> 4 Again, you heard Mr. Jimenez who testified he was the--he was the gentleman who moved the containers from the railroad to the customers. He said he quit doing business. He couldn't take the risk anymore. <br> Mr. Senn described in detail the effect on the business. <br> 10 Second factor or second element of proof, no <br> 11 payment or offer of compensation. There has never <br> 12 been an offer of payment or compensation. And <br> 13 contrary to Respondent's claim, there is no private <br> 14 party right to assert a counterclaim or claim for <br> 15 compensation against the Government in the proceeding <br> 16 to confer the Lesivo Decree. Indeed, the Attorney <br> 17 General acknowledged that the Government used the <br> 18 Lesivo process to avoid paying compensation, and you <br> 19 see the quote from the Attorney General on the next 20 slide. <br> 21 Now, let's talk about the frustration of <br> 22 RDC's legitimate expectations. Certainly, it was a | 10:45:44 1 in effect. Just yesterday, Respondent's Expert said 2 that no less than four FEGUA Overseers were acting <br> 3 illegally. To go to Professor Crawford's point about 4 fraud, surely FDG had the right to believe that they 5 were acting legally, and their actions and the <br> 6 Government's actions in inducing RDC's performance by <br> 7 the expectation of legal action where they now say <br> 8 they're relying on it being illegal must constitute 9 fraud. <br> 10 By accepting performance and payment without <br> 11 protest, Respondent reaffirmed that the Contracts were <br> 12 in effect. The Usufruct had a 50 year term. Surely, <br> 13 RDC was entitled to rely upon the length of the term <br> 14 in establishing and formulating its Business Plan. <br> 15 Now, you got quotations here from senior <br> 16 FEGUA officials admitting that there was nothing weird <br> 17 or wrong about FVG's Contract and that FVG had honored <br> 18 its contractual commitments. <br> 19 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: One gets the certain <br> 20 impression that after six or seven or eight years of <br> 21 operation the railway really wasn't going anywhere. <br> 22 Now, I say that's an impression, and it's not an |
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| 10:44:24 1 legitimate expectation of RDC that the Government <br> 2 structured railroad Usufruct complied with Guatemalan <br> 3 law and had the Government's backing and blessing. I <br> 4 think the Congress promptly approved Contract 402. <br> 5 FVG had won all the necessary public bids. Overseer <br> 6 Porras, as you heard him testify, urged Presidential <br> 7 approval of Contract 41 numerous times. He said, I <br> 8 don't have the faintest idea why he didn't prove it. <br> 9 He's a lawyer and an MBA who negotiated the Usufruct <br> 10 Contracts, and he knew of nothing illegal or harmful <br> 11 to the interests of the State in Contract 41. It met <br> 12 all the negotiation and bid requirements, and that's <br> 13 why, I, myself, he said, submitted to the President to 14 be approved. <br> 15 FEGUA promptly negotiated an agreement, a <br> 16 letter agreement for FVG to have the use of all <br> 17 equipment on terms exactly like Contract 41. FVG and <br> 18 FEGUA negotiated replacement Contracts, and as we have <br> 19 seen FEGUA accepted payments under Contract 143. <br> 20 The FEGUA Overseer had independent Legal <br> 21 Authority to enter into those Contracts, and FEGUA's <br> 22 Legal Department acknowledged that the Contracts were | 10:47:17 1 impression which I've definitively formed at all, but I would be interested in your comment on that. <br> 3 MR. FOSTER: Well, I think the railway was-4 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: If I may say so, it <br> appears to have started well, but doesn't appear to have taken off. <br> 7 MR. FOSTER: Well, indeed, by 2004, the railway, if you include FEGUA's contribution to the Trust, which they should have made, the railroad was 0 cash-flow positive, so I think it's very difficult to 11 say that the railroad wasn't headed in the right direction. <br> Furthermore, the existence of the extension <br> to the Planos y Puntos Right of Way Agreement, which <br> was frustrated at the very last minute by Lesivo, is a further indication that the railway leasing activities were beginning to take off, and now we have the picture of the entire right of way, the demand for that right of way, admittedly the demand may be at least in part because of not having to pay-- <br> 21 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Exactly. <br> 22 MR. FOSTER: But the fact is, Professor |

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| 10:48:23 1 Crawford, when somebody invests millions and millions 2 and millions of dollars in poles and wires, and when 3 that is, as you heard the evidence, that is the most 4 convenient--the best way to get from point to point 5 because it's uninterrupted, they're not going to 6 remove those poles. And when it's the Government 7 whose entities are the principle industrial squatters, 8 for them to come in here and say that somehow they can 9 rely on their not paying rent in order to show that <br> 10 FVG didn't have a bright and promising future? That's <br> 11 just plain wrong. They're neither legally nor morally <br> 12 entitled to come in here and argue because they're not <br> 13 doing what they ought to do, that that's the reason <br> 14 somehow that FVG was not successful. <br> 15 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Let me just follow up <br> 16 on Professor Crawford's questions. <br> 17 From what we've understood the actual profits <br> 18 from the railway operation would have been a <br> 19 relatively minor part of the expected rate of return <br> 20 and that most would have come from the leasing of the <br> 21 rights-of-ways; is that an accurate statement? <br> 22 <br> MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir. | 10:51:00 1 that there was a substantial diversion of FVG away <br> 2 from its focus. Not only on leasing but actually a <br> 3 diversion of its focus even on operating the railroad <br> 4 because of the activities of the Government, and they <br> 5 want to come in here and blame that on FVG. <br> 6 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: There was a period in <br> 7 that middle phase before Lesivo where there was a <br> 8 series of disputes with the Government, but it didn't <br> 9 seem that that had any particular commercial <br> 10 implications in terms of the success of the railway as <br> 11 an enterprise with its relevant elements. Isn't there <br> 12 a concern about that intermediate period? <br> 13 MR. FOSTER: Well, I don't think there should <br> 14 be because despite these diversions, the business was <br> 15 moving steadily to profitability, which it actually <br> 16 attained and would have been profitable again in 2005 <br> 17 if it hadn't been for Hurricane Stan. <br> 18 So, I think what we have here is a business. <br> 19 Railroads are not known for being instant cash cows to <br> 20 start with. I don't think Mr. Buffet bought <br> 21 Burlington Northern Santa Fe counting on the money he <br> 22 was going to get from it the first year he owned it. |
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| PAGE 1980 <br> 10:49:40 1 <br> 2 why did the leasing part seem to get off to such a <br> 3 slow start? That is, one would have thought that from <br> 4 Day 1 there would have been an aggressive effort while <br> 5 you were trying to get the railroad operation going, <br> 6 to get this right of way leased, and it doesn't appear <br> 7 that that started until well into the process. <br> 8 MR. FOSTER: Well, actually, a lot of the <br> 9 leases were early in the process, and I think if you <br> 10 look at the evidence, what you see is--and Professor <br> 11 Crawford alluded to this---there was a very good start, <br> 12 the railroad got operating again, there was some <br> 13 leasing, and then the disputes began to arise that <br> 14 were fomented by Dr. Gramajo. The whole concocted bit <br> 15 about the alleged illegalities of Contracts 143 and <br> 16 158. Then the dispute began to arise over the removal <br> 17 of squatters and payments into the Trust Fund, and <br> 18 then the arbitrations were begun by Ferrovías in order <br> 19 to try to remedy that situation. And then the dispute <br> 20 arises about whether or not they should open the South <br> 21 Coast route. <br> 22 I think the direct answer to your question is |  |

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| 10:53:33 1 that the Lesivo Action was undertaken to uphold the <br> 2 rule of law or for the common good of the citizens <br> 3 through the development and rehabilitation of the <br> 4 railway's transport and use of rail equipment as the <br> 5 standard I think has now been articulated in the most <br> 6 recent Lesivo decision of the Constitutional Court. <br> 7 Moreover, as we have seen, President Berger <br> 8 himself publicly stated that the real intent was to <br> 9 get the $\$ 50$ million to open up the South Coast route. <br> 10 And you heard today Mr. Marroquin testify about the <br> 11 High-Level Railroad Commission, and he said it was to <br> 12 make viable the whole question of the railroad. He <br> 13 conceded that many issues were discussed in the <br> 14 High-Level Commission. He conceded, he said, the <br> 15 Contracts were three. In effect, one was tied to the <br> 16 other. He said the purpose was to make viable rail <br> 17 operations, a lack of rail operations in the entire <br> 18 country. That's what was sought. They wanted a <br> 19 revised rail operations plan. <br> 20 What does any of this have to do with <br> 21 technical illegalities in the Contract? The technical <br> 22 illegalities were never the focus of anything the | PAGE 1985 <br> 10:55:58 1 think this is not an issue you may be able to address 2 here. There was some indication in the documents that <br> 3 there were a number of other countries in Central and <br> 4 Latin America and perhaps in Europe that have <br> 5 something similar to a Lesivo process, and it would be <br> 6 useful, I think, for the Tribunal to know whether in <br> 7 those other countries there were any so-called "due <br> 8 process" built into the Administrative stage as <br> 9 opposed to the subsequent phase with respect to <br> 10 Courts. I don't know whether you can testify to that <br> 11 now or you could perhaps put that as one of the issues <br> 12 that both sides might address. <br> 13 MR. FOSTER: I would love to testify at any 14 time, but-- <br> 15 <br> MR. ORTA: So long as I can cross-examine, <br> 16 Allen. <br> 17 MR. FOSTER: That's a deal. <br> 18 The one that I remember, and it's been a long <br> 19 time since I've looked at them, but the one that I <br> 20 remember and I believe I'm remembering accurately is <br> 21 the Spanish Lesivo process, and my recollection is on <br> 22 two respects I remember two things that I think |
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| PAGE 1984 <br> $10: 54: 48$ 1 <br> 2 Government did. They were always trying to achieve <br> 3 another objective which they had not achieved through <br> 4 ARBITract negotiations. <br> 5 were technical illegality? <br> 6 MR. FOSTER: Sir? <br> 7 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Do you accept there <br> 8 were technical illegalities? <br> 9 MR. FOSTER: No, sir. No, sir. We do not <br> 10 believe, and as Dr. Mayora testified that there never <br> 11 was a requirement for a public bidding on Contracts <br> 12 143 and 158, and there was no requirement for <br> 13 Presidential approval of any of the Contracts, ever. <br> 14 Then we turn to a denial of due process. We <br> 15 talked about this a lot. I'm not going to go back <br> 16 through it in detail. You know what the lack of due <br> 17 process in the Lesivo proceeding is. There is not <br> 18 even a semblance of anything like due process as it is <br> 19 understood in the major legal systems of the world, <br> 20 and I believe that that is the standard for due <br> 21 process under customary International law. <br> 22 ARBITRATOR EIzENSTAT: Excuse me, although I | PAGE 1986 <br> 10:57:10 1 <br> 2 distinguish it completely from the Guatemalan system. <br> 3 Number one, there is a procedure for hearings <br> 4 there is a provision for compensation. I think there <br> 5 are undoubtedly other things as well, but you're <br> 6 right, Secretary Eizenstat, it would be more <br> 7 appropriate for us to address that issue not on my <br> 8 memory but on the basis of citations to the Statute. <br> 9 Now here is the quotation from Mr. Franco <br> 10 that there was some question about earlier. He says, <br> 11 yes, yes, oh, yes, yes, yes, the thing is that--this <br> 12 is quoting the Court proceeding--the Court Official. <br> 13 Yes, yes, yes, the thing is, as regards to that <br> 14 proceeding--on that proceeding, there is International <br> 15 arbitration. <br> 16 And then Mr. Franco said, yes, that's <br> 17 correct, but the International arbitration has <br> 18 absolutely nothing to do, nor does it stand in the way <br> 19 at all of there being a ruling and a judgment in this <br> 20 proceeding. <br> 21 and then the Court official said, yes, but <br> 22 that's the instruction we have. |

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| PAGE 1987 <br> 10:58:26 1 <br> 2 expect the Tribunal to give to an unidentified <br> 3 Official who we have no basis to know was speaking on <br> 4 behalf of anyone other than himself? <br> 5 MR. FOSTER: Mr. Franco named the person who <br> 6 is a Court Official. Apparently he's the one who was <br> 7 in charge of this particular proceeding. <br> 8 And in conjunction with the fact that the <br> 9 Government says, oh well we've asked for a decision <br> 10 twice. It's been five years, they had six months <br> 11 under the Statute to, if you add up all the time <br> 12 periods under the Statute, they had six months to <br> 13 render an Opinion, and it's been five years. I would <br> 14 certainly ask the Tribunal to draw the inference, and <br> 15 I think it's a good inference particularly in <br> 16 consideration of this evidence, the inference that the <br> 17 decision is merely awaiting the resolution of this <br> 18 case. And then I can--I think I can predict pretty <br> 19 confidently you'll have it. <br> 20 Now, I would like to turn to the National <br> 21 Treatment issue, the three-prong test. The first of <br> 22 course is the like circumstance, and we'd offered | 11:01:08 1 Mr. Campollo. I would just ask you to read the <br> 2 timeline that we give you in the Opening Statement but <br> 3 did not have an opportunity to look at in detail. <br> 4 Read the timeline and see if you can come to any <br> 5 conclusion other than the fact that Mr. Pinto was, in <br> 6 fact, acting on behalf of Mr. Campollo, that <br> 7 Mr . Campollo not only wanted to compete in the same <br> 8 sector as FVG, Mr. Campollo wanted FVG's concession, <br> 9 direct competition. <br> 10 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: May I just ask again <br> 11 in terms of understanding your contention here, if in <br> 12 order for this issue to be relevant of whether Pinto <br> 13 was acting for Campollo, which Campollo said he was <br> 14 not, Pinto, of course, is not alive, do we first have <br> 15 to make a judgment that they were in effect in a like <br> 16 circumstance, that they were actually potential <br> 17 competitors--competition with each other? That is to <br> 18 say, if we don't make that finding, then is any of the <br> 19 Campollo issue relevant? <br> 20 MR. FOSTER: I think it's 180 degrees the <br> 21 other way. You make the determination whether or not <br> 22 they're in the same sector in part upon your decision |
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| 10:59:47 1 evidence that Mr. Campollo operates in the same <br> 2 business or economic sector as FVG; that is, railroads <br> 3 and real estate. You heard about his railroad. It <br> 4 hauls more tonnage than Ferrovías ever did. <br> 5 Mr. Berger admitted, Mr. Campollo, by means of Héctor <br> 6 Pinto, had a series of meetings with Ferrovías staff <br> 7 in order to reach an agreement to exploit the right of <br> 8 the railway with the view to support his ciudad del <br> 9 Sur project. And Mr. Campollo himself acknowledged <br> 10 that his interest in the railway was based in <br> 11 principle part on the benefits it would bring to his 12 project. <br> 13 The Desarrollos G offer, and I would ask you <br> 14 to infer if Mr. Berger admits that Mr. Campollo by <br> 15 means of Héctor Pinto had a series of meetings, I <br> 16 would ask you to infer that when he presented--when <br> 17 Mr. Pinto presented the Desarrollos $G$ offer, he was <br> 18 acting again on behalf of Mr. Pinto, and you saw that <br> 19 the cover e-mail for that offer sends a copy of it to <br> 20 the son of Mr. Campollo's personal lawyer. <br> 21 Now, I'm not going to go over--through all <br> 22 these things that Mr. Pinto said and did on behalf of | PAGE 1990 <br> $11: 02: 26$ 1 <br> 2 as to whether pinto's statements are attributable to <br> 2 Campollo. But even without those statements, you can <br> 3 still come to the conclusion that they were in the <br> 4 same business from the undisputed proof about <br> 5 Mr. Campollo's railroad and the undisputed proof about <br> 6 his Ciudad del Sur real estate development. <br> 7 ARBITrafor eIzevsram: But I mean, on the <br> 8 raillroad, this was in another country, which was not <br> 9 in direct competition with RVG. It was apparently a <br> 10 very small line, and it didn't appear to be a <br> 11 principle part of Mr. Campollo's business, where as <br> 12 for RVG this was their main business. How do you <br> 13 respond to that? <br> 14 MR. FOSTER: They don't have to be direct <br> 15 competitors to begin with. They have to just merely <br> 16 be--the test is that they have to be engaged in the <br> 17 same economic segment, and I don't think it makes any <br> 18 difference whether--what country they're in in the <br> 19 economic segment because what we are saying is that <br> 20 here is a person who was in the same economic segment <br> 21 and who was seeking to obtain RDC's Usufruct. <br> 22 So, I think that you can come--as I say, I |

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| 11:03:46 1 think you can come to that conclusion without relying 2 upon what Mr. Pinto said, but I think it is easier for you if you do connect what his statements to Mr. Campollo. <br> Now, the second prong of the test is that the intended discriminatory effect was substantially to deprive RDC of its expected economic benefits under the Usufruct. Certainly the take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer required FVG to surrender unrestored railway sections in which other investors may be <br> 11 interested. We, of course, contend that that's a code 12 phrase for Ramon Campollo. And, indeed, Ramon <br> 13 Campollo was the only interested investor in the South <br> 14 Coast corridor who was identified by a Government <br> 15 Official in the March 2006 meeting with the President. <br> 16 That evidence is, of course, they say that it never <br> 17 happened, but the simple fact is that Mr. Posner has <br> 18 contemporaneous notes before he ever had a clue that <br> 19 this arbitration was going to ensue. He's got <br> 20 contemporaneous notes that say that Mr. Campollo was <br> 21 identified as the other investor at that meeting. <br> 22 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: If the purpose was to | 11:06:28 1 going to be direct evidence because the butler is not 2 going to confess that he did the murder. <br> 3 The Government has never identified any other 4 interested investor. Who were they talking about? <br> 5 Why didn't they come to you and say, oh, yeah, when we <br> 6 said other interested investors, we were talking about <br> 7 Smith and Jones. We weren't talking about Campollo. <br> 8 And here are Smith and Jones who are going to tell you <br> 9 that they were interested. But they haven't done <br> 10 that, and the reason they haven't done it is because <br> 11 the other interested investor was Ramon Campollo. <br> 12 The third factor is, and I believe you've <br> 13 already answered this one in your Second Opinion on <br> 14 jurisdiction, when you concluded the Respondent used <br> 15 the Lesivo process as an element of pressure to <br> 16 achieve other results which were unrelated to the <br> 17 Lesividad Declaration, that confirms that there's no <br> 18 nexus between the issuance of the Resolution targeting <br> 19 FVG and rational public policy. <br> 20 Now, we've got some slides in here concerning <br> 21 some of the evidence about Mr. Campollo's railroad and <br> 22 how it's similar to FVG's. I'm not going to go |
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| 11:05:09 1 give this railroad to Mr . Campollo, and we're now in 2 2011, you've left in 2007, would one not assume that 3 that might already have happened? <br> 4 MR. FOSTER: I wouldn't. If I were advising <br> 5 the Government of Guatemala, I would tell them that <br> 6 the last thing on earth they should ever do is to <br> 7 prove the other side's case by giving the railroad to <br> 8 Campollo until after this is over. <br> 9 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Didn't seem to be too <br> 10 particularly interested in the highway. <br> 11 MR. FOSTER: That's what he said, and what <br> 12 would you expect him to say? Would you really expect <br> 13 him to come in here and say, oh, yeah, I wanted to <br> 14 take over the railroad. I was conspiring with <br> 15 President Berger the entire time to do it. <br> 16 No, this is obviously not a case in which <br> 17 there's ever going to be any direct evidence. About <br> 18 but as we know circumstantial evidence is just as <br> 19 valuable in proving a fact as direct evidence is. The <br> 20 issue is whether or not you credit it, and you may <br> 21 say, well, it's easier to credit the direct evidence, <br> 22 but the simple fact of the matter is there's not ever | PAGE 1994 <br> 11:07:47 1 through it with you, but as Mr. Duggan said, when it looks like a duck and it walks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, it's a duck. <br> Now, the next factor is arbitrariness falling <br> below International standards. You've heard repeatedly from the Witnesses that no one can explain to this day why Contract 41 was not signed by the Executive. No one can. And, indeed, Overseer Porras said it could have been signed by any President. It wasn't necessary that it be signed by the President in office at the time. And if you remember the exchange, he went through all the Presidents since that time, he left out President Berger, and I had to remind him that--would President Berger have been able to do it, and he said yes, absolutely. President Berger could have solved this entire problem. All he had to do was sign the Contract, and it's over. <br> 18 And there are lots of other points here <br> 19 concerning arbitrariness that falls far below <br> 20 International standards. <br> 21 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: I believe that your <br> 22 Expert Witness himself, Mr. Mayora, when we asked that |

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| 11:09:08 1 question yesterday, may have said that he thought that 2 under the circumstances the President may not have 3 been able to sign 143 and 158. <br> 4 <br> MR. FOSTER: I believe he was saying--I <br> 5 believe he was saying, if what I understand about his <br> 6 testimony--I wasn't here, but it's been described to <br> 7 me. I believe what he was saying was that he didn't <br> 8 think it was necessary. It's clearly his opinion that <br> 9 Presidential approval is not necessary for these <br> 10 Contracts. I think that's what he was referring to <br> 11 yesterday. <br> 12 There is a large number of items here that we <br> 13 would like to draw your attention to about <br> 14 arbitrariness, falling below International standards, <br> 15 and the record, in documents, statements, and opinions <br> 16 and hearing testimony is replete with the proof of <br> 17 those elements. <br> 18 And as you know, even Mr. Aitkenhead agreed <br> 19 with regard to some of these, as Arbitrator Eizenstat <br> 20 asked him, you're saying you were seeking a global <br> 21 agreement on the five different items in the minutes. <br> 22 That was the goal. And he said, the ultimate purpose | 11:12:03 1 squatters, the industrial squatters, came after 2 Lesivo. And, indeed, FEGUA's Chief engineer, <br> 3 Mr. Samayoa, admitted that the influx of squatters increased after the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 5 Now, let's turn briefly-- <br> 6 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Excuse me, are you <br> 7 contending that this alleged failure to provide full <br> 8 protection and security existed before Lesivo or only <br> 9 after? <br> 10 MR. FOSTER: Well, I think we are limited in <br> 11 this proceeding to contending that it existed <br> 12 afterwards, but if you look at the chart that I showed <br> 13 you in Opening Statement of the actions of the <br> 14 Government, you can see that they took virtually no <br> 15 actions whatsoever during--between the time that we <br> 16 got the concession and the time of Lesivo. But we're <br> 17 not arguing that that inaction during that period of 18 time is a violation of CAFTA. <br> 19 What we are arguing, however, is that the <br> 20 Government cannot come in here and tell you that FVG <br> 21 was unprofitable when one of the reasons or a large <br> 22 portion of the reasons that FVG was not having as |
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| 11:10:31 1 was that, although we could have had intermediate objectives. <br> Now, turning to bad faith, again, we've got a <br> large number of items here with a lot of evidentiary <br> support behind them. We believe that you've seen <br> amply demonstrated to you that throughout the goal of <br> the Government was to renegotiate the terms not to fix <br> the illegalities. They were not proceeding in good faith. <br> 10 Let's turn briefly to failure to provide full <br> 11 protection and security. You saw that there has been <br> 12 a sharp rise in squatters, theft, and vandalism after <br> Lesivo, whereas the Respondent's efforts were directed <br> merely at identification and documentation of third <br> party interference with FVG's rights. I showed you in <br> our Opening Statement the pie charts of the difference <br> in quality of the actions that they took before FVG <br> got the concession when they were concentrating on <br> indictments and criminal prosecutions versus after <br> Lesivo when it was paper-pushing. <br> 21 Again, Mr. MacSwain's evidence <br> 22 concerning--it's set forth in detail here, that the | 11:13:19 1 great a profit as it could have was its failure to pay <br> 2 into the Trust Fund and its failure to remove <br> 3 squatters which caused all sorts of operational <br> 4 problems. That they can't do. <br> 5 Now, we talked a lot in the Opening Statement <br> 6 about the need for a full reparation standard, which <br> 7 includes, we argue, it includes both the recovery of <br> 8 sunk costs and lost profits. Mr. Spiller admitted <br> 9 when he testified before you that the result of his <br> 10 methodology would be to assign the exact same amount <br> 11 of damages for a legal act or an illegal act. There's <br> 12 no distinction in the way that his damage methodology <br> 13 operates. <br> 14 There are many examples which we cited to <br> 15 you--I won't go through them again--in the literature <br> 16 and in the cases, in which both sunk costs and lost <br> 17 profits are recoverable. <br> 18 Now, I would like to turn to the proof of <br> 19 lost investment. <br> 20 Now, Dr. Spiller remembered, he conceded that <br> 21 the net cash contribution method, which is essentially <br> 22 recovery of sunk costs, is appropriate when the |

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| 11:14:46 1 expropriation takes place in close proximity to the 2 investment. I didn't put the citation on this slide. <br> 3 If you would like to make a notation of it, that's in <br> 4 the First Spiller Report at Paragraph 75. Not 74, as 5 noted on the slide. That's a typo. <br> 6 Dr. Spiller admitted when he testified before <br> 7 you that RDC was still making investments, that it had <br> 8 made investments throughout the entire period both <br> 9 before and after Lesivo. He admitted that before he <br> 10 saw where my questions were going. Then he proceeded <br> 11 in some of his--I actually out of curiosity had <br> 12 someone count them, he managed to get out over 7,000 <br> 13 words in a little over an hour. I think that's bound <br> 14 to be a record for testimony. <br> 15 In any event, Claimant's proof of sunk costs <br> 16 remains un-rebutted in these proceedings. The <br> 17 Respondent has not--they've contested our entitlement <br> 18 to sunk costs, but they have not either through <br> 19 cross-examination or Expert Witness contested the <br> 20 numbers that make up our sunk costs. They didn't even <br> 21 want to cross-examine Mr. Hensler and Mr. de Leon who <br> 22 presented the evidence of sunk costs, and that | Then a company that had been a substantial <br> 2 investment with an operating history and reasonably <br> 3 expected future profit, he said that's worth the same <br> 4 thing as the other one. It makes no sense whatsoever <br> 5 how three businesses in totally different <br> 6 circumstances can be worth exactly the same thing to <br> 7 Dr. Spiller. <br> 8 Now, Respondent found it astonishing, they <br> 9 told us, that Claimant's Experts believed rail <br> 10 revenues were going to increase. Well, what's really <br> 11 astonishing is that FVG attained container compound <br> 12 growth rate of 40.5 percent per year on average from <br> 13 the time they started carrying traffic. <br> 14 Real estate income, we contend, we already <br> 15 talked a little bit about this. We contend it would <br> 16 have increased dramatically without Lesivo because of <br> 17 the number and extent of electric utilities alone <br> 18 which used the right of way, and we've got some charts <br> 19 on that. And when you consider this, please consider <br> 20 the testimony you've just heard from Mr. Marroquin <br> 21 that the Mesoamerica Study upon which the Respondent <br> 22 relies so extensively didn't even consider real estate |
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| 11:16:07 1 evidence was that the sunk costs are approximately <br> 2 \$19 million plus another $\$ 1,350,000$ in shutdown costs. <br> 3 You know that when you operate the model on the <br> 4 Weighted Average Cost of Capital and you bring those <br> 5 sunk costs to the value--to their value at the end of <br> 6 2006, they come to $\$ 42.9$ million in sunk costs. <br> 7 And, of course, the Respondent does contest <br> 8 the WACC number, but as we discussed before, you will <br> 9 be able to manipulate that model yourself. If you <br> 10 don't like it the way it is, you can come to your own <br> 11 number for WACC and put it into Mr. Thompson's model. <br> 12 Now, turning to the future profits, it was <br> 13 notable that when Dr. Spiller testified he would <br> 14 accord the same value to a company in which there had <br> 15 been no investment but which had reasonably expected <br> 16 future profits--I give you an example of a McDonald's <br> 17 franchise for that--no investment at all, and he says, <br> 18 okay, it's worth X. Then he says, a company where <br> 19 there had been a substantial investment but with no <br> 20 operating history but reasonably respectable future <br> 21 profits, it's just worth X also, even though they made <br> 22 a huge investment. | 11:18:47 1 income. <br> 2 Now, you've got two charts here, one of which shows the existing rentals and projected right of way leases versus commercial leases. The next chart merely adds in one other factor, and that adds in the income from Tecún Umán so that you can see how it affects the slope there. <br> Dr. Spiller asserts that because FVG had experienced losses, there can be no certain proof of <br> 10 future profits. Well, I would just ask you to <br> 11 consider from your own knowledge of the business--of <br> 12 the business environment, the number of companies that <br> 13 there are, who make enormous investments and show <br> 14 operating losses for a considerable period of time, <br> 15 and then literally shoot into dramatic profitability. <br> 16 I'm not going to go through the Weighted <br> 17 Average Cost of Capital computations again. You saw <br> 18 those before. I'll just give you a summary. Remember <br> 19 the argument over the-- <br> 20 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Just to go back, can <br> 21 you -- <br> 22 MR. FOSTER: Yes, sir. |

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| 11:25:23 1 obligated to complete. Starting a business costs 2 money, and winding it down costs money, and it costs <br> 31.35 million to respond this one down. <br> 4 On pre-judgment interest, that's I think <br> 5 going to be an interest of law for you as to whether <br> 6 or not it should be compounded or not. We believe <br> 7 that the current authorities are overwhelming that <br> 8 pre-judgment interest should be compounded. One issue <br> 9 is what the rate should be. One of your alternatives <br> 10 is to consider looking at the sunk costs. This has <br> 11 been a forced loan, a coerced loan to Guatemala, and <br> 12 that Guatemala should, therefore, pay the 9.34 percent <br> 13 that is allocable to the times when Guatemala borrows <br> 14 money. <br> 15 That, then, brings us to some options that <br> 16 you have before you. The first is to award sunk costs <br> 17 plus lost profits minus amortization, and then minus <br> 18 mitigation. That would bring you to $63,778,000$. <br> 19 The second option is to award lost profits <br> 20 without sunk costs, and that lost profits of <br> 2130 million minus mitigation would bring you to <br> 22 27,361,000. | 11:28:28 1 of collecting its money. <br> 2 Now, finally, just as a last comment, I would <br> 3 like to recall to you something that Mr. Thompson <br> 4 said. Here Mr. Thompson is one of the world's <br> 5 foremost Experts on railroads in developing countries, <br> 6 and he said he had never seen anything like what <br> 7 happened here, and he said that he certainly would not <br> 8 have advised the Govermment to do what they did <br> 9 because it ultimately was so self-destructive. <br> 10 And really, that's what we come down to here. <br> 11 Governments who take--who do arbitrary things for <br> 12 reasons that are not related to public good, you <br> 13 cannot encourage that kind of behavior when you're <br> 14 dealing with International investments, and we would <br> 15 urge--we would urge that your Award should recognize <br> 16 the fact that the purpose--the principle purpose of <br> 17 CAFTA is to encourage investment by the part of <br> 18 foreign nationals into the economies of these <br> 19 countries, and that the only way that that purpose can <br> 20 ever be fulfilled is that the countries which receive <br> 21 those investments must comply with the terms of CAFTA. <br> 22 Thank you very much. |
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| PAGE 2008 <br> 11:26:50 1 <br> 2 the same position as if the investment had not been <br> 3 made, and that is an investment of 19 million brought <br> 4 up to current value by 12.9 percent wacC plus <br> 5 wind-down costs minus mitigation, that brings you to <br> 6 \$41, $589,000$. <br> 7 Another potential, a variant on option number <br> 8 three is to use, instead of using the wacC of <br> 9 12.9 percent to use the coerced loan theory at <br> 10 9.34 percent, which would bring you to \$33 million. I <br> 11 would point out to you, however, that if you were to <br> 12 choose the coerced loan theory, that I would submit <br> 13 that you must award legal costs and expenses. Because <br> 14 the only way that you remedy a coerced loan in order <br> 15 to recover their coerced loan, RDC had to hire lawyers <br> 16 and spend money. So, an essential part of the coerced <br> 17 loan theory is the recovery of costs and expenses. <br> 18 Regardless of that, however, we ask <br> 19 you--regardless of which way you go, we ask you to <br> 20 award RDC its costs and attorneys' fees in this case <br> 21 because, as a matter of justice, this is a case in <br> 22 which the Claimant should not have to bear its costs | PAGE 2010 <br> 11:29:55 1 <br> 2 apologize. I promised you that I was going to tell <br> 3 you how to operate Mr. Thompson's model so that you <br> 4 would be able to do that, and I'm not going to <br> 5 describe it to you, but there is--the last slide in <br> 6 the presentation are the operating instructions for <br> 7 Mr. Thompson's model. <br> 8 Thank you, sir. <br> 9 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: The Claimant has <br> 10 subsisting interests in Guatemala? <br> 11 MR. FOSTER: I'm sorry? <br> 12 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: The Claimant has <br> 13 subsisting interests in Guatemala? <br> 14 MR. FOSTER: Well, they have a presence there <br> 15 at the present time, yes. <br> 16 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: The interests of <br> 17 collecting rent, for example? <br> 18 MR. FOSTER: Yes. <br> 19 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: What do you propose is <br> 20 to be done in relations to those interests? <br> 21 MR. FOSTER: Your Award would have to include <br> 22 that fact that--if your Award were complete |

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| 11:30:48 1 compensation to the Claimant, then obviously the <br> 2 Claimant would have to turn those over to the Government. <br> ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Thank you. <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you, Mr. Foster. <br> We will have literally five minutes' break <br> before we have the next closing statements. <br> (Brief recess.) <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: We are going to continue our <br> 10 morning session. <br> Mr. Orta for the Respondent. <br> CLOSING ARGUMENT BY COONSEL FOR RESPONDENT <br> MR. ORTA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would <br> like to start off also by thanking the Members of the <br> 15 Tribunal, the Secretary of the Tribunal, the ICSID <br> 16 staff, and all of the folks who have worked to put <br> 17 this hearing together. I'd like to thank opposing <br> 18 counsel, and we have gone down a long road in this <br> 19 case that started back in 2007, when Claimant filed <br> 20 their Notice of Intent to Arbitrate and eventually <br> 21 their Request for Arbitration. <br> 22 To put us in context, you might recall that | 11:42:14 1 witnesses that there is a local proceeding pending in 2 relation to the Declaration of Lesividad, and you've also heard that there are local arbitrations pending regarding many of the issues that have been complained about here, and the Tribunal ruled early on in this case that those issues pending in the local arbitrations were outside the bounds of its jurisdiction in this case, given the terms of CAFTA. 9 At the end of the day, it's our contention <br> 10 that the appropriate conclusion for this Tribunal to <br> 11 reach is that there has been no violation by Guatemala <br> 12 of its undertakings with respect to CAFTA, and the <br> 13 issues between the Parties can and should be resolved 14 locally. <br> 15 Now, when we started this hearing, we <br> 16 mentioned that there were basically two issues that we <br> 17 believed that this Tribunal needed to decide. The <br> 18 first is whether Guatemala violated its CAFTA <br> 19 undertakings when it applied the lesivo law, which the <br> 20 evidence shows has been part of Guatemalan law for <br> 21 over a hundred years, to declare the Usufruct <br> 22 Equipment Contract lesivo. In the face of the |
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| 11:40:33 1 in the opening I started off with a series of points 2 about what this case is really about, and here we're 3 boiling it down even to its more basic form. <br> 4 In 1997, Claimant, through their local <br> 5 enterprise, participated in a bid to modernize and <br> 6 restore the Guatemalan railway. I think the evidence <br> 7 demonstrates that they didn't have sufficient capital, <br> 8 and their projections in terms of demand, in terms of <br> 9 funding sources were optimistic and turned out to be <br> 10 completely off the mark, so things didn't work out <br> 11 between the Parties. <br> 12 Now, as you're going to hear in a second, <br> 13 none of the actions that have been signaled by <br> 14 Claimant in relation to conduct by Guatemala <br> 15 constitute actions that would substantiate any of the <br> 16 Treaty claims that they are asserting in this case. <br> 17 There simply have been no Treaty violations proven. <br> 18 We think the hard evidence proves that, and we hope <br> 19 that throughout the course of this case and the eight <br> 20 or nine days of hearings that we have had that the <br> 21 evidence has borne that out for the Tribunal. <br> 22 Now, you've heard some testimony from various | PAGE 2014  <br> $11: 43: 48$ 1 <br> 2 decision that President Berger made and given all of <br> 2 the circumstances associated with that decision when <br> 3 it was taken, that's what we believe this Tribunal is <br> 4 being asked to answer. Because, after all, when <br> 5 Claimant framed their case, they claimed it based on <br> 6 the issuance of the Lesivo Declaration and the <br> 7 consequences thereof. That's how they framed their <br> 8 case to this Tribunal. <br> 9 Looked at in context, we also contend that <br> 10 what is in essence really happening here is that the <br> 11 Tribunal is being asked to shift to Guatemala the <br> 12 responsibility for Claimant's failed and risky <br> 13 business venture. And we say that because we believe <br> 14 the evidence shows that Claimants, in fact, did enter <br> 15 into a very risky business venture, and that business <br> 16 venture failed long before the Lesivo Declaration was <br> 17 issued. <br> 18 And we further believe that the evidence <br> 19 demonstrates that when carfa went into effect and the <br> 20 Lesivo Declaration was issued, Claimant immediately <br> 21 seized upon that as its exit strategy from a failed <br> 22 venture in Guatemala. |

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| PAGE 2015 <br> 2015 <br> 11:45:16 1 <br> Now, I would like to start where I think the <br> 2 Tribunal will be focusing a good portion of its time <br> 3 when it deliberates in this case, and that is the <br> 4 Lesivo Declaration and whether the actions taken by <br> 5 Guatemala in relation to the issuance of the Lesivo <br> 6 Declaration violate Guatemala's undertakings under <br> 7 CAFTA, and I want to remind the Tribunal it is our <br> 8 contention that this Tribunal need not decide whether <br> 9 the Lesivo Declaration was properly issued under <br> 10 Guatemalan law. That issue is before the <br> 11 Administrative Court in Guatemala. <br> 12 Now, looking at the actions that were taken <br> 13 by the Government, we know that between April 2004 and <br> 14 June 2005, the Parties undertook negotiations in <br> 15 relation to the possible amendment or undertaking of a <br> 16 new Equipment Contract because very shortly after <br> 17 Dr. Gramajo took over as the Overseer of FEGUA, he <br> 18 notified Claimant through FVG that the Contract <br> 19 suffered--the Equipment Contract, the one at issue <br> 20 here, suffered from legal defects. And we know that <br> 21 because there has been testimony to that effect from <br> 22 Dr. Gramajo. There have been Draft Agreements shared | PAGE 2017 <br> MR. ORTA: I think that's correct. I think <br> 2 that's correct. The only point we're making, and I <br> 3 think this goes to the first aspect of your <br> 4 observation, Professor Crawford, is that you need not get there in the sense that the conduct that is at 6 issue can, we believe, demonstrate that Guatemala did not violate fair and equitable treatment standard or any other of the claims that are at issue here. <br> (Comment off microphone.) <br> MR. ORTA: Yes, sir. <br> Now, in relation to the timeline, in or <br> 12 around June 2005, actually dating back even a little <br> 13 bit earlier into April of 2005, we know that at that <br> 14 point negotiations between the parties had not <br> 15 prospered, and both sides in essence began considering 16 what legal options they had in relation to some of the <br> 17 problems that they were--that they had between each <br> 18 other. We know, for example, that Ferrovías began <br> 19 planning their local arbitrations. We have seen <br> 20 e-mail exchanges. They were part of the record in <br> 21 this case. Witnesses were questioned about them where <br> 22 Ferrovías's witnesses said that they were launching |
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| 11:46:47 1 with the Tribunal. They're a part of evidence, $R$ - 50 , $2 \mathrm{R}-51$. And there are e-mail exchanges between the 3 Parties in relation to those Draft Agreements, and I 4 think both sides admit that there were negotiations 5 going on, but that those negotiations ultimately did 6 not prosper. Now-- <br> 7 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Before you move on, you said the Tribunal need not decide whether the Contract 9 is lesivo, but you accept that we could decide that; is that right? <br> 11 <br> MR. ORTA: Well, it's our contention that <br> that issue--in other words, whether it's actually <br> lesivo under Guatemalan law is not really relevant to <br> the undertakings of determining whether Guatemala <br> violated its CAFTA obligations. <br> 16 ARBITRATOR CRANFORD: I mean, certainly, as <br> you say, it would be possible to decide the case without deciding it, but if we were to decide that the President was entitled as a matter of Guatemalan law to declare the Contract lesivo, that would surely have a considerable relevance to a fair and equitable 22 treatment claim. | 11:49:17 1 their attack against FEGUA. This is a direct 2 statement made by Mr. Senn in one of his e-mails in 3 April of 2005. And that attack was the local 4 arbitrations that they were filing in relation to the 5 issue of squatters and Trust Fund payments that this 6 Tribunal is well aware of. <br> 7 Now, Dr. Gramajo has testified both through 8 his oral testimony before you and through his Witness 9 Declarations that in April 2005, recognizing that the 10 Parties had reached an impasse in relation to trying 11 to resolve the legal defects associated with contract 12143 and 158 , he began making inguiries to first the 13 Legal Department within the Ministry of <br> 14 Communications--that's the Ministry to whom the 15 railway agency responds--and eventually consulting 16 with outside counsel, the Attorney General of 17 Guatemala. And all of that led him to receive a 18 number of very consistent opinions from these legal 19 advisers, including from the highest Legal Authority 20 for the State in Guatemala that the Contract at issue 21 had a number of important legal infirmities. <br> 22 And time and time again Claimant likes to |

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| 11:50:47 1 call them legal technicalities, but I think if we're 2 being fair, these are much more than legal <br> 3 technicalities. Whether or not the Contract should <br> 4 have been put to a public bid is not a technicality. <br> 5 Public Contracting Laws are very important for <br> 6 Governments, especially developing Nations, and <br> 7 upholding those contracting laws is not a matter of 8 just a mere technicality. <br> 9 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Wasn't that the <br> 10 Government's responsibility to do? I mean, if this <br> 11 was something that was important, why didn't they do 12 that? <br> 13 MR. ORTA: Well, Secretary Eizenstat, in <br> 14 relation to the execution of Contract 143 and 158 , we <br> 15 don't know why the Overseer of FEGUA at the time did <br> 16 not celebrate a public bid. We don't know why he <br> 17 chose--and this is of record--you have the declaration <br> 18 of Mr. Mario Cifuentes, who was his legal adviser at <br> 19 the time within FEGUA. We don't know why he chose to <br> 20 ignore has legal advisors' advice and sign an <br> 21 agreement that did not comport with Guatemalan law. <br> 22 Now, I want to be fair. His legal adviser at | 11:53:27 1 those Bidding Terms into the Contract when those <br> 2 Bidding Terms say that a bid is required and when <br> 3 those Bidding Terms say that Executive approval is <br> 4 required, and then to unilaterally write into the <br> 5 Contract out--to write out in the Contract the <br> 6 requirement for Executive approval. That's the main <br> 7 defect that was immediately spotted by both of those <br> 8 legal advisers. <br> $9 \quad$ Once Dr. Gramajo elevates this to outside <br> 10 counsel and the Attorney General's office, that's when <br> 11 he is first informed about the public bidding <br> 12 requirement from outside legal advisers, the fact that <br> 13 that had not happened. <br> 14 So, earlier on, the record will establish he <br> 15 wasn't told that. <br> 16 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: But didn't Ferrovías <br> 17 have a right to rely on the signature of an Overseer <br> 18 to the contracts under which it was operating and the <br> 19 fact that pursuant to that the Government was <br> 20 accepting or FEGUA was accepting Canon fees? I mean, <br> 21 isn't there a reliance issue here that needs to be <br> 22 addressed? |
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| 11:52:04 1 the time did not say him a public bid was necessary. <br> 2 He did say Executive approval was necessary, and I <br> 3 think when you examine the documentation, you will see <br> 4 in the record that the initial reaction to this <br> 5 Contract, both from the legal adviser to Mr. Sarceno <br> 6 before he entered into the Contract and when the legal <br> 7 team that was advising Dr. Gramajo after he entered in <br> 8 as the Overseer, when they analyzed the Contract, <br> 9 neither of them initially recognized that a public bid <br> 10 was necessary. Rather, they both took issue with the <br> 11 fact that in the original Bidding Terms for Contract <br> 12 41, there was a necessity for there to be a public <br> 13 bid. It was a requirement of the Bidding Terms, and <br> 14 we believe the contracting law requires it because <br> 15 when you're giving state assets to a third party for <br> 16 their use, the contracting law requires that a bid <br> 17 take place. <br> 18 Now, in relation to the issue of <br> 19 incorporating those Bidding Terms into Contract 143 <br> 20 and 158, both the adviser for Mr. Sarceno and the <br> 21 legal team for Dr. Gramajo immediately recognized that <br> 22 it was a violation of Guatemalan law to incorporate | PAGE 2022 <br> $11: 54: 40$ 1 <br> 2 later in the slides, but just to directly address your <br> 3 questions, Secretary Eizenstat, the answer is that we <br> 4 believe reliance under international law, public <br> 5 international law, has to be reasonable, and one <br> 6 cannot rely upon their own misconduct in asserting a <br> 7 claim under carfa, and here we believe the evidence <br> 8 demonstrates amply that at the time that Ferrovias was <br> 9 executing or entering into the Contract 143 and 158, <br> 10 they knew full well that Executive approval was <br> 11 required. Why did they know that? Because the <br> 12 Bidding Terms for Contract 141 required it. Their <br> 13 letters to overseers throughout the years acknowledged <br> 14 that Contract 41 never went into effect because they <br> 15 didn't have that Executive approval. And yet, <br> 16 notwithstanding that they incorporate the very same <br> 17 Bidding Terms which require Executive approval in the <br> 18 Contract 143, they say in the Contract that that <br> 19 Executive approval is not going to be required. <br> 20 Now, admittedly, Overseer Sarceno overstepped <br> 21 his bounds. He should not have done that, and we've <br> 22 heard that here, but the point in response to your |

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| 11:56:00 1 question is that Ferrovías understood that was not in <br> 2 compliance with Guatemalan law, and they cannot <br> 3 reasonably rely upon the acquiescence by the FEGUA <br> 4 Overseer at that time when they, themselves, knew that <br> 5 that was not in compliance with Guatemalan law. <br> 6 That's our contention. <br> 7 And in relation to the issue of the <br> 8 Acceptance of payments, you heard from Dr. Gramajo <br> 9 that from his perspective, the payments were being <br> 10 accepted by FEGUA pursuant to the letter <br> 11 authorizations. <br> 12 Again, even if you were to accept that fegua <br> 13 was, after the execution of Contract 143 and 158, <br> 14 accepting payments pursuant to that contract, which <br> 15 they-which FEGUA itself had told Ferrovías was not in <br> 16 compliance with the law, Ferrovías--FVG cannot be <br> 17 excused based on that because again they, themselves, <br> 18 knew that they were making payments, even if it's <br> 19 pursuant to the Contract, pursuant to a contract that <br> 20 they, themselves, knew was not in compliance with <br> 21 Guatemalan law at the time they entered into it. <br> 22 And we've cited the principle in our system, | 11:58:45 1 that. Between January and April of 2006, they asked 2 the Ministry of Public Finance, which we heard is the 3 Ministry dealing with public contracting, they had three separate advisers that looked into--three separate legal advisers within that Ministry that looked into the question of whether the contracts were lesivo, and with what we believe is, you know, a good amount of consistency between the other opinions, notwithstanding that they were conducted <br> 10 independently--and the record evidence is that these <br> 11 determinations by these various different officials <br> 12 were conducted independently, and that's unrebutted in <br> 13 this case, reached the Opinion that Contract 143 and <br> 14158 was lesivo, to the interests of the State. Those <br> 15 opinions get transmitted back to the legal advisers <br> 16 for President Berger. They conduct their own <br> 17 independent analysis. <br> 18 And at the end of the day what we have are <br> 19 nine separate independent legal opinions that are put <br> 20 before President Berger, telling him that these <br> 21 contracts suffer from important fundamental legal <br> 22 defects under Guatemalan law, and telling him that he |
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| 11:57:17 1 the doctrine of unclean hands. There is a similar <br> 2 principle in public international law, and they can't <br> 3 benefit from that misconduct, if you want to say it <br> 4 that way, or from their knowing that they were doing <br> 5 something that was not in compliance with Guatemalan <br> 6 law, and they cannot invoke that here to excuse their <br> 7 conduct in entering into an agreement that they knew <br> 8 was not in compliance with the law. <br> 9 Now, going back to the issue of the <br> 10 reasonableness of the decision made by President <br> 11 Berger to issue the Declaration, we know that in <br> 12 January of 2006 President Berger receives a letter <br> 13 from Dr. Gramajo in which Dr. Gramajo cites a number <br> 14 of grounds as to why he understood the Contract was <br> 15 lesivo to the interests of the State, and he asks the <br> 16 President to consider making that Declaration. <br> 17 Now, the evidence shows that the President <br> 18 didn't seize upon this letter and immediately sign a <br> 19 declaration, immediately instruct anyone to sign a <br> 20 declaration, or instruct anyone to do anything other <br> 21 than have his legal team look into the question that <br> 22 was posed by Dr. Gramajo. And his legal team did | 12:00:07 1 should issue the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 2 Now, again, there is no dispute that these <br> 3 opinions were all based on technical-legal analyses by <br> 4 these different public officials. <br> 5 We also know, and this is undisputed, that <br> 6 President Berger was counseled that in light of this <br> 7 Contract containing these illegalities, that not only <br> 8 should he declare the Contract lesivo, but if he <br> 9 failed to do so, he would incur personal liability <br> 10 himself. Now, there has been much questioning from <br> 11 the experts as to whether, in fact, President Berger, <br> 12 under Guatemalan law, would be subject to personal <br> 13 liability. We believe the answer is yes. We <br> 14 understand you've heard two different Opinions from <br> 15 Guatemalan Law Experts on that, and we've cited you to <br> 16 the law. We would remit you to the Articles 153 <br> 17 through 155 of the Guatemalan Constitution and the <br> 18 other sources of law cited by Professor Aguilar, <br> 19 Mr. Aguilar. <br> 20 But I think the real inquiry here again is <br> 21 was it reasonable for the President to make the <br> 22 assumption that he was going to be subject to personal |

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| 12:06:42 1 is that when actual offers to sit down and negotiate 2 and negotiate the issue of Contract 143 and 158 were 3 put before FVG, what we know is they weren't able to 4 reach agreement in the April 2004-2005 time frame when 5 that was the only issue that was being discussed, that 6 contract. <br> 7 And we further know that when the Claimants <br> 8 are confronted with a request to negotiate that issue, <br> 9 if you look at C-44, and I ask you to look at that <br> 10 document carefully, that is the settlement proposal <br> 11 that was put before Mr. Senn on 24 August 2006, the <br> 12 day before the Lesivo Declaration was published. The <br> 13 evidence, I think, is unrebutted that while that <br> 14 agreement dealt with a number of issues, there is <br> 15 nothing in that agreement that said you have to settle <br> 16 all of them or we won't settle any one of them. <br> 17 And the other thing is that when you look on <br> 18 the face of the Agreement as to each and every point, <br> 19 including the issue of Contract 143 and 158, what the <br> 20 Government was offering was to sit and negotiate a way <br> 21 out of the problems. There are no demands made in <br> 22 that document. Every one of the subpoints in the | 12:09:25 1 with the issue of the Equipment Contract, Mr. Senn <br> 2 said to the Government officials that issue is of <br> 3 secondary priority because the main point here, which <br> is trying to see if there is a way to rehabilitate the <br> Phase $I I$, is a standard gauge railway in which they wouldn't be able to use the rail equipment. <br> 7 In response to your other question, Secretary <br> 8 Eizenstat, the testimony from Dr. Aguilar is that <br> 9 there was a way to settle, that the Government could <br> 10 settle. What he said was you couldn't cure Contract <br> 11143 itself because that suffered from illegalities. <br> 12 But you could enter into a settlement whereby you <br> 13 entered into a separate new Equipment Contract, which <br> 14 is what was being proposed in $\mathrm{C}-44$ and in the <br> 15 negotiations that are exhibited in R-36 and R-37. So, <br> 16 you could reach a settlement, and that would involve <br> 17 potentially a new public bid and a new Equipment <br> 18 Contract that didn't suffer from legal defects. <br> 19 Now, let's look at the issues of the supposed <br> 20 motivations for the issuance of the Lesivo Declaration <br> 21 as contended by RDC in this case. First of all, you <br> 22 know, they've said from the beginning of this case and |
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| 12:08:05 1 documents say "points to be discussed or negotiated," <br> 2 and that evidences that the Government was willing to <br> 3 sit down and negotiate those points, and there is <br> 4 nothing that the document that says you have to <br> 5 negotiate them all or you will not be able to <br> 6 negotiate away the issues with respect to the Lesivo <br> 7 Declaration. <br> 8 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Just enlighten me on <br> 9 one last point. Did we not hear that, in a sense, <br> 10 from both experts that there was virtually no way to <br> 11 remedy the defects, particularly with respect to the <br> 12 Presidential approval? Once you identified it, it <br> 13 couldn't be remedied. Is that what the record shows? <br> 14 MR. ORTA: I don't believe so, but if I could <br> 15 just make one minor point closing out on the prior <br> 16 question, which is, in relation to that proposal, $\mathrm{C}-44$ <br> 17 that was put forth to Mr. Senn, the evidence is <br> 18 unrebutted that he didn't really study it. He made no <br> 19 counterproposals, and he said he had no authority to <br> 20 negotiate any of the points in there on the day before <br> 21 lesivo was published. And that even lesivo, R-37 <br> 22 proves this point. Even after lesivo, when confronted | 12:10:52 1 they continue to maintain it today, that the <br> 2 Government was looking to benefit Mr. Ramon Campollo <br> 3 and that that was the real motivation in issuing the <br> 4 Lesivo Declaration. With all respect, we believe the 5 evidence on this is clear, and that is, there is 6 absolutely no evidence to support this allegation. 7 None. You heard directly from Mr. Campollo. He said he had no interest in the railway, never expressed an 9 interest in the railway, never made any threats. To <br> 10 the extent Mr. Pinto said anything that could have <br> 11 been perceived by the other side as threats, he never <br> 12 authorized him to do that, and we know that as of <br> 13 April 15, 2005, a letter was sent directly to Claimant <br> 14 by Mr.--to FVG, I should say, by Mr. Campollo saying <br> 15 he had no interest in the railway project. There is <br> 16 no evidence of any communications between the <br> 17 Government and Mr. Campollo or anyone on his behalf or <br> 18 Mr. Campollo or anyone on his behalf with the <br> 19 Government in relation to the allegation that he <br> 20 wanted to take the railway Usufruct, and last of all, <br> 21 we know as we sit here today, Mr. Campollo has no <br> 22 rights in the Usufruct at all. |

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| PAGE 2035 <br> $12: 12: 14$ 1 <br> 2 going to get into this in a little bit more detail <br> 3 again, this is based on a number of things that are <br> 4 really just press reports and nothing more. <br> 5 And lastly, on the issue of the use of the <br> 6 Lesivo Declaration to force Claimants to renegotiate, <br> 7 I believe I just dealt with that in response to <br> 8 questions from Secretary Eizenstat. And again, we <br> 9 will deal with it in a little bit more detail. <br> 10 Claimants, again, in order to make their <br> 11 carfa claim, attempt to assert in this case that their <br> 12 investment was profitable. The evidence shows just <br> 13 the opposite, and that Guatemala took away their <br> 14 entire investment, and again I think the evidence <br> 15 shows just the opposite. <br> 16 In assessing the case, I think it's important <br> 17 that you assess the quality of the evidence that's <br> 18 been presented to you in this case by Claimant. Most <br> 19 of it is hearsay evidence, what somebody believes they <br> 20 heard from somebody else or from somebody else, and <br> 21 all of the hearsay evidence is, in essence, being <br> 22 purported by Claimant's representatives or their | 12:14:41 1 take our words for it. It's Mr. Duggan telling you 2 this. R-322. <br> 3 On the issue of Campollo, again, what I would 4 like to stress here--and this is, I believe, <br> 5 important--I think I've already said what the lack of 6 evidence is, but I would like to remit you to the <br> 7 direct evidence because you heard Mr. Foster say in <br> 8 response to a question from Professor Crawford that <br> 9 the question is whether you want to credit the <br> 10 evidence that they have put forward and whether you <br> 11 want to credit the inferential or circumstantial leaps <br> 12 that they would like for you to make based on that <br> 13 evidence. And I submit to you that if you look at the <br> 14 documents that we have put before you--and these are <br> 15 mostly all documents that they have submitted in this <br> 16 Case, communications between Mr. Pinto and Mr. Posner <br> 17 or Mr. Senn, look at them in chronological order. <br> 18 We've put them for you here in chronological order. <br> 19 And what you're going to see when you study <br> 20 them, one by one in chronological order, is that <br> 21 Mr. Pinto wasn't making any threats to take their <br> 22 railway. Mr. Pinto, even if you assume he was acting |
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| 12:13:25 1 lawyers. <br> 2 Huge inferential leaps, we hear words like <br> 3 sugar and private investor, and we're being <br> 4 asked--you're being asked to interpret that to mean <br> 5 Mr. Ramon Campollo. You are being asked to conclude <br> 6 that it's clear that that means Ramon Campollo. We <br> 7 submit that's not the case, and most of their evidence <br> 8 comes from newspaper clippings. <br> 9 Now, Claimant has talked about their success <br> 10 and how that should evidence what they would have done <br> 11 here if they would have been allowed to carry out <br> 12 their investment, and Mr. Foster, in his opening and <br> 13 again today talked about a number of other operations <br> 14 that RDC had and said, you know, you should assume <br> 15 that the success, to the extent there was success in <br> 16 these other rail ventures, was going to be replicated <br> 17 here. <br> 18 But what was left out--and this is in <br> 19 document R-322--is that Mr. Duggan has admitted that, <br> 20 as a matter of fact, they had never, ever implemented <br> 21 a project like this before. They had never, ever <br> 22 tried to revive an abandoned railway. Again, don't | 12:15:53 1 on behalf of Mr. Campollo, which we say to you the 2 evidence does not allow you to make that leap, even if 3 you make that assumption, you will see that what, in 4 essence, was going on is that Mr. Pinto was inquiring 5 as to whether there would be rail service provided by 6 FVG to the southern coast, and he was asking for <br> 7 quotes for sugar transport to see whether that might be viable for--whether that might be viable. <br> 9 And again, when you look at the evidence, <br> 10 read the e-mails that they have provided in context, <br> 11 you're going to see that Mr. Posner, himself, responds <br> 12 to an e-mail from Mr. Pinto on 3 August 2006, just <br> 13 before the Lesivo Declaration, and he tells Mr. Pinto <br> 14 that he's anticipating positive results for everyone <br> 15 in relation to the possible rail transport to the <br> 16 south. Positive results for everyone. <br> 17 The other communications, again, demonstrate <br> 18 a request about the possibility of FVG providing <br> 19 transport services to the south, not Mr. Campollo <br> 20 wanting to take the railway, not any insistence on the 21 Desarrollos G proposal. <br> 22 And I think it's important that you look at |

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| PAGE 2039 <br> 2039 <br> 12:17:10 1 this and judge the quality of the evidence that's <br> 2 being put before you. The Desarrollos $G$ proposal <br> 3 itself, which is--which has been talked about in this <br> 4 case, take a look at that proposal and take a look at <br> 5 C-44, which is the settlement proposal. Those are the <br> 6 two main documents that they ask you to look at when <br> 7 they say there have been threat allegations. The <br> 8 Desarrollos $G$ proposal is merely that: A proposal, <br> 9 and nothing more. Again, Mr. Campollo said he had <br> 10 nothing to do with it. But even if you believed he <br> 11 had something to do with it, it is a proposal and <br> 12 nothing more. And the evidence shows that Mr. Pinto <br> 13 asked for a counterproposal to which FVG decided not <br> 14 to provide. You heard they didn't provide one. <br> 15 Mr . Senn told you that. <br> 16 So, there is simply nothing to their <br> 17 allegations about Mr. Campollo. It's a complete <br> 18 nonevent in this case, but I will tell you it is their <br> 19 featured claim of conspiracy and of discriminatory <br> 20 intent in relation to the Lesivo Declaration, and it <br> 21 completely falls on its face when you look at the <br> 22 evidence. | PAGE 2041 <br> 12:19:41  <br> 1 So, in conclusion, on the issue of <br> 2 Mr. Campollo, there is--really, we submit it's a <br> 3 nonissue in this case. There is no evidence to <br> 4 support it. <br> 5 $\quad$ On the issue of the 50 million-dollar <br> 6 threat--okay, this is another issue that's been put <br> 7 before you, and they claim President Berger demanded <br> 8 \$50 million or else he would proceed with the Lesivo <br> 9 Declaration--demanded \$50 million or else he would <br> 10 proceed with the Lesivo Declaration in relation to the <br> 11 railway equipment, and the \$50 million was demanded, <br> 12 as they say, for purposes of investment in the <br> 13 railroad. <br> 14 What you see is that they are citing to <br> 15 nothing more than newspaper clips, and newspaper clips <br> 16 that were issued post-lesivo and newspaper clips <br> 17 reporting on what President Berger said. And even <br> 18 worse newspaper clips that themselves are inconsistent <br> 19 about what President Berger said or didn't say. The <br> 20 newspaper clips, when you analyze them in context, and <br> 21 there is another slide coming up that does that, some <br> 22 of them report that Mr. Berger were simply saying they |
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| PAGE 2040 <br> $12: 18: 20$ 1 <br> 2 unreliability of the evidence that is before you. You <br> 3 heard Mr. Mario Fuentes testify, and that is a witness <br> 4 that the Claimant proffered in this case, that he <br> 5 never told Claimants about any supposed plot by Juan <br> 6 Esteban Berger to be taking or to be manufacturing or <br> 7 drumming up illegalities to take away the railroad. <br> 8 Now, why is that important? Because Mr. Senn, <br> 9 Mr. Duggan, and I believe Mr. Posner tell you that the <br> 10 reason they believe this is because they heard it from <br> 11 Mr. Fuentes, from Mr. Melville, and Mr. Montano. <br> 12 Well, the problem that they have is that Mr. Fuentes <br> 13 denied having ever made such a statement to them, <br> 14 ever, and that's on the record, and you have the cites <br> 15 here. <br> 16  <br> 17 Declarations, Melville and Montano submitted Witness <br> 18 confirm what they call "speculation" by Claimant. And <br> 19 Juan Esteban Berger told you no such thing ever <br> 20 happened. So, that is important when you are <br> 21 analyzing the rest of the evidence that they've put <br> 22 before you. | 12:20:52 1 never had the $\$ 50$ million they needed for investment 2 in the railroad, and some of them say that what the <br> 3 Claimants say, that he said that they needed <br> $4 \$ 50$ million or else they were going to proceed with <br> 5 the Lesivo Declaration. But again, inherently 6 unreliable. <br> 7 And what can't be denied is that there is no <br> 8 communication from the Government to FVG that there <br> 9 was ever a request by the Government to either invest <br> 1050 million in the railroad or else the Lesivo <br> 11 Declaration would be issued. There is no evidence to <br> 12 that, and Claimant's Expert--witnesses, I'm sorry, <br> 13 have told you that. <br> 14 We've submitted here a quote from Waste <br> 15 Management that talks about the inherent unreliability <br> 16 of statements made by political figures in the heat of <br> 17 public debate, and again we will get to a little bit <br> 18 more about that issue later. <br> 19 Now, on the issue of renegotiation, again, I <br> 20 think in relation to the question posed by Secretary <br> 21 Eizenstat, I ran through a good amount of this, I <br> 22 again ask you to really focus on the fact that the |


| 12:21:59 1 reason these issues were being discussed in tandem is 2 that Claimant asked President Berger for him to <br> 3 conform a Commission to resolve all the issues between <br> 4 the Parties, and it's natural that if that were to <br> 5 happen, all the issues were going to be on the table. <br> 6 Again, other, I think, important signposts of <br> 7 evidence on this issue, the Lesivo Declaration--you <br> 8 heard it from Mr. Marroquin again--when Claimants <br> 9 complain about this in early May of 2006, what does <br> 10 the Government do? Well, their Chief negotiator <br> 11 didn't know about the Lesivo Declaration, obviously <br> 12 couldn't have been using that as a threat--he told you <br> 13 that today. But moreover, at the highest levels of <br> 14 the Government, the President, himself, stopped the <br> 15 lesivo process back in May in order to give the <br> 16 Parties time to negotiate. Again, as I said in <br> 17 opening, that is the direct opposite of using the <br> 18 Lesivo Declaration as a threat mechanism or a pressure <br> 19 mechanism to renegotiate their agreements. <br> 20 I talked already about what happened on the <br> 21 24th of August in that Settlement Agreement. I ask <br> 22 you to just look at the Settlement Agreement and the | 12:24:48 1 Government was somehow using the Lesivo Declaration to <br> 2 force them to renegotiate their rights in the other agreements. <br> ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Mr. Orta? <br> MR. ORTA: Yes, sir. <br> ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: One of the concerns <br> that one might have about the whole lesividad issue <br> was that it was never very clearly explained--okay, <br> people pointed to these legal difficulties, but the <br> 10 Claimants had been through a bid process. It had <br> rights--we were only concerned with one Contract. It <br> had rights independently of that, which were valuable. <br> It had made an investment. None of that seems to have factored in the decision making at all. <br> 15 Now, you may say, well, there is simply no <br> 16 discretion. There was debate between the legal <br> 17 experts on that, but frankly, I find it very hard to <br> 18 understand how when it comes to a matter such as the <br> 19 interests of the State in relation to a declared <br> 20 interest and a manifest interest in the State and <br> 21 having a functioning railroad how those factors were <br> 22 irrelevant. I just find that hard to understand. |
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| 12:23:23 1 testimony relating to that. <br> 2 And, lastly, again I remit you to R-36 and <br> 3 R-37, and in particular in R-37 you will see that, and <br> 4 that's not before you on the screen now, but in R-37 <br> 5 you will see that--and there's testimony to this <br> 6 effect from Dr. Gramajo, from Mr. Fuentes, their <br> 7 witness, that during the negotiation meetings Mr. Senn <br> said the issue of fixing the legal defects to FVG was <br> a secondary priority. They didn't really care about <br> 10 it because they were more focused on the other issues <br> 11 that the Parties were discussing. <br> 12 The statement made by the Attorney General <br> 13 during the private meeting, I talked about it in <br> 14 opening, it didn't really feature much during the <br> 15 hearing, but it was referred to again, and again it's <br> 16 a statement made in a private meeting. It was not <br> 17 communicated to them. They put up a clip of the <br> 18 Attorney General in relation to another issue, <br> 19 expropriation. Again, unreliable. It's a newspaper <br> 20 clipping of something that he purportedly said. No <br> 21 evidence, we believe, as to this, which has in essence <br> 22 become the central point of their case now that the | PAGE 2046 <br> $12: 26: 02$ 1 <br> 2 that the evidence suggests that those factors were <br> 3 irrelevant, and we don't have testimony from President <br> 4 Berger as to exactly how he factored in the issue of <br> 5 how this Lesivo Declaration would affect the rest of <br> 6 the investment. <br> 7 What we do know, however, is that the <br> 8 President was counseled that this Contract was illegal <br> 9 and that action had to be taken. We also know that <br> 10 the President asked on a number of occasions his other <br> 11 public officials to sit at the negotiating table and <br> 12 try to resolve a resolution of this issue and other <br> 13 issues with FVG. <br> 14 And we further know that, just in terms of <br> 15 the evidence that's before the Tribunal, that when <br> 16 presented with a possible settlement of these issues, <br> 17 the response was, I have no authority from Mr. Senn. <br> 18 There was no--again no counterproposal, there is no <br> 19 statement from Mr. Senn during the meeting on <br> 20 24 August. Let's put the other issues to one side and <br> 21 just resolve today the lesivo issues. I mean, that's <br> 22 absolutely missing. In fact, what you heard from him |

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| 12:27:20 1 is he didn't make any counterproposals. He viewed <br> 2 C-44 as a threat, and he basically walked out of the <br> 3 meeting. He didn't even bother to call Mr. Posner or <br> 4 Mr. Duggan or anyone else who he was reporting to to <br> see whether there was a way to resolve just the issue of the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 7 And you further heard from the Government <br> 8 witnesses at that meeting that they never said you <br> 9 have to resolve all of them or we won't resolve the <br> 10 lesivo issue. Rather, they put before Mr. Senn and <br> 11 his lawyers a proposal that would have resolved had <br> 12 the Parties been able to reach negotiation that day, <br> 13 the issues in relation to Contract 143 and 158, but <br> 14 what they were met with was a response that there <br> 15 would be--there was no authority, and they didn't want <br> 16 to proceed with any further negotiation. <br> 17 I hope that's addressed your question. <br> 18 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Thank you very much. <br> 19 MR. ORTA: In relation to what the evidence <br> 20 shows again, I think there's ample evidence that the <br> 21 Government was acting in good faith at all times. In <br> 22 these negotiations, you see it time and time again | 12:29:57 1 supposed deals were about to happen or would have just 2 happened? They're simply not there. You have <br> 3 evidence before you that from one of the witnesses <br> 4 that it took them over two years to try to come up <br> 5 with a lease, and they couldn't come up with one until 6 just before the Lesivo Declaration was issued. <br> 7 And, further, that in relation to the <br> 8 contracts that actually did exist pre-lesivo, that <br> 9 they still have them, they're still benefiting from <br> 10 them, and their revenues have, in fact, gone up since <br> 11 the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 12 On the issue of what really happened, again I <br> 13 think it goes to the second question that we've put <br> 14 before you. We know that there was a defunct railroad <br> 15 with, notwithstanding the efforts made by FVG. <br> 16 However you want to characterize them, they simply <br> 17 were not sufficient. And what we do know is that when <br> 18 they're seeking 63, \$65 million from this Tribunal, <br> 19 they're in essence not only trying to use CAFTA as <br> 20 their insurance for their failed investment, but <br> 21 they're asking you to award them a 22 percent annual <br> 22 return on this failed investment. That's calculated |
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| 12:28:35 1 from the President's instruction to form the <br> 2 High-Level Commission, his decision to suspend the <br> 3 lesivo process, his instruction to his public--his <br> 4 advisers to continue to negotiate with FVG to avoid <br> 5 the possibility of the publication of the Lesivo <br> 6 Declaration and to continue to negotiate with them <br> 7 afterwards in an effort to resolve the issues before <br> 8 the Administrative Court action was starting. Or <br> 9 would start, I should say. <br> 10 On the issue of damages, what we know is <br> 11 that, I think it's pretty undisputed here <br> 12 notwithstanding the comments otherwise, the Claimant <br> 13 was never profitable. Their investment produced only <br> 14 losses. On the issue of the supposed future possible <br> 15 leases and easements and other thing, what is the hard <br> 16 evidence before you? You have a number of letters <br> 17 that were all sort of organized immediately after the <br> 18 Lesivo Declaration was issued. We find it somewhat <br> 19 remarkable that all of these letters were sent in such <br> 20 a short time span, but be that notwithstanding, you <br> 21 have no contracts. Where are the contracts? Where <br> 22 are the documents that would support that all of these | 12:31:13 1 directly based on the number they're asking for. 2 Again, this case is being used as their 3 golden exit strategy. The statements from the, I <br> 4 believe, the financials are very telling. Mr. Posner 5 telling his Shareholders-- <br> 6 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Excuse me, could you <br> 7 point us either now or at some point to where you're <br> 8 contending they were asking for a 22 percent. <br> 9 MR. ORTA: Yes, that's a calculation made <br> 10 based on the $\$ 65$ million that the investment they made <br> 11 and the $\$ 65$ million that they are claiming in this <br> 12 case. <br> 13 Now, statements from Mr. Posner <br> 14 to--contemporaneous statements before the lesivo issue <br> 15 came up, he tells his Shareholders that they're <br> 16 treading water, that their cash-flow negative, that <br> 17 they're having difficulty obtaining financing. And <br> 18 what we do know is that immediately upon the issuance <br> 19 of the Lesivo Declaration they began planning this <br> 20 case. We have an e-mail on the 11th of August where <br> 21 Mr. Carrasco, one of their lead lawyers in this case, <br> 22 is saying we are working on the international legal |

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| PAGE 2051 <br> $12: 32: 30$ 1 <br> 2 proceeding that might be available to us. I will <br> 3 proceeding they have filed in relation to the Lesivo <br> 4 Declaration. <br> 5 Just a day before, and this is quite telling, <br> 6 a couple of days before the Lesivo Declaration is <br> 7 published, they are signing a long-term contract with <br> 8 Gesur, and that is evidence of the fact that they knew <br> 9 they were going to continue to profit from this, even <br> 10 they were going--meaning the Usufruct, even though <br> 11 they were going to try to put this claim together. <br> 12 Mr. Senn showing up without negotiating <br> 13 authority on the day before the Lesivo Declaration is <br> 14 published. The publishing of the paid advertisement <br> 15 on 28 of August, the first business day after the <br> 16 Lesivo Declaration is issued, and that's substantiated <br> 17 by R-36. And in that statement, Mr. Posner telling <br> 18 the world that the Government of Guatemala had just <br> 19 begun an expropriation of RDC's investment in <br> 20 Guatemala. That's directly taken from the paid press <br> 21 release. <br> 22 Statements at the negotiating table on the | PAGE 2053 <br> $12: 34: 54$ 1 <br> 2 questions posed by Secretary Eizenstat, so I won't <br> 3 important for you to to focus on the fact that Claimant <br> 4 knew, FVG knew at the time it executed Contract 143 <br> 5 that it was entering into a contract that did not <br> 6 comply with Guatemalan law. <br> 7 You heard Mr. Aguilar and Mr. Mayora--both <br> 8 were consistent on this point--it is improper to <br> 9 incorporate Bidding Terms into a contract and then to <br> 10 deviate from bidding requirements in that contract, <br> 11 and that is precisely what happened in Contract 143 in <br> 12 relation to the issue of Government approval. I want <br> 13 to say that again because that is the direct proof <br> 14 that FVG knew that they were violating Guatemalan law <br> 15 when they entered into that contract. They cannot <br> 16 claim ignorance of the Public Contracting Law here. <br> 17 They can't say, well, Mr. Sarceno was willing to do <br> 18 it, the FEGUA Overseer, and therefore it's okay. They <br> 19 knew that it was against the law, and they did it <br> 20 anyway. <br> 21 And so they shouldn't have any reasonable <br> 22 expectation that Guatemala is not going to use the |
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| 12:33:39 1 28th of August, asking Mr. Senn to please instruct FVG 2 to stop the media campaign in relation to the Lesivo 3 Declaration, given that there were negotiations going on. <br> Press conferences called by Mr. --by FVG at which Mr. Posner traveled to Guatemala to attend. And the statements for those press conferences, you have them on the record, and we've cited them here, mischaracterized the effect of the Lesivo Declaration. 10 They cite to comments by President Berger. <br> 11 They were clearly made after the press conference and in response to their press conference, and if you listen to it carefully, you'll see that he says so. 14 And very shortly after that, they're hiring 15 their damages experts. Mr. MacSwain said to you he 16 was hired in 2006. That doesn't sound like a company who's trying to salvage their investment. <br> 18 March of 2007, they filed their Notice of Arbitration, and then June of 2007, the Request for Arbitration. <br> 21 We've talked about the issue of estoppel, and <br> 22 I think I've addressed this in relation to the | 12:36:03 1 lesivo law to address that and other important 2 illegalities. <br> 3 Now, we've talked about the issue of public <br> 4 bidding. Again, they also knew a public bid or should <br> 5 have known a public bid-- <br> 6 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Excuse me, just on <br> 7 that point, even if Ferrovías knew or should have <br> 8 known of the requirement incorporated into the <br> 9 Contract for 41 on the bid, if both Parties, in <br> 10 effect, proceeded on the basis that it was not needed, <br> 11 notwithstanding that, why is it, then, that Ferrovias <br> 12 should have known that one of the two Parties, namely <br> 13 FEGUA, was going to change from what seemed to have <br> 14 been perhaps from your own statement a consensus both <br> 15 new, both proceeded on that basis, why would Ferrovías <br> 16 have reason to think that at some later date that <br> 17 FEGUA was going to change its opinion? <br> 18 MR. ORTA: Well, it's our contention, why are <br> 19 they entering into a contract--if you look at the <br> 20 evidence, up until August 2003, how were they using <br> 21 the rail equipment? They were using it based on these <br> 22 letter agreements that had been exchanged with the |

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| PAGE 2055 <br> 12:37:27 1 <br> 2 Overseer. And again, this evidence is unrefuted. <br> 3 equipment up until August 2003? Nothing. They had <br> 4 letter agreements saying they would pay--they proposed <br> 5 the letter agreements, and you heard from Mr. Aguilar <br> 6 yesterday they proposed the letter agreement, I think <br> 7 it was, 17 days after the Contract 41 went into effect <br> 8 when they knew that, at a minimum, it was going to <br> 9 take time to get--some time to get the Government <br> 10 approval and that the Contract would not go into <br> 11 effect until 30 days after that approval was obtained. <br> 12 That's right in Section 6 of Contract 41 and in the <br> 13 Bidding Terms. <br> 14 So, they knew that they shouldn't be <br> 15 requesting the use of the equipment through the Letter <br> 16 Authorizations, but they nonetheless did so, and then <br> 17 they proceeded to use the equipment for almost four <br> 18 years without paying for it. <br> 19 So, a few--and this is important. A few <br> 20 months, just three months before the end of the <br> 21 administration, the prior Presidential administration, <br> 22 they enter into backdated leases with the Overseer in | 12:40:08 1 because there was a new Presidential administration <br> 2 coming in, and they wanted to regularize their use of <br> 3 the equipment. Again, that's my conjecture based on the facts. <br> 5 <br> Now, what happens is they make a request for <br> 6 use of the equipment to the new Overseer, and what <br> 7 does he say? And this is unrebutted, he sends back a <br> 8 letter saying, I have to deny your request, see <br> 9 attached Legal Opinion, and the attached Legal Opinion <br> 10 talks about a few legal defects, including the lack of <br> 11 Executive approval. <br> 12 So, what reasonable--I don't think it was <br> 13 reasonable for them, I contend, to rely upon this, <br> 14 this acceptance of this Contract by the Overseer in <br> 15 the face of what they had done in the four years <br> 16 proceeding and in the face of the fact that they <br> 17 immediately were told by the new administration that <br> 18 contract is out of bounds and against the law. <br> 19 PRESIDENT RIGO: Excuse me, I would ask that <br> 20 you be succinct as possible in the replies because we 21 are--we have no time. <br> 22 MR. ORTA: I understand that, and I will do |
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| PAGE 2056 <br> 2056 <br> 12:38:48 1 order to pay to make up payments--the payments for <br> 2 their use of the equipment for that interim four years <br> 3 where they weren't making any payments. They make <br> 4 those agreements and then immediately terminate them <br> 5 and enter into this other agreement. <br> 6 Now, in light of that, in the face of that, <br> 7 and in the face of their knowledge that this <br> 8 requirement was necessary and, hence, why they were <br> 9 operating under these letter agreements for the prior <br> 10 four years, they can't benefit from that conduct here <br> 11 in asserting their CAPTA claim. <br> 12 And the other response to your question, <br> 13 Secretary Eizenstat, is that a few months, a few short <br> 14 month, and you even heard Mr. Senn say it was almost <br> 15 immediately, and you know it was because it was <br> 16 unrebutted here, in March of 2004 or April 2004, which <br> 17 is literally three months or four months after--five <br> 18 months, something like that, after the amended <br> 19 Contract 158, they make a request from Overseer--from <br> 20 the new Overseer, there is a new administration coming <br> 21 in, and I--my conjecture, it's conjecture that the <br> 22 reason this Contract gets signed when it did is | 12:41:14 1 my best. <br> 2 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: Last point on this. <br> 3 Is there any relevance to the fact that a prior <br> 4 Overseer in the Year 2000 under 41 went directly to <br> 5 the President to try to get him to sign 41 and <br> 6 testified to us that it's mystifying to him as to why <br> 7 that wasn't done, and then under 143 it doesn't get <br> 8 done. There seems to be this pattern of not getting <br> 9 Presidential approval. <br> 10 So, is there any relevance to his testimony? <br> 11 MR. ORTA: For the issues that are being <br> 12 decided in this case, I don't think so because I think <br> 13 the question--I mean, this is not a case about whether <br> 14 the Government declared lesivo Contract 41. The <br> 15 Parties, together, terminated Contract 41 when they <br> 16 entered into Contract 143, and the legal opinions all <br> 17 say, you know, that's a terminated Contract that the <br> 18 Parties have by their consent terminated, so you can't <br> 19 revive that one, to my understanding. <br> 20 And as it relates to Contract 143, as you <br> 21 heard, you can't submit an illegal Contract to the <br> 22 President and ask him to approve it. You had to enter |

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| 12:42:27 1 into a new contract, and you had to have a new public 2 bid and cure the legal deficiencies. <br> 3 So, moving along, we believe that the record 4 establishes, you know, that there really--there should <br> 5 not be any estoppel as has been requested by Claimant <br> 6 for the reasons we've argued and the reasons that I've <br> 7 just asserted in terms of the conduct from the <br> 8 Claimant. On the--and I'm going to move through some <br> 9 of these things. There are points that I've made to <br> 10 the Tribunal already, you know. Claimant recognizes <br> 11 after they are told that the Contract is deficient <br> 12 immediately by the Overseer. They knew the Contract <br> 13 wasn't being accepted. They wrote to the <br> 14 Vice-Minister of Communications telling him that, <br> 15 asking him to formally acknowledge the Contract and <br> 16 talking about the fact that they were in negotiations <br> 17 to enter into a new contract. They knew at the time <br> 18 that the Government wasn't accepting the contract. <br> 19 They've crafted a different argument here for <br> 20 litigation, but that's not what the evidence shows. <br> 21 This is document R-9. <br> 22 I have been through the issue of the | 12:44:52 1 really think. <br> 2 The other thing that we will point out very <br> 3 quickly is that the amount that they have claimed in <br> 4 this case has been remarkably consistent, and we <br> 5 believe it's a remarkable coincidence that in the <br> 6 Notice of Arbitration they sought 65 million, claiming <br> 750 and 15--50 in lost profits and 15 in lost <br> 8 investment, and this is before their Expert was <br> 9 involved, and you heard him say, Mr. Thompson, he had <br> 10 no involvement at all in these figures, but yet the <br> 11 experts today come up with the same number, 65 million 12 in essence. <br> 13 I do want to raise one legal point which I <br> 14 think is important, and that is this Tribunal has <br> 15 already ruled that the issues in relation to squatters <br> 16 and the eviction of the squatters and the trust <br> 17 payments is out of this case, and that those measures <br> 18 cannot form the basis for any finding of liability in <br> 19 this case, and we just reassert that point here <br> 20 because there has been a lot of discussion about <br> 21 pre-lesivo conduct by the Government here. <br> 22 And while we recognize that the awards allow |
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| PAGE 2060 <br> $12: 43: 43$ 1 <br> 2 President's decision being reasonable, so I'm not <br> 3 think this is important--the theory of the case has <br> 4 changed. When you look at the press release that <br> 5 Claimant put out that's most close in time to the <br> 6 issuance of the Lesivo Declaration, the alleged <br> 7 Government motivation for the Lesivo Declaration was <br> 8 withdrawal of the local arbitration process, <br> 9 appropriate the Claimant's investment without payment, <br> 10 and the giving of the Usufruct to, they say, private <br> 11 interests, and we assume they meant Mr. Campollo, <br> 12 although that they didn't name him. <br> 13 Same in the Request for Arbitration, but then <br> 14 when they get to the Memorial for the merits, then <br> 15 they begin to talk about the Lesivo Declaration as a <br> 16 threat instrument to get them to renegotiate <br> 17 Contracts, so by that point, you know, now with the <br> 18 benefit of their lawyers, they come up with this <br> 19 different theory. <br> 20 And then not until the Reply in this case do <br> 21 we first hear about this 50 million-dollar business, <br> 22 so I think that is quite telling in terms of what they | 12:46:11 1 you to look at that for context, certainly the 2 doctrines, well respected doctrines of ratione <br> 3 temporis, which I don't need to tell this Tribunal <br> 4 about, don't allow you to point to or rely on <br> 5 Government conduct pre-entry into CAFTA in order to <br> 6 find the Government liable under CAFTA. <br> 7 Now, let's talk about the legal claims, okay? <br> 8 We , as I contended at the beginning, we believe they <br> 9 haven't proven any of them, and I'm going to spend the <br> 10 most time talking about fair and equitable treatment <br> 11 because I think that with respect to the other claims, <br> 12 while I will discuss them very briefly, I think that <br> 13 there is absolutely no evidence at all for any of <br> 14 their claims, but in particular for these others, I <br> 15 think they're very easily disposed of by the Tribunal. <br> 16 On the issue of indirect expropriation, the <br> 17 Claimants have conceded it's a matter of record here <br> 18 that Guatemala as a legal matter didn't interfere with <br> 19 any of their contracts. They have every right that <br> 20 they ever had under Contract 143 and 158 today. They <br> 21 have possession of the rail equipment. They have <br> 22 every right they ever had under Contract 402, the |

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| 12:47:24 1 Right of Way Contract. They have that today, and they 2 continue to profit from it. <br> 3 The why, and this is a very interesting <br> 4 question for the Tribunal, the why they haven't gone <br> 5 out and tried to continued to exploit their rights <br> 6 under that agreement, the why they're not going out <br> 7 and trying to collect rent from all these industrial <br> 8 squatters, well, Guatemala shouldn't be liable for <br> 9 that. They decided unilaterally to leave the country <br> 10 in a very public way with a public announcement with <br> 11 Mr. Posner being in the front pages of the newspaper <br> 12 in September of 2007. They announced it in March of <br> 13 2007, and we, meaning the Government of Guatemala, <br> 14 should not be responsible for their decision to leave <br> 15 the country and not exploit their Usufruct rights that <br> 16 they again still have today. <br> 17 On the issue of interference, again I think <br> 18 based on what I just said, as a legal matter, their <br> 19 property rights have not been interfered with. They <br> 20 claim they have an inability to generate economic <br> 21 returns from that investment, but again we believe <br> 22 that that's not the case. The reason they're not | 12:49:46 1 case, which was quite a long time ago, the legislative <br> 2 Decree on its own had the immediate effect of bringing <br> 3 their Contract to an end. That's not this case. <br> 4 Their contract rights are still in their possession, 5 and they can exploit them. They have just chosen not 6 to. <br> 7 On the issue of whether this is an unlawful <br> 8 expropriation, I'm only going to, you know--we have <br> 9 been through the other elements. Certainly we believe <br> 10 that upholding the Guatemalan Constitution, upholding <br> 11 Public Contracting Laws are reasons that are in the <br> 12 public purpose and for the public interest, and that <br> 13 is the evidence as to why the President made the <br> 14 decision he made to declare the Agreement lesivo. <br> 15 The issue on due process, I think, is again a <br> 16 nonissue here. You heard Mr. Franco's testimony, and <br> 17 I think that speaks for itself. <br> 18 And on the issue of prompt and adequate <br> 19 compensation, under CAFTA that's not due yet, and <br> 20 again we don't think there has been any expropriation <br> 21 here, but that claim is not right because under CAFTA <br> 22 that compensation is not due. And you also saw that |
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| 12:48:38 1 generating any more economic investment from their <br> 2 Usufruct rights is because they've decided not to <br> 3 pursue them. They left the country. They're not out <br> 4 there trying to collect rents from the squatters. You <br> 5 heard from them 92 percent of their investment is <br> 6 their right to exploit the right of way for real <br> 7 estate values. But they're not going out there and <br> 8 doing it. That's not Guatemala's fault. Guatemala is not preventing them from doing it. <br> 10 So, you know, we claim that they have not <br> 11 offered evidence on the issue of interference. They <br> 12 have also not offered evidence on the issue of the <br> 13 substantiality of the effect of the expropriatory, <br> 14 what they claim is the expropriatory act here, the <br> 15 Lesivo Declaration. Their revenues have gone up <br> 16 post-lesivo. <br> 17 On the issue of discriminatory intent, I <br> 18 think we've already dealt with it. They simply have 19 not proven it. <br> 20 On the issue of the Shufeldt case which they <br> 21 cited in their opening, I will just leave you to the <br> 22 slide, but it was not a case like this one. In that | PAGE 2066 <br> 2066 <br> 12:51:03 1 they do have the ability to obtain back any monies <br> 2 that they paid through the Usufruct if the <br> 3 Administrative Court confirms the Lesivo Declaration. <br> 4 And you also heard from their own witness, Mr. Franco, <br> 5 that they have the ability to file a separate action <br> 6 to seek damages, even if you don't believe they can <br> 7 seek damages in the administrative action. <br> 8 ARBITRATOR EIEENSTAT: Is there some point in <br> 9 time after a number of year delay Administrative Court <br> 10 not ruling that one could come to the conclusion that <br> 11 there is not going to be a ruling and, therefore, <br> 12 prompt and adequate compensation should be due? <br> 13 MR. ORTA: I suppose that would be possible. <br> 14 I don't think we're even close to there yet, because <br> 15 what the record evidence establishes is that the <br> 16 proceedings closed back in 2010, so they have been <br> 17 waiting for a ruling, I believe--I don't want to <br> 18 misspeak, but somewhere around a year. It's not <br> 19 entirely uncommon for ICSID tribunals to take a year <br> 20 to issue rulings. I don't think it can be said that <br> 21 in Guatemala the fact that there isn't a ruling yet, <br> 22 especially in the face of requests by the Government |

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| 12:52:17 1 for a ruling to be issued that that should be given 2 any weight here. <br> 3 On the issue of fair and equitable treatment, <br> 4 I want to spend a little bit of time, not much, on the <br> 5 standard because I want to highlight again as I did in <br> 6 opening that this is the first Tribunal who's going to <br> 7 make a determination about what the fair and equitable <br> 8 treatment standard means under CAFTA. Again, both <br> 9 Parties agree, customary international law, but they <br> 10 disagree on what that means, and I think that is a <br> 11 very important issue that this Tribunal will have to 12 struggle with. <br> 13 We have said that the standard can't be what <br> 14 the Claimant has articulated. It can't be whatever <br> 15 you find in any arbitral award because those arbitral <br> 16 awards, in order for them to be relevant for this <br> 17 Tribunal, you need to first reach the conclusion that <br> 18 those arbitral awards were making a decision on what <br> 19 customary or applying international minimum standard <br> 20 of treatment under customary international law, and <br> 21 Claimant has cited a number of awards that are not <br> 22 doing that, and so we believe the standards they have | PAGE 2069 <br> $12: 54: 45$ 1 <br> 2 the conduct at issue here is grossly unfair, unjust, <br> 3 or idiosyncratic, arbitrary beyond a merely <br> 4 inconsistent or questionable application of <br> 5 because I think that's very relevant for what you're <br> 6 being asked to determine here, the standard that's <br> 7 articulated here in Cargill--and it has to be conduct <br> 8 that is so unexpected so as to be a shocking <br> 9 repudiation of a policy. The application of an <br> 10 existing law made at the time that they invested <br> 11 simply does not meet that standard. <br> 12 We also cite you to s.D. Myers, which we <br> 13 think is very relevant for your decision making. <br> 14 Tribunals could not be second-guessing government <br> 15 decision making, and the standard really is a high one <br> 16 when you're being asked to do that, and here you're <br> 17 being asked to second-guess a decision that's made by <br> 18 the highest official in Guatemala, the President. <br> 19 so, this is the standard, and we believe <br> 20 that, as applied to that standard, we've proven we <br> 21 haven't violated it. The reason Government opinions <br> 22 informed the President's decision, he took the actions |
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| PAGE 2068 <br> $12: 53: 25$ 1 <br> 2 articulated in that regard should not be utilized <br> 3 here. <br> 4 from--it's not up on the screen, but Annex $10 b$ says <br> 5 that the cAFTA parties, in asking tribunals to apply <br> 6 customary international law, they say it has to be <br> 7 something that results from a general and consistent <br> 8 practice of States that they follow from a sense of <br> 9 legal obligation. That's not arbitral awards citing <br> 10 autonomous standards. That has to be established by <br> 11 the Claimant, and we believe that the Glamis Gold <br> 12 Award, ups Award, and others that we've provided to <br> 13 the Tribunal are ones that articulate the right <br> 14 standards. Again, you should not be looking at <br> 15 autonomous standards to determine what the minimum <br> 16 standard of treatment is for fair and equitable <br> 17 treatment in this Treaty. <br> 18 on the issue of the minimum standard of <br> 19 treatment, we submit to you the Cargill Award--these <br> 20 are in our briefs. This is the standard as to which <br> 21 Guatemala's conduct should be applied. We cite to you <br> 22 here RL-175, Paragraph 296 . The question is whether | 12:56:02 1 for important reasons, for protection of the public 2 interest. He would incur personal liability, or at <br> 3 least he was told he would if he didn't take it, and 4 that does not establish a fair and equitable treatment 5 violation under CAFTA. Far, far from it. <br> 6 On the standards that Claimant has <br> 7 articulated, as we said in opening, we believe that we <br> 8 meet the standards that should be applied, and those <br> 9 are the ones that I just talked about, but even if you <br> 10 judge Guatemala's conduct based on the standards that <br> 11 Claimant has asked you to judge him against, we <br> 12 believe that the evidence shows that we have not <br> 13 violated any of them. <br> 14 In the interest of time, I'm not going to go <br> 15 through all of the evidence here. I submitted it to <br> 16 you. Everything that we have cited here is backed up <br> 17 by quotes or cites to the Declaration-I'm sorry, to 18 the evidence in the case. <br> 19 Now, again, no violation of due process, no <br> 20 arbitrary conduct by the Government in relation to the <br> 21 issuance of the Lesivo Declaration. No frustration of <br> 22 their legitimate expectations. Again, we claim they |

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| 12:57:21 1 don't have a legitimate expectation not to have the <br> 2 Contract that they knew was illegal challenged by the <br> 3 Government. <br> 4 On the issue of transparency, again, the <br> 5 lesivo law was on the books, and they signed up for it <br> 6 when they invested in Guatemala. Nobody made any <br> 7 assurances to them that this lesivo law would be <br> 8 applied as to their investment. No one. <br> $9 \quad$ Full protection and security, I think again <br> 10 I'm not going to spend much time here because the real <br> 11 issue is did the Government act with due diligence, <br> 12 did they take reasonable measures, and we believe that <br> 13 the evidence shows that they took reasonable measures. <br> 14 The best that Claimant has been able to <br> 15 muster is point to a few instances where they suggest <br> 16 Guatemala didn't act as quickly as they wanted. <br> 17 That's not a violation of full protection and security <br> 18 under CAFTA. Again, it doesn't even come close, in <br> 19 our estimation. <br> 20 On the issue of squatters, and I want to <br> 21 pause here again very briefly just to say underscore <br> 22 the point we made both during the hearing and in | 01:00:01 1 talk very briefly about damages. <br> 2 On the issue of damages, again I think that <br> 3 the evidence before this Tribunal is quite stark, and <br> 4 again I want to remind you the context in which you're <br> 5 being asked to award Claimant $\$ 65$ million. They had <br> 6 made an investment. They had only restored one phase. <br> 7 They had only been able to procure very limited Right <br> 8 of Way Contracts for the real estate, and it's <br> 9 unrebutted that they had only losses, only losses, <br> 10 from Day 1 until the day they left the country. Only <br> 11 losses. <br> 12 Now, notwithstanding that they're asking you <br> 13 for 65 million--and again, we point out the remarkable <br> 14 coincidence between the numbers that they've sought <br> 15 from Day 1 and that their experts have validated for <br> 16 them, their experts have remarkably reached the same <br> 17 number that they were asking for before they hired <br> 18 their experts, the setting at the time of the Lesivo <br> 19 Declaration was a business that produced only losses, <br> 20 a huge, huge problem in relation to the building out <br> 21 of Phase II because they couldn't get funding for it, <br> 22 and the evidence is undisputed that, at a minimum-at |
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| 12:58:39 1 opening, there is no evidence--no, no, evidence, we 2 think, reliable, credible evidence about the 3 industrial squatters, when they got there and whether 4 they were there pre- or post-lesivo. And perhaps an 5 even more important point, no evidence that those 6 industrial squatters didn't decide to go and invade 7 the right of way when Claimant made the very public 8 announcement that they were abandoning their 9 investment and leaving the country. All of the <br> 10 pictures that were remitted to you were from 2009 to <br> 11 2011, and that is more than two years after Claimant <br> 12 publicly told all of Guatemala that they were packing <br> 13 up their bags and heading back to pittsburgh. <br> 14 So, no violation of full protection and 15 security. <br> 16 On the issue of national treatment, again I <br> 17 think this is a nonevent, an easy claim to dispose of. <br> 18 It's a different railway. It's not the same kind of <br> 19 business. There has been no showing that Mr. Campol1o <br> 20 is in like circumstances or that he received any more <br> 21 favorable treatment as compared to them. <br> 22 With the few minutes I have left, I want to | 01:01:31 1 a minimum they would need at least a hundred million <br> 2 dollars to build Phase II, and their estimates are <br> 3 much higher. I remit you to document 322 where <br> 4 Mr. Duggan makes estimates at right around <br> 5 \$100 million. <br> 6 And the question is would a willing buyer <br> 7 really be willing to pay a willing seller anything for <br> 8 that? Anything? When the only way they stayed out of <br> 9 bankruptcy was asking their Shareholders for capital <br> 10 contributions each and every year. Warren Buffett's <br> 11 name was invoked here. What would Warren Buffett pay <br> 12 for this investment on the day of Lesivo Declaration? <br> 13 I think the answer is nothing. <br> 14 There has been some suggestion in terms of <br> 15 the damages Award that somehow the Tribunal should <br> 16 Award a different--a different set of damages in order <br> 17 to somehow punish Guatemala for their conduct. I <br> 18 realize the Chairman made a statement on the record <br> 19 that, of course, under CAFTA that's not allowed, but <br> 20 our point is that it looks like the Claimants' experts <br> 21 are seeking exactly that, based on their testimony in <br> 22 this case. |

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| 01:02:51 1 <br> On the issue of the future profits claimed, <br> 2 again we believe that they're highly, highly <br> 3 speculative, and that there's no real evidence of it. <br> 4 Again, what you have before you here in $\mathrm{C}-27$ is their <br> 5 actual record of operations. They lost money every <br> 6 single year. <br> 7 In relation to, again what you're being asked <br> 8 to believe what had happened, they're asking you to <br> 9 believe that their real estate revenues would have <br> 10 gone up because they would have dramatically changed <br> 11 and altered what happened in the first eight years <br> 12 that they were in business. You have been given no <br> 13 proof or evidence to really reach that conclusion. <br> 14 Again, where are the contracts? Where are <br> 15 the--where's the hard evidence that any of this was <br> 16 anything other than something that they hoped for or <br> 17 something that was more of a pie in the sky <br> 18 projection? There is none. <br> 19 On the issue of the real estate revenues--I'm <br> 20 sorry, the railroad revenues, again same thing, and <br> 21 especially when you consider that they had--as of the <br> 22 date of the Lesivo Resolution, they had no viable | 01:05:29 1 and that is why if you were wondering I maintained my 2 objection as to the authenticity. <br> 3 So, in closing, we maintained that the Fair <br> 4 Market Value of the investment as, I think, <br> 5 correctly--correctly--projected by Dr. Spiller is that <br> 6 at the time of the Lesivo Declaration their business <br> 7 had a negative $\$ 2.7$ million value; and, as a result, <br> 8 when judging what would a willing buyer pay a willing <br> 9 seller for that investment, for that asset, at that <br> 10 period of time, we believe the answer is zero, and <br> 11 Claimants have failed to prove otherwise. <br> 12 With that, I will in about 10 seconds here <br> 13 just tell you about our prayer for relief. Again, we <br> 14 believe that we have proven that they have not made <br> 15 out a case for any of the CAFTA violations that <br> 16 they've asserted in this case, and we therefore <br> 17 believe that Guatemala should be found to have not <br> 18 violated CAFTA, and its attorneys' fees and costs in <br> 19 interest should be awarded. I think especially when <br> 20 you judge the quality of the evidence before you. If <br> 21 you Award any damages, we say that those damages <br> 22 should first be conditioned on their renouncing all of |
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| 01:04:10 1 sources for funding for the rail project. <br> 2 Same thing, just look at their own <br> 3 statements, we remit them to you here. Look at their <br> 4 contemporaneous statements where they tell you that <br> 5 there was no demand for their right of way, no demand 6 for their rail operations. <br> 7 On the issue of what is the Fair Market Value <br> 8 of their investment? Again, we don't believe that <br> 9 they have proven that it's anything other than <br> 10 negative value. They cite to a lot of these <br> 11 industrial squatters. I've made the point about them. <br> 12 They sent you pictures about them. You might have <br> 13 wondered why I maintained my objection as to the <br> 14 authenticity of some of to them. Well, the fact <br> 15 is--and I don't remember which slide it's in here, but <br> 1625 percent of those pictures, nine out of the 36 of <br> 17 them, were taken apparently by somebody else because <br> 18 Mr. Senn's testimony is he took them within a <br> 19 two-month time frame, but again, 25 percent of them <br> 20 were not by their--if you just believe the date of the <br> 21 picture, were not taken on those dates. So we don't <br> 22 know who took them, we don't know where they're from, | 01:06:56 1 their rights under the Usufruct contracts. This went directly to the question posed by Professor Crawford 3 to Mr. Foster at the end of his presentation and--that might be the end of my presentation, but unexpectedly, but we again believe that the number here, if you were ever to get the damages, should be zero, and we would 7 remit to you the Biwater Gauff Case where there was a 8 similar scenario in relation to--in that case the 9 Tribunal found liability but found that the Fair <br> 10 Market Value of the investment at the time of the <br> 11 alleged violation was negative and, therefore, awarded 12 zero. <br> 13 Again, we believe there has been no <br> 14 establishment that there has been any violation of <br> 15 CAFTA, but if you get to damage, that is what we <br> 16 believe the right result is. I want to thank you for your time this morning. <br> 18 PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you, Mr. Orta. <br> 19 We will have a break now, and we will <br> 20 reconvene at $2: 15$, so have a good time at lunch. <br> 21 MR. ORTA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. <br> 22 (Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the hearing was |

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| 02:25:49 1 money operating the golf course. They make the money <br> 2 selling the lots that surround the golf course, and <br> 3 those lots don't all sell out in one year, and they <br> 4 build the golf course first, and they concentrate on <br> 5 making sure that the golf course is operating well so <br> 6 that people want to come and buy the lots that adjoin <br> 7 the golf course. So, I think it was a perfectly natural thing. <br> 9 I would also point out that it was the <br> 10 honorable thing. They could have done a slipshod job, <br> 11 invested $\$ 10$ million instead of 20 million, skimped on <br> 12 what they were doing with the railroad, and spent all <br> 13 their time concentrating on that which was going to <br> 14 put the most money in their own pockets. But instead <br> 15 they concentrated on that aspect of the project that <br> 16 was most important to the country of Guatemala. <br> 17 So, what I think Mr. Orta is asking you to do <br> 18 is to fault RDC for taking the honorable course, not <br> 19 the quick course, the cheap course, or the <br> 20 self-profiting course. <br> 21 Professor Crawford also asked the question <br> 22 about if you, the Tribunal, were to decide that the | 02:28:36 1 They created a lack of public bidding problem for <br> 2 themselves as an excuse to declare lesivo; and, once <br> 3 they create that problem, it, unlike the Executive <br> 4 approval, can't be solved so easily. <br> 5 So, if, instead of creating these problems <br> 6 for themselves when they identified the lack of <br> 7 Executive approval of the Contract as being a problem, <br> 8 if they had simply done that which was well within <br> 9 their own power, and that is secure the Executive <br> 10 approval either from that President or any other <br> 11 President that came into office thereafter, then we <br> 12 wouldn't be faced with what we're faced with today. <br> 13 But the absurdity of this whole idea is <br> 14 demonstrated by Dr. Gramajo's testimony, when he was <br> 15 asked why didn't you get another public bid, his <br> 16 answer was, "We were afraid FVG wouldn't win it." It <br> 17 is incomprehensible that the real reason that they <br> 18 didn't get the public bid was because they were afraid <br> 19 FVG wouldn't win it, under the conditions--you heard <br> 20 Dr. Gramajo and how determined he was in his campaign <br> 21 over many years and with nine separate secret legal <br> 22 opinions to get this Contract declared lesivo, and |
| :---: | :---: |
| 02:27:06 1 contract was lesivo, wouldn't that have considerable <br> 2 effect on a fair and equitable treatment claim? Well, <br> 3 I would ask you also to consider the possibility that <br> 4 you conclude that the Contract was not lesivo; or that <br> 5 you conclude that the reasons advanced for lesividad, <br> 6 these legal defects are not a proper ground; or that <br> 7 you conclude that the lesivo process, itself, did not <br> 8 afford due process; or you conclude that the process <br> 9 of lesivo, keeping it secret for many years was done <br> 10 in bad faith. I would suggest to you that those <br> 11 conclusions would have an equal, if not greater effect <br> 12 upon your consideration of fair and equitable <br> 13 treatment. <br> 14 Mr. Orta told you that a public bid was not <br> 15 just a technicality. Well, it's interesting that a <br> 16 little bit later in his presentation he admitted that <br> 17 in the original evaluation of the contract, the issue <br> 18 of the public bidding was not even mentioned. It was <br> 19 focused on Presidential approval, not public bidding. <br> 20 So, what we have here is a course of conduct <br> 21 by the Respondent through nine secret opinions of <br> 22 various lawyers creating a Catch-22 for themselves. | 02:30:07 1 he's trying to tell you that the real reason they <br> 2 didn't want a public bid was they were afraid FVG <br> 3 wouldn't win it? <br> 4 Now, as to the issue of whether FVG or RDC <br> 5 had any idea that any of these contracts had contained <br> 6 illegalities, there is not a shred of evidence that <br> 7 FVG in any way knew that Contract 41 that was signed <br> 8 with Overseer Sarceno was in any way illegal. If they <br> 9 had ever thought that it was in any way illegal, would <br> 10 they have agreed to replace it with 143 and 158 if <br> 11 they had thought there was going to be a possible <br> 12 illegality in 143 and 158 as well? No one would do <br> 13 that. Why? It's undisputed that 41 was executed, and <br> 14 we had several opinions from the Overseer at the time <br> 15 who negotiated it saying there wasn't a thing wrong <br> 16 with that contract. Why would anyone agree to <br> 17 renegotiate a contract that everybody said had nothing <br> 18 wrong with it if they thought they were going to <br> 19 renegotiate it with an illegal Contract? That makes 20 absolutely no sense. <br> 21 And furthermore, isn't FVG entitled to rely <br> 22 on the fact that FEGUA's own Legal Department opined |

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| 02:31:37 1 that Contract 143 was in effect and that FEGUA was 2 accepting Canon payments under that contract? Surely <br> 3 they can't come in here today and tell you that FVG <br> 4 knew the Contract was illegal when their own Legal <br> 5 Department was saying that it was in effect and they 6 were receiving Canon payments under it. <br> $7 \quad$ Mr. Orta posits what I would describe as the <br> 8 ridiculous assertion that we can rely on letter <br> 9 authorizations to use the equipment prior to Contract <br> 10 143, but they're we are not entitled to have <br> 11 reasonable reliance on the contracts themselves. That 12 also makes absolutely no sense. <br> 13 Mr. Orta, on numerous occasions and in slides <br> 14 cites these nine separate Legal Opinions that they <br> 15 secured--in secret, of course. Can't we rely upon the <br> 16 fact they never showed any of them to us? If they <br> 17 thought that we already knew that contracts 143 and <br> 18158 were illegal, what advantage would there have been <br> 19 to keeping those opinions secret? Why wouldn't they <br> 20 have just given them to us? And furthermore, on the <br> 21 issue of good faith, if they had honestly wanted to <br> 22 resolve any problems that there were in connection | 02:34:371 if you remember Dr. Gramajo wrote him the letter 2 asking him to declare the Contract lesivo in early <br> 3 January of 2006. You have the letter before you. The 4 presidential--meeting with the President was on March 5 the gth, if my memory serves me correctly. He 6 appointed the High-Level Railroad Commission. 7 Mr. Orta tells you, oh, the President was 8 trying to solve these problems by appointing the 9 High-Level Railroad Commission. Well, what the <br> 10 President didn't do was to say, "By the way, since <br> 11 January the 6th, I have been considering a request <br> 12 from this guy who's standing right over here at this <br> 13 meeting that we're having today. I have been <br> 14 considering a request from him to declare your <br> 15 Contract lesivo for a couple of months now. So, why <br> 16 don't you sit down and talk about that when you're <br> 17 talking in your High-Level Railroad Commission?" <br> 18 Indeed, the absence of telling anybody about <br> 19 the lesivo process while the High-Level Railroad <br> 20 Commission was meeting cuts against them, not for <br> 21 them. If they had been negotiating in good faith, all <br> 22 of these things would have been out on the table, and |
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| 02:33:11 1 with that Contract, why wouldn't they have come to us 2 and said here's the Legal Opinion that we just got 3 from so-and-so or the Attorney General or the 4 attorneys for the Ministry of Communication, and they 5 point out these problems in the Contract. Why don't 6 we get together and solve these problems? But none of 7 that was ever done. <br> 8 And, indeed, on this issue of good faith, <br> 9 even after lesivo was declared, it was six months <br> 10 before they ever told us what the technical <br> 11 difficulties were with the contracts. Now, if there <br> 12 was any desire whatsoever to negotiate in good faith <br> 13 to resolve the difficulties with these contracts, <br> 14 wouldn't the appropriate course of action have been to <br> 15 come to us and say, "Here are the problems. What can <br> 16 we do, working together, to solve them?" <br> 17 Mr. Orta also tells you that the reason all <br> 18 these issues were in negotiation between the Parties <br> 19 was because the Claimant wanted all the issues to be <br> 20 negotiated at the same time. That's nonsense. The <br> 21 President created the High-Level Commission. At the <br> 22 same time he was creating the High-Level Commission, |  |

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| 02:37:15 1 course not. We brought to the table the absolute <br> 2 obligation of FEGUA to remove squatters and their <br> 3 total and complete abdication of that responsibility. <br> They're the ones who wanted to remove it from the Contract. <br> 6 And in this regard I'd like to direct you to <br> 7 C-44 which I had right here--here it is. Thank you, <br> 8 Nick. I want to read you something from C-44. This <br> 9 is the proposal which we call it the <br> 10 take-it-or-leave-it proposal. They don't like those <br> 11 words, but I want to read you something from this <br> 12 document. On Page RDCOO2428, they say: "In line with <br> 13 the privatization process, FEGUA called private <br> 14 companies to take part in a public bidding process to <br> 15 receive in onerous usufruct the repair, maintenance, <br> 16 use, and exploitation of the railway equipment owned <br> 17 by FEGUA." Now, they're reciting in this document <br> 18 drafted by them that there was a public bidding <br> process for the Equipment Contract. <br> 20 "As a result of said process, Ferrovías was <br> 21 awarded the Onerous Usufruct Contract Involving <br> 22 Railway Equipment as documented by public Deed | 02:40:24 1 about renegotiating Contract 42, to restructure the 2 national railway network restoration plan, surrender 3 railway sections yet to be restored in which other investors may be interested, surrendering real property not destined to railway use, receiving railway sections that are currently free of squatters. That's all Contract 402. <br> 8 <br> 9 143. This is Contract 402. The first thing they talk <br> 10 about is renegotiating Contract 402. Then they talk <br> 11 about renegotiating Contract 820 , when they talk about <br> 12 modificating fees for railway and different from <br> 13 railway activities and FEGUA not being bound to <br> 14 further evictions. And that's all-none of this has 15 anything to do with the railroad equipment. <br> 16 And then, finally, they get down to 143, and <br> 17 they want to modify the trust--that's 820 also, I'm <br> 18 sorry-modifying the payment trust regarding the <br> 19 actual amount that FEGUA has to contribute to the <br> 20 trust. <br> 21 They finally get down at the very bottom of <br> 22 the page to Contract 402: Modifications to the |
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| 02:39:06 1 Number 143." They're reciting in this document that 2 Contract 143 was awarded by public bid. I submit to <br> 3 you gentlemen that the reason this document says that <br> 4 is because that's the way they had decided to fix the <br> 5 problem. If they got Ferrovías to agree to all the <br> 6 other demands in this document, they were going to fix <br> 7 the public bidding process by just declaring that it 8 had happened. <br> 9 Now, there are only two possibilities: That <br> 10 they didn't read what they wrote or that that's what <br> 11 they meant and that's what they were going to do. I <br> 12 don't believe you will be able to conclude that they <br> 13 didn't mean what they wrote or that they didn't read 14 it. <br> 15 Now, then go on from that, if you will, <br> 16 please, to the next page in this document, and look <br> 17 what it is that they want us to sign. That day, <br> 18 remember they gave it to us on the 24th, and lesivo is <br> 19 going to be declared tomorrow, so their protestations <br> 20 that there was going to be time for any significant <br> 21 negotiations simply ring hollow. We had one day. <br> 22 That was it. And at the top of this, they're talking | 02:41:52 1 Contract involving railway equipment in order to <br> 2 rectify the terms which are deemed to cause lesion, 3 and they don't tell us what they are. <br> 4 And then, of course, you get to the part they <br> 5 really were interested in, which is modifications to 6 the amount of the fees. <br> 7 Now, they then tell us that we have to post a <br> 8 bond in order to guarantee. That's the next provision <br> 9 in here. We have to post a bond to guarantee that we <br> 10 will renegotiate these terms. <br> 11 And then if you turn over to the last <br> 12 paragraph, General Acceptance, "the appearing Parties <br> 13 in their corresponding acting capacities declare to <br> 14 expressly accept the contents of this instrument and <br> 15 are bound to fully comply the terms of this <br> 16 agreement." I submit to you that that is a <br> 17 take-it-or-leave-it offer. <br> 18 Let's also consider the circumstances that <br> 19 are involved in the meeting where the <br> 20 take-it-or-leave-it offer was presented. Mr. Senn was <br> 21 called early one morning, the day before the meeting <br> 22 was going to occur. He was told to show up at the |

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| 02:43:17 1 meeting. He was not told what the meeting was going 2 to be about, and he was not told that he was going to 3 receive a settlement demand, and they fault Mr. Senn 4 for going to the meeting and saying that he wasn't 5 authorized to sign the document on the spot? 6 Let's talk just a second about the personal <br> 7 liability of the President. The personal liability of 8 the President, that reason is not included in any one <br> 9 of the nine opinions that they got with regard to <br> 10 lesivo. This is an after-the-fact invention of the <br> 11 Respondent to try to justify what they did. It <br> 12 certainly was not a basis on which anyone ever said <br> 13 lesivo needed to be declared. <br> 14 Now, let's talk about the 50 million-dollar <br> 15 investment that the President demanded that we make. <br> 16 Gentlemen, you watched a video clip of the President <br> 17 making the demand. You heard, although of not good <br> 18 quality, an audio clip of the President making the <br> 19 same demand on the radio. We showed you no less than <br> 20 eight newspaper articles, all of which have one <br> 21 variety or another of the same demand. <br> 22 But most important, these unreliable | I would also point out that in Mr. Orta's <br> timeline of the events involving Mr. Campollo, he has <br> 3 inexplicably left out the meeting of March the 15th, '05, when Mr. Pinto explicitly threatened FVG. In fact, he said that FVG might be allowed to participate in their own deals--a very generous offer from Mr. Pinto. <br> 8 A small point, but Mr. Orta tried to say that <br> 9 Mr. MacSwain was hired in 2006. In fact, he was hired <br> 10 in 2007, and his testimony explicitly says he was <br> 11 hired either in late 2006 or in early 2007. <br> 12 What we have here, gentlemen, is a situation, <br> 13 a problem created entirely by the Government. They <br> 14 wanted to replace Contract 41 with contracts that had <br> 15 more favorable terms to them. They got FVG to enter <br> 16 into contracts 143 and 158 at an increased Canon <br> 17 payment and a Canon payment that then went entirely <br> 18 into FEGUA rather than to the Trust Fund for the <br> 19 renovation of the railway. <br> 20 The Contract specifically says that <br> 21 Presidential approval was not required, and the <br> 22 testimony is that even if it was required, any |
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| 02:44:57 1 newspapers reports include the Government's official 2 newspaper. C-131 is the publication in the Diario de 3 Centro America. That is the official publication, and 4 it says President Berger: Berger explained that the 5 Declaration of Lesividad arises from the fact that the 650 million investment under said Contract did not 7 occur. Their official publication. They want you to 8 believe that these were just some crazy reporters 9 wandering around reporting things that had never been 10 said. I would submit to you that the consistency of <br> 11 the reports of the newspapers themselves is excellent 12 evidence of the fact that President Berger actually <br> 13 said it. But the idea that they want to disavow their 14 own official publication is simply astounding. <br> 15 Now, Mr. Orta told you he thought it was <br> 16 strange that all of the letters from suppliers, <br> 17 customers, and others came right after lesivo. If <br> 18 they hadn't come right after lesivo, Mr. Orta would <br> 19 have said I certainly think it's strange if they were <br> 20 so worried about lesivo that they wouldn't have <br> 21 written them right after lesivo. He can't have it 22 both ways. | 02:47:59 1 President could have approved it. A new bidding <br> 2 system process was entirely within their control, and <br> 3 they say that they were worried that FVG wouldn't win. <br> 4 <br> on the issue of collections, the arbitrators <br> 5 raised the issue of why aren't you out there <br> 6 collecting. Why isn't the Government, who is the <br> 7 principal squatter, out there paying? That's the real <br> 8 issue. They can't come in here and defend and say our <br> 9 damages claim suffers from a lack of proof when they <br> 10 are the principal squatter who's not paying. <br> 11 Mr. Orta talked about the Shufeldt case. If <br> 12 you read it, you will find out that while the <br> 13 legislature said the Contract was immediately brought <br> 14 to an end, the arbitrators specifically note that <br> 15 Mr . Shufeldt, like FVG, was still in possession of the <br> 16 Usufruct; and, despite the fact that he was in <br> 17 continued possession, they found, the arbitraries <br> 18 found that it had been a taking. <br> 19 On the issue of compensation, they would like <br> 20 you to believe they have offered compensation. They <br> 21 say that we can get our money back in the lesivo <br> 22 proceeding, but the only money we can get back is the |

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| 02:49:26 1 Canon fees we paid, not the compensation for the <br> 2 taking or for the lack of fair and equitable <br> 3 treatment. And that being the only compensation we <br> 4 can get, it is certainly not adequate, and there is no <br> 5 case which has ever held that a five-year delay in <br> 6 making payment was prompt compensation under the terms <br> 7 of the Treaty. They have clearly not provided prompt <br> 8 and adequate compensation, and that failure alone <br> 9 makes them liable for an indirect expropriation. <br> 10 On full protection and security, Mr. Orta <br> 11 says that we cited a few instances where we didn't <br> 12 think the Government acted quickly enough. It's <br> 13 important to note that all of those figures that we <br> 14 gave you with regard to the governmental actions, both <br> 15 before we got the Usufruct and after lesivo, all of <br> 16 those instances are compiled not from our data, but <br> 17 from the Government's own data that they provided in <br> 18 this arbitration. <br> 19 On the issue of damages, Mr. Orta says it is <br> 20 unrebutted that we had only losses. He repeated that <br> 21 five times. He was wrong the first time, the second <br> 22 time, the third time, the fourth time, and the fifth |  |
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|  | 02:53:24 1 it shifted over to Guatemala because as I mentioned, 2 there is a serious problem with the proof that has been presented here by the other side. <br> 4 Quality of the evidence, I mentioned it in the original presentation. I think it's worth underscoring yet again, and the presentation that's 7 been made both here and throughout the hearing and in the papers I think will back up what we are saying in terms of the evidence that has been presented by Claimant for its case, the newspaper articles, the inferential leaps, the speculation, that does not make out a CAFTA claim. We ask that the Tribunal focus on the contemporaneous evidence, the documents, the e-mails, the contracts, the lesivo opinions, the declarations by witnesses. We ask that you focus on those things as especially as corroborated by the contemporaneous writings, and we believe that when you do that, you will reach the same conclusion we have, which is the Claimants have not established any of the elements of their CAFTA claim. <br> 21 Now, there has been discussion about <br> 22 Presidential liability, and because we do think it |


| 02:54:48 1 does bear on the issue of the reasonableness of the 2 action taken by President Berger at the time that he <br> 3 issued the Lesivo Declaration, we wanted to highlight <br> 4 again for you the appropriate Articles, Articles 153 <br> 5 to 155 of the Guatemalan Constitution. We believe <br> 6 that they established that any public official, <br> 7 including the President--and you heard Mr. Mayora tell <br> 8 you yesterday, Claimant's Expert, that those clauses <br> 9 do apply to Presidential action, as Mr. Aguilar also <br> 10 confirmed for you. <br> 11 And the question is whether when confronted <br> 12 with a situation where your advisers are telling you <br> 13 you have a Contract that is illegal, is the President <br> 14 compelled to take action there; and, if he doesn't, <br> 15 does he face the risk of personal liability? We <br> 16 believe these articles confirm that the President does <br> 17 incur that risk and would be liable or would face the <br> 18 risk of liability for failing to take action. There <br> 19 was a question asked, it's been asked several times, <br> 20 are there any cases where a President has been <br> 21 confronted with a request for a Lesivo Declaration <br> 22 where that resulted in personal liability to the | 02:57:22 1 discretion to decide, to make decisions. Nowhere do 2 they say that. <br> 3 We thought it instructive to point to you <br> 4 testimony from Mr. Mayora on the issue of what a <br> 5 public official should do when confronted with an <br> 6 illegal Contract. Again, while Mr. Mayora claims that <br> 7 a President has no liability for failing to declare an <br> 8 illegal Contract lesivo, as I understand his opinion, <br> 9 because he has discretion to make that decision, his <br> 10 prior testimony does suggest that public officials <br> 11 must, and I underscore that word, "must" take action <br> 12 when confronted with an illegal Contract in order to <br> 13 elevate that illegal document to the Competent <br> 14 Authority for it to be dealt with. And I cite to you <br> 15 here transcript from the jurisdictional hearing where <br> 16 Mr. Mayora, in his own words, tells you that very <br> 17 thing. <br> 18 And that is what President Berger did here. <br> 19 He acted in the face of advice that the Fegua Overseer <br> 20 had executed a contract that was illegal. He elevated <br> 21 the issue to the appropriate Competent Authority, and <br> 22 that was the Attorney General of Guatemala, who then |
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| 02:56:09 1 President? And both experts told you that they <br> 2 weren't aware of any such case, and we're not aware of 3 one either. <br> 4 But it's probably not surprising because <br> 5 there probably aren't too many Presidents who <br> 6 disregard the advice of their legal advisers when <br> 7 confronted with an illegality. Probably, they follow <br> 8 that advice, as President Berger did here. Whether he <br> 9 had discretion to take the action or not, we <br> 10 understand this Tribunal has ruled already in the <br> 11 context of jurisdictional hearings that you believe <br> 12 the President has discretion to take action. Well, <br> 13 whether the President has discretion to take action or <br> 14 not is really--really doesn't address the question of <br> 15 whether the President would be liable for failing to <br> 16 respond to an illegality. He may or may not have had <br> 17 the discretion. Even if you assume that he did, the <br> 18 exercise of that discretion to not respond to an <br> 19 illegal situation can place the President at risk of <br> 20 personal liability under Article 153 through 155. You <br> 21 read those articles. Nowhere do they say there is an <br> 22 exception for public officials when they have | PAGE 2106 <br> 2106 <br> 02:58:42 1 took it to the Judicial Branch for the Judicial Branch <br> 2 to make the decision about whether the Contract is or 3 is not lesivo. <br> 4 I'm going to leave the screen up, which talks 5 about damages. I'm going to get to a few other issues 6 before I get to damages. <br> 7 First of all, on the issue of planning for <br> 8 this case, I think we highlighted a number of things <br> 9 on Claimant's immediate planning for bringing this <br> 10 action once the Lesivo Declaration was issued. <br> 11 Mr . Foster said that the record is going to <br> 12 substantiate that Mr. MacSwain said he was hired in <br> 132006 or 2007. I submit to you that it's clear in the <br> 14 record that he admitted he was hired in 2006. He was <br> 15 then asked when in 2006. He said he wasn't sure, but <br> 16 he said it was in 2006. <br> 17 And again, the fact that they're hiring their <br> 18 damages Expert, their real estate damages Expert, <br> 19 just--it has to have been short months, even if you <br> 20 give them the benefit of the doubt, after the Lesivo <br> 21 Declaration. That was issued basically the end of <br> 22 August. |

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| So, just very short months after that, giving <br> 2 them every benefit of the doubt, that tells you that <br> 3 they were planning to bring this case then as opposed <br> 4 to responding to the situation, as opposed to trying <br> 5 to salvage their investment if they really thought it <br> 6 was at risk, as opposed to going out and trying to <br> 7 obtain from customers and reassure them that the 8 business was going to go forward. <br> 9 On the issue of the investment that was made <br> 10 and the phases, we've heard time and time again that <br> 11 Claimant only made a promise to invest $\$ 10$ million, <br> 12 and they tell us that they only ever were obligated to <br> 13 complete Phase I. We don't believe that's what was <br> 14 promised, and that's in part why we said in our <br> 15 opening slides that Guatemala feels misled. You heard <br> 16 the testimony from the FEGUA Overseer who negotiated <br> 17 the Agreement, and he told you that is certainly not <br> 18 what he negotiated, and certainly not what he believed 19 he was getting. <br> 20 And on that point, I think it bears again, <br> 21 raising the rhetorical question, which I think is a <br> 22 really an interesting one: Is Claimant really | 03:02:36 1 squatters didn't go there when Claimant announced that 2 they were leaving the country publicly or as a result 3 of that or because of that? That happened in 2007, 4 mid-2007, and then very publicly in September 2007. 5 And $2 l l$ of the pictures that you have been provided 6 postdate that event by at least two years. <br> 7 On the issue of Government, whether any of 8 those industrial squatters are Government squatters, even if you get past the other hurdles that we've 10 mentioned, Claimants have ignored that in Contract 402 11 under Clause 11, they, under Clause 11 I , they agreed 12 to provide access to the right of way in the event of 13 public need, okay? Clause 11 which is titled 14 "obligations of the Usufructary," Clause I says, 15 provide access--one of the obligations. Among other 16 obligations, the Usufructary shall be bound to do the 17 following: Provide access to right of way in the 18 event of public need, including the access to 19 vehicles, passage, or pipe installation for carrying 20 drinking water or other liquids, for agricultural, <br> 21 irrigation, drainage, installation and conduction of 22 power, or telephone cables; right? They're |
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| 03:01:16 1 asserting in this case that they only had to build out 2200 miles of an $800-$ mile or a 500 -mile--excuse me--a <br> 3500 -mile restoration project. They were given over 4500 miles' worth of land to restore in the railway. <br> 5 Is it really their contention that they only have to 6 build out 200 of those miles and they get to keep the <br> 7 rest of the Government land for 50 years to exploit 8 however they like? Is that really what they believe 9 what they got from the Government? <br> 10 On the issue of industrial squatters, in <br> 11 addition to the points that we made earlier and I <br> 12 think that it's perhaps worth mentioning the one or <br> 13 one of the ones that I think is perhaps most <br> 14 resonating, which is that they cannot prove that the <br> 15 industrial squatters were there because of the Lesivo <br> 16 Declaration. All of the industrial squatters that <br> 17 they claim are there post-lesivo. And again, we <br> 18 believe there is deficiency of proof in whether they <br> 19 are there pre- or post-lesivo. We don't think they <br> 20 have actually submitted evidence to prove actually <br> 21 that they were there post-lesivo, but even if you <br> 22 believe that, what is to you say that those industrial | 03:04:05 1 complaining about public telephone or power cables 2 being put on their property, but they had an <br> 3 obligation to provide that pursuant to Contract 402 Section I. I'm sorry, Clause 11, Section I. <br> On the issue of the Presidential quote, they 6 cited to you C-131. They said that was a Government 7 newspaper. Well, you know, reporters make mistakes whether they work for a Government newspaper or not, and I just want to correct something for the record. When it was read into the record by Mr. Foster, he said and I quote, and then he went ahead to read the 2 President's-what he said was the President's words, but if you look at C-131, when they report what the 4 President purportedly said, there are no quotes--I 5 repeat, no quotes--around those words, so it's incorrect to say that there was a direct quote of the President in that exhibit. <br> 18 And just to remind the Tribunal, that goes to 9 the issue of whether there was any supposed <br> 50 million-dollar demand made by the President for restoration of the railway. <br> 22 On the issue of whether they made a |

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| 03:05:28 1 sufficient investment, again, they promised <br> 210 million. It's, I think, established in the record <br> 3 that the amount that they invested, whatever it actually is, was not enough to make this into a profitable investment. It just simply was not. And it wasn't enough to do the job that they promised, and at least according to the Government's version, an understanding of what they promised. And we know that because they, themselves, admit that it was going to cost at least a hundred million dollars--at least--to build out the second of five phases that they agreed to restore. At least a hundred million dollars. <br> And by the way, when they tell you that they had completed Phase II and they rely on that letter, well, you heard the testimony from Dr. Gramajo, but ask yourself why are they going to President Berger in March of 2006 to seek funding for the restoration of Phase II if they really believed that they had completed their obligations under that phase? Does that make any sense? <br> 21 We were told there was not one shred of 22 evidence that the Claimants were told that FVG was | 03:08:09 1 he was at that meeting and understood that it was 2 supposed to be a settlement meeting. So, the <br> 3 statement by Mr. Foster is contradicted by the evidence of record. <br> The fact that in the precursor of the document it says that Deed 143 and 158 were submitted to a public bidding process simply reflects that this is a Draft Agreement. People make mistakes when they draft. For him to suggest here without any shred of evidence that that means that the Government was simply going to bypass the very important requirement of a very important bidding process is simply nonsense. We know it's a draft. All you need to do is look at the document. There are a number of blanks 15 on it. You could see it on the screen. <br> 16 If we go to the portion of the document that <br> 17 talks about--please, Kelby, I think it's Section 3 or 18 four--bear with me--highlight four for a second. 19 Again, we've made this point--and just that 20 paragraph--the document, on its face, shows it's a 21 draft. It talks about the issues to be negotiated 22 between the Parties. Of course, it's going to contain |
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| PAGE 2112 <br> $03: 06: 43$ 1 <br> 2 told that Contract 143 and 158 had legal defects. <br> 3 Well, I think the record establishes that they were <br> 4 told that immediately upon Dr. Gramajo being informed <br> 4 of that. We would cite to you again R-8 and R-49, <br> 5 that's Dr. Gramajo's letter to Mr. Senn in April 2004; <br> 6 and R-9, which is a letter by Mr. Senn to <br> 7 Vice-Minister Diaz which confirms that they knew that <br> 8 the Government had problems with the Contract, and <br> 9 they were sitting down and negotiating with the <br> 10 Government about those problems. <br> 11 On the issue of C-44, I would like to put <br> 12 that document up, if we could. And, again for the <br> 13 record, C-44 is the settlement proposal that was <br> 14 given--that was given to Mr. Senn during the meeting <br> 15 that took place on 24 August 2006. <br> 16 First, for Mr. Foster to say that Mr. Senn <br> 17 did not know that he was showing up there to discuss <br> 18 settlement is contrary to both the testimony of <br> 19 Mr. Senn and the testimony of all the other witnesses <br> 20 who attended that meeting, including Mr. Fuentes, who <br> 21 told you that he had been commissioned by the <br> 22 President to try and find a solution to this, and that | PAGE 2114 <br> $03: 09: 33$ 1 <br> 2 mistakes. <br> 3 Clause Sixth, please. Okay. And let's highlight that <br> 4 again. <br> 5  <br> 6 meeting no hene told them--no one told Mr. Senn or the <br> 7 other representatives there on behalf of FVG that what <br> 8 the illegalities were, what the issues were that were <br> 9 motivating the Lesivo Declaration. Let's highlight <br> 10 all of Clause 6, please. You can see on the face of <br> 11 the document it says issues to be settled in <br> 12 connection with the Onerous Usufruct Contract, and <br> 13 then it talks about the Parties negotiating and <br> 14 deciding upon a number of things, and A says: <br> 15 "Modification to the Onerous Usufruct Contract <br> 16 Involving Railway Equipment in order to rectify the <br> 17 terms which are deemed to cause lesions to the <br> 18 interests of the State of Guatemala according to the <br> 19 opinions rendered by, "and then it sets forth three <br> 20 opinions there. Now, if Mr. Senn had, rather than <br> 21 simply rejecting outright the possibility of entering <br> 22 into a negotiation on this, rather than doing that, |

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| PAGE 2115 <br> $03: 10: 54$ 1 <br> 2 which is what the record evidence shows that he did, <br> 3 if heuld have engaged in a dialogue about this, I'm <br> 3 sure they would have discussed the issues that were <br> 4 set forth in the opinions; otherwise, there's no way <br> 5 they could have reached an agreement as to those <br> 6 points. They had to, by their very nature, discuss <br> 7 them. But the evidence is that he simply rejected the <br> 8 notion of entering into negotiations. <br> 9 On the issue of whether a public bid was <br> 10 required for entering into force of contract 143, they <br> 11 made mention--Mr. Foster made mention of the fact that <br> 12 I accurately represented the record on the issue of <br> 13 when Dr. Gramajo was first informed or notified that a <br> 14 public bid was required for Contract 143, and he <br> 15 says--I'm not entirely sure what the point is that <br> 16 he's establishing, other than some lawyers made <br> 17 mistakes. Lawyers do make mistakes. We all know <br> 18 that, that some lawyers who first looked at Contract <br> 19 143 and 158 assessed that it had some illegalities and <br> 20 didn't pick up on others doesn't prove anything. once <br> 21 the Government became aware that this was an issue--in <br> 22 other words, once under the Berger administration and | PAGE 2117 <br> $03: 13: 53$ 1 <br> 2 consideration when you assess that statement from <br> 3 Mranco. <br> 4 On the issue of--and this was raised in one <br> 4 of the questions, I believe, by Secretary <br> 5 Eizenstat--the other countries that have lesivo laws, <br> 6 well, we cited to you in the First Report of Professor <br> 7 Aguilar, I believe it's Section 1, Paragraph 1, that <br> 8 there are a number of countries who have lesivo laws. <br> 9 It's not just Guatemala. Spain, France, Mexico, Costa <br> 10 Rica, Ecuador, Argentina. And in relation to Spain's <br> 11 lesivo law, you heard from Mr. Foster that that law <br> 12 mentions or provides for an opportunity for the person <br> 13 who's affected by the Lesivo Declaration to be heard <br> 14 before the Iesivo Declaration is issued. Well, it's <br> 15 made clear in Paragraph 48 of Mr. Aguilar's opinion, <br> 16 First Opinion, the reason that is provided for in <br> 17 Spain's law is that unlike Guatemalan lesivo law, the <br> 18 Executive has the ability to declare null and void a <br> 19 contract on its own without submitting it to the <br> 20 Judicial Branch; and, under that circumstance, it <br> 21 makes a lot of sense as to why there is an opportunity <br> 22 to be heard given to the person who might be affected. |
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| 03:12:13 1 FEGUA Overseer became aware that this was an issue, it 2 was an issue that was brought--that was brought to the 3 attention of the Parties, and it was an issue that they focused on. They didn't disregard it. <br> 5 Again, on the issue of causation and damages, 6 I ask you to focus on the issue of their abandoning <br> 7 publicly their position in Guatemala and what that did <br> 8 in relation to any potential damages, and I ask again <br> 9 why aren't they out there today trying to collect <br> 10 rent? <br> 11 On the issue of the testimony from Mr. Franco <br> 12 about what some official in the court told him about <br> 13 whether or not the lesivo--the Opinion from the <br> 14 Administrative Court on the lesividad would be issued, <br> 15 again I think it's inherently unreliable. We don't <br> 16 know what the public official--what instruction the <br> 17 public official was given, if any, by whom. We know <br> 18 that Mr. Franco is a lawyer who has been working for <br> 19 the Claimant for quite a long time, and we know that <br> 20 his boss is sitting across from us at the table and is 21 one of the lawyers in this case. <br> 22 So, we ask you to take all of that into | PAGE 2118 <br> $03: 15: 25$ 1 <br> 2 submitted to an independent Judiciary, as you've now <br> 3 heard several times, and the Judicial Branch through <br> 4 the Administrative Court makes the determination about <br> 5 whether the Contract is or isn't lesivo, and the <br> 6 Claimant, as you know, or the affected Party is <br> 7 provided an opportunity to be heard there. <br> 8 Now, on the issue of profitability or lack of <br> 9 profitability of Claimant's investment through FVG, <br> 10 again we've heard that in 2oos there is a calculation <br> 11 that shows according to Mr. Foster that there was <br> 12 profit in that year. First of all, I want to point <br> 13 out to the Tribunal that he's referring to an exhibit <br> 14 that was provided by Mr. Posner, and that exhibit says <br> 15 nothing about profit. If we could put up the exhibit, <br> 16 it says nothing about profit. What it shows is the <br> 17 EBITDA of the company throughout a number of years <br> 18 when you factor in the Trust payments that they claim <br> 19 should have been provided, and you see that in the <br> 20 very last line: As estimated Fecua trust payments." <br> 21 And what's important to point out is that <br> 22 says nothing about profit. That says what the |

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| 03:17:04 1 earnings would be before you talk about income, 2 depreciation, taxes, and when you factor all those out 3 is only when you can determine whether or not there's 4 profit. So, that number tells you nothing about 5 whether the company was profitable in 2004. 6 And you see that even--even adding in the <br> 7 FEGUA Trust payments, one year later you have a <br> 8 negative number somewhere in the range of over <br> $9 \$ 400,000$. <br> 10 We can now put up the slides, please, or go <br> 11 back to the slides that we prepared. <br> 12 There was mention made of the bond--the <br> 13 particular example that was put up or that was put up <br> 14 by Professor Spiller, and suggesting that somehow <br> 15 Professor Spiller incorrectly is estimating the effect <br> 16 of amortization, and the problem with the example that <br> 17 was put up is that it was conducted over a five-year <br> 18 period and not a 42 -year period, which is the correct <br> 19 period to be estimated here, given the length of the <br> 20 Usufruct. And when you apply the correct discount <br> 21 rate, you can see, based on this slide, that there is <br> 22 still double counting to the tune of 82 percent. | 03:19:50 1 were supposed to recover that 5 million in debt <br> 2 through earnings from the easement revenues, but they <br> 3 were never able to do so. And that speaks volumes <br> 4 about the lack of demand based on the projections that <br> 5 they had for the real estate easement revenues. <br> 6 There were questions raised about the <br> 7 possibility of awarding damages based on sunk costs or <br> 8 historical costs. We have included here some slides <br> 9 in relation to this issue. It is our contention that <br> 10 that standard would not be appropriate here. That <br> 11 standard to the extent it's been used and it has been <br> 12 used by some tribunals as pointed out by Professor <br> 13 Crawford, is more appropriate or apt for an investment <br> 14 that is cut off at the knees at its infancy. That is <br> 15 not this case. This investment was ongoing for more <br> 16 than eight years, and we won't belabor the point. <br> 17 We've included a number of slides here, but the point <br> 18 is we do not believe that that is the appropriate <br> 19 standard. And based on the appropriate standard, as <br> 20 we've told you, we believe the Fair Market Value of <br> 21 the investment at the time of the alleged <br> 22 expropriatory act or wrongful conduct by Guatemala, |
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| PAGE 2120 <br> $03: 18: 33$ 1 <br> 2 believe it should not be compounded. On the issue of <br> 3 forced loan, the forced loan theory, we don't think <br> 4 that is the proper standard that should be utilized by <br> 5 this Tribunal. The proper standard should be the <br> 6 reinvestment rate, if any damages are granted and <br> 7 pre-award interest is awarded, and we believe that the <br> 8 correct rate is the one that we have suggested to you, <br> 9 which is the commercially reasonable rate such as <br> 10 LiBoR plus 2 percent. And we cite to you here some <br> 11 awards that have used that rate. <br> 12 This point, I have already made, which is the <br> 13 lack of profitability. <br> 14 I would also like to point out that while <br> 15 they talk about a 10 million-dollar investment and <br> 16 they talk about the fact that their real estate <br> 17 revenues were soon to be going very upwardly in a <br> 18 positive trajectory, that they promised in their bid <br> 19 that they would be using the real estate revenues in <br> 20 order to service \$5 million of the what they say is <br> 21 promised 10 million-dollar investment. They said <br> 22 5 million in equity and 5 million in debt, and they |  |

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| 03:22:26 1 would mean would not be a modification of the existing 2 agreement because that agreement, on its face, based 3 on the illegalities, can't be remedied. But the idea, 4 as I understand it was for the Parties to enter into a 5 settlement in order to execute a new Usufruct <br> 6 Equipment Contract and celebrate a new public bid that <br> 7 would take away or basically deal with the problems <br> 8 that caused the Agreement to be lesivo. As evidence <br> 9 of that, I point you to $\mathrm{R}-36$ and $\mathrm{R}-37$, where <br> 10 immediately post-lesivo, when the Parties actually do <br> 11 sit down to discuss the issue of the Equipment <br> 12 Contract and its illegalities, that is precisely what <br> 13 the Parties were discussing. They were discussing the <br> 14 execution of a new Equipment Contract. <br> 15 And as I pointed out before, document <br> 16 R-37--and you will see, if you go through it, the <br> 17 minutes $\mathrm{R}-36$ and $\mathrm{R}-37$ of the meetings that took place <br> 18 just after the Lesivo Declaration, in R-37 you see <br> 19 that FVG, through Mr. Senn, said that they really <br> 20 weren't too interested in doing that because, as <br> 21 Mr. Senn said, that was of secondary priority to them, <br> 22 given that they wouldn't need the rail equipment for | 03:26:00 1 the Fair Market Value of the investment at the time of 2 the Act. Why do I say that? Because the Discounted <br> 3 Cash Flow analysis, as we've pointed out both in our <br> 4 Memorials and in the Report of Professor Spiller, does <br> 5 provide full reparation to the Parties and in this <br> 6 case in this instance to the Claimant. So we believe <br> 7 that that would be in the first instance the correct <br> 8 standard for the Tribunal to apply. <br> 9 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Somehow it probably <br> 10 implies that you've lost the investment, whereas you <br> 11 could have a breach of FET which leaves with the <br> 12 investment. The investment may be worth less, it <br> 13 might be a lot less than it would have had there been <br> 14 no breach, but it's not necessarily worth nothing. <br> 15 The problem--and I would be interested in <br> 16 further enlightenment because in another case I <br> 17 basically left the Tribunal--the Tribunal basically <br> 18 left the Claimant in situ having paid--having awarded <br> 19 damages for breach of fair and equitable treatment and <br> 20 therefore didn't resolve the dispute between the <br> 21 Parties. Now, I understand this is slightly academic <br> 22 because you agreed between you that whatever the basis |
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| 03:23:49 1 Phase II because that would be standard gauge. <br> 2 PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you. <br> 3 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Mr. Orta, the Parties <br> 4 are agreed that if the Tribunal were to award damages, <br> 5 it would be appropriate for the Claimants to return <br> 6 its assets, cancel its contracts, et cetera, in <br> 7 Guatemala. Now, one can understand the juridical <br> 8 basis for that in the event that we found an <br> 9 expropriation, and you might say if the Parties are <br> 10 agreed, then it's not a problem finding a juridical <br> 11 basis. <br> 12 But let's assume the Parties are not agreed. <br> 13 Let's assume that the breach that was found was a <br> 14 breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. <br> 15 On what basis could we condition an award of damages <br> 16 in relation to the return of the property? <br> 17 MR. ORTA: Just bear with me one second. <br> 18 (Pause.) <br> 19 MR. ORTA: Professor Crawford, again we think <br> 20 that the appropriate standard under CAFTA is the Fair <br> 21 Market Value analysis. And so, I think again, based <br> 22 on that question, the Tribunal would be answer what is | PAGE 2126 <br> 03:27:25 1 for recovery might be, if there is any, that condition <br> 2 should be attached to it, but I'm interested in the <br> 3 theory of the claim, bearing in mind that you could <br> 4 have a breach of fair and equitable treatment, which <br> 5 led to a recovery of small amount of money or the <br> 6 recovery of virtually the entire investment. <br> 7 MR. ORTA: Thank you, Professor Crawford. I <br> 8 have two different things to suggest there. The first <br> 9 is--and this relates to, I guess in part, the slides <br> 10 that we put up just toward the end, but if the <br> 11 Tribunal under that circumstance, for example, were <br> 12 wanting to consider a remuneration or I guess an <br> 13 evaluation of a possible remuneration to Claimant <br> 14 based on the--on their capital contributions, their <br> 15 net capital contributions, I think in this particular <br> 16 case you would have to take into account the fact that <br> 17 the Claimant made investment early on in 1999 and <br> 18 2000, and I think as we heard from Professor Spiller <br> 19 there were some perhaps minor additional investments <br> 20 of about 500,000 in 2000 and 2001, and then the <br> 21 investment stopped. And what you have after that is <br> 22 simply capital contributions to cover losses. |

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| So, I mean, I think in that circumstance it <br> 2 would be--it would be difficult to determine what, if <br> 3 anything, the Claimant in this case should be awarded <br> 4 because by the time you get to 2006, you know, through <br> 5 just the actions that took place in relation to their <br> 6 investment in Guatemala, the lack of demand and lack <br> 7 of financing and funding and other things, they had <br> 8 really basically already burned up the investment that <br> 9 they had made, and they were staying afloat, as I say, <br> 10 by asking their Shareholders, in particular their <br> 11 principal Shareholder, to contribute to keep them <br> 12 afloat. <br> 13 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Now the concern relates <br> 14 to the question what would have been the subject of an <br> 15 expropriation in the event the Tribunal were to find 16 an expro. <br> 17 The Equipment Contract is a separate legal <br> 18 document, and in the event that there was an indirect <br> 19 expropriation, it is at least arguable that it was <br> 20 limited to the Equipment Contract or to the legal <br> 21 interests associated with it. After all, at least in <br> 22 theory, the Claimant retained its rights in relation | 03:32:00 1 Claimant was no longer making any investment per se <br> 2 into the railroad operations. They were simply <br> funding through capital contributions the shortfalls that they were having in order to stay afloat. <br> 5 <br> So, I think, in relation to the Declaration <br> of Lesivo of that agreement, what we're really faced <br> with is an issue where they could only use that equipment to operate Phase I, and Phase I, by their own admission, produced only losses. <br> 10 In relation to the operation of the train in <br> 11 any other phase, you've heard that, as to Phase II it <br> 12 would require different equipment. So, this has no <br> 13 effect on that. To the extent there is an <br> 14 expropriation or some wrongful conduct under CAFTA in <br> 15 relation to the Railway Equipment Contract, it doesn't <br> 16 affect their ability to operate in any of the other phases per their own admissions. <br> 18 So, you're faced with an issue where you have <br> 19 equipment that perhaps they can't utilize in Phase I, <br> 20 although again we claim they have every right to do <br> 21 that today. They could be operating the trains today <br> 22 in Phase I if they hadn't left the country. |
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| PAGE 2128 <br> $03: 30: 391$ to the right of way for other purposes, and it's <br> 2 agreed that the value of the commercial interests <br> 3 associated with the right of way were potentially <br> 4 greater than in relation to the conduct of the <br> 5 railway. It would be a somewhat Solomonic verdict to <br> 6 say that the expropriation was limited to the <br> 7 Equipment Contract, but I would be interested in your <br> 8 comments on that. <br> 9 MR. ORTA: Professor Crawford, I think we <br> 10 agree in this case that the Contract that's at <br> 11 issue--we understand the Claimant has a different <br> 12 viewpoint, but the Contract that's at issue that was <br> 13 declared lesivo is the Equipment Contract, and we <br> 14 believe that there have been a series of concessions <br> 15 made in relation to Contract 402 that established by <br> 16 Claimant's own words that it's wholly unconnected <br> 17 to--well, the substantial part of their revenue of the <br> 18 real estate is wholly unconnected to the entire <br> 19 railway operation. <br> 20 Now, getting directly to your question, the <br> 21 Equipment Contract at issue here was entered into in <br> 22 2003. And as I mentioned, by that point in time the |  |

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| PAGE 2131 <br> 03:35:13 1 recovery at all? This goes back to a question I asked <br> 2 you this morning, where you said we didn't need to <br> 3 decide the lesivo issue, and I said we might not need <br> 4 to decide it, but if we did decided, it surely would <br> 5 be relevant to the case. I mean, I don't want to put <br> 6 your case higher than you put it, but I would <br> appreciate any comment you have on that scenario. <br> 8 I should say that these questions are asked <br> to the Claimant as well. <br> 10 MR. ORTA: If you just give me one second to ponder that, Professor Crawford. <br> ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: These questions are <br> asked to you as well, so you may in due course like to comment on them. <br> 15 MR. FOSTER: You mean I can't sleep? <br> 16 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: You might have to. It has to be done today. <br> 18 (Pause.) <br> 19 MR. ORTA: All right, here is my best shot. <br> 20 So, if this Tribunal were to determine that <br> 21 the Lesivo Declaration was proper-- <br> 22 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: In terms of Guatemalan | PAGE 2133  <br> $03: 38: 34$ 1 And with respect to the other claims, full <br> 2 protection and security and national treatment, again  <br> 3 I think those fall away just by their inability to  <br> 4 meet the elements. But on the expropriation, given  <br> 5 the substantiality requirement, I think that claim  <br> 6 would fall away because they couldn't meet the  <br> 7 threshold element that it would have to be substantial  <br> 8 enough, the effect, so as to allow for compensation to  <br> 9 begin with.  <br> 10 $\quad$ ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: Thank you very much.  <br> 11 MR. FOSTER: I'm afraid we're going to get a  <br> 12 bill from Cambridge at the end of this for this  <br> 13 seminar.  <br> 14 ARBTTRATOR CRAWFORD: If it came from  <br> 15 Cambridge, it would be a very modest bill.  <br> 16 $\quad$ MR. FOSTER: Iet me go back to one of your  <br> 17 first questions about the effect of a decision on the  <br> 18 existing leases. The way I answered the question this  <br> 19 morning was, and I hope it was because I intentionally  <br> 20 chose my words carefully as opposed to sheer accident,  <br> 21 but what I said was that if you awarded full  <br> 22 reparation, however you define that, if you awarded  |
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| PAGE 2132 <br> $03: 37: 25$ 1 <br> 2 law. <br> 3 it's our contention that there would be no conduct--no <br> 4 conduct that would have offended the claims under <br> 5 CAFTA because, first, as it relates to expropriation, <br> 6 there would---they still would be in possession of what <br> 7 they have admitted as the biggest part of their <br> 8 investment. <br> 9 So, even if you admit or even if you allow <br> 10 for the position that this has affected their ability <br> 11 to conduct railway operations in the first phase, <br> 12 which is the only phase as a matter of record that <br> 13 they would be using that equipment to begin with, <br> 14 that, per their own admission, would represent no more <br> 15 than 8 percent of their revenues, and so there would <br> 16 be no expropriation because it wouldn't be substantial <br> 17 enough. <br> 18 And in any event, you're ruling that it's <br> 19 proper so there is no improper conduct that would be <br> 20 violative of carTA to begin with, and I think that <br> 21 would take care of the inquiry with respect to fair <br> 22 and equitable treatment. | PAGE 2134 <br> 2134 <br> 03:40:03 1 full reparations, whether it's--for whatever State 2 action that violates international law, once you Award <br> 3 full reparations, then the payor of those reparations, <br> 4 the State, is subrogated to all of our rights under <br> 5 the Contract, its Contract, it seems to me. <br> 6 And therefore, it seems to me that the <br> 7 fashioning of your Award to the extent that you'd <br> 8 concluded that what you were awarding were full <br> 9 reparations, fashioning it in that fashion you would <br> 10 automatically cause Guatemala to be subrogated to our <br> 11 rights under the leases. So, that would be my comment <br> 12 on that one. <br> 13 On your more recent question, I believe it <br> 14 was one of the drafters of the Articles on State <br> 15 responsibility--I certainly hope it was you, but I <br> 16 can't remember which one it was, but I think one of <br> 17 the things that was said was that a Government can't <br> 18 rely upon necessity under its own internal laws to <br> 19 justify breach of international law, and so even if <br> 20 the Declaration of Lesivo might have been legal under <br> 21 Guatemalan law, then you still have to examine it <br> 22 under the applicable principles of international law. |

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| 03:41:36 1 I mean, except for--for example, except for the time, 2 putting the time period aside, they have apparently <br> 3 complied with what they think Guatemalan law is in <br> 4 connection with the Declaration of Lesivo, but that <br> 5 doesn't mean it satisfies the requirements of 6 customary international law. <br> 7 ARBITRATOR CRAWFORD: It was Professor Ago, 8 but I agreed with him, so the rule survived. <br> 9 ARBITRATOR EIZENSTAT: I think that what I <br> 10 would like to do is we're going to ask my questions, <br> 11 rather than going one by one giving each of you a <br> 12 series of questions, and I have every reason to <br> 13 believe you'll both take good notes and that unlike <br> 14 some of the witnesses you will be direct in answering <br> 15 rather than feeling you're paid by the word. <br> 16 So, let me for the Claimant ask the <br> 17 following, and these likewise are in no particular <br> 18 order and I have gone over some of this in your <br> 19 original presentations, and I will try to avoid being <br> 20 repetitive. <br> 21 First is whether there is a tension in your <br> 22 two themes of why Guatemala issued the lesivo | 03:45:27 1 developer. <br> Now, you mentioned earlier that you wanted to <br> do the right thing and give Guatemala an operating <br> railroad, and that's why you really invested more than <br> the minimum amount you could, but at this point it's <br> difficult for me to understand the thinking behind <br> your declaring that you were a dead man walking <br> because that would seem to make it more difficult for <br> 9 you to obtain rentals in the future or to keep <br> 10 squatters off or collect from squatters even now. <br> 11 Third, and this may relate to something James <br> 12 got into, but if we were to conclude that the <br> 13 Government acted unreasonably but did not sufficiently <br> 14 impair your investment, how would you propose that we <br> 15 go about looking at a damage analysis? How would it <br> 16 differ from the damage analysis, if at all, if there <br> 17 were an expropriation? And how would that damage <br> 18 analysis be implicated by your obligation to mitigate <br> 19 your damages? <br> 20 Then for the Respondent, there seems to be a <br> 21 clear difference in what Party believed the original <br> 22 Contract obligated Ferrovías to do, the one phase |
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| 03:43:21 1 Declaration. On the one hand, you seem to argue that 2 the process was designed to extract additional <br> 3 concessions that went beyond 143 and 158, \$50 million, <br> 4 for example, development of the South Coast and so <br> 5 forth. On the other hand, you argue that the purpose <br> 6 of the exercise was to transfer control to <br> 7 Mr . Campollo, and I would like to ask whether there is <br> 8 any seemingly conflicting objective here and an <br> 9 inconsistent argument about what their motive might <br> 10 have been. <br> 11 Second to the Claimant is that once lesivo <br> 12 was declared and you issued your--had your press <br> 13 conference and your press release, one might have <br> 14 thought, since the principal benefit of your Contract <br> 15 was in 402 and the right of way, which was at least <br> 16 not directly related, that you might have tried to <br> 17 reassure your financiers, your suppliers, your <br> 18 customers, that you were there to stay in Guatemala to <br> 19 develop this most valuable piece of your Contract, <br> 20 that you already have contracts which continue to this <br> 21 day and which, as we have seen, have increased in <br> 22 revenue, and that you become in effect a real estate | PAGE 2138 <br> 03:47:42 1 versus the five phases, but the Contract seems to talk <br> 2 about initiating rather than completing work, and <br> 3 there was evidence introduced by the Claimant in which <br> 4 it appears that FEGUA specifically confirmed that <br> 5 Ferrovías had sustained its obligations on phases, at <br> 6 least on Phase II and perhaps at Phase III--it was not <br> 7 possible to succeed, so I would like to have your <br> 8 thoughts on that, not what you hoped to get, but what <br> 9 did the Contract actually require and why was it that <br> 10 FEGUA seemed to put its imprimatur on the Claimant's <br> 11 fulfillment of that? <br> 12 I would like to hear you--and this actually I <br> 13 think both is on the power and authority of the <br> 14 Overseer of $\operatorname{FECUA}$ when he signed 143 and 158 , signed a <br> 15 letter authorizations, accepted Canon payments. If <br> 16 you're saying that he acted in some ultra vires way, <br> 17 nevertheless what should the Tribunal conclude in the <br> 18 fact that he was an official of the Contracting Party <br> 19 here. <br> 20 Next, to the Respondent, it appears to me <br> 21 that there were sort of three opportunities to get <br> 22 this Contract right, which was Contract at least |

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| 03:50:15 1 seemed to me to be initiated by FEGUA, and it's <br> 2 certainly signed by it. In 41 they didn't apparently <br> 3 get the Presidential approval. <br> 4 And perhaps because they didn't, they then <br> 5 wrote 143 and 158 not to require it, at least that's <br> 6 what Mr. Gramajo I thought said several times very, <br> 7 very strongly, did not require Presidential approval, <br> 8 and maybe the reason it didn't is because they had <br> 9 tried to get it under 41, and the previous Overseer <br> 10 was at the door as the hourglass was running out on <br> 11 the administration, which I've participated in, too, <br> 12 and couldn't get it, and maybe that was why. <br> 13 And then in $\mathrm{C}-44$, when you come up with this <br> 14 proposal which went well beyond, well beyond <br> 15 correcting the defects of 143 and 158 , you yourself <br> 16 said that there was a mistake made, there was a draft, <br> 17 certainly you can see it was a draft as you point out, <br> 18 and saying that mistake with respect to whether there <br> 19 was a requirement for a bid. I mean, how many <br> 20 mistakes can one keep making here. The lawyers who <br> 21 presumably wrote 143 and 158 not to require <br> 22 presidential, then come up with the notion that it is | 03:53:50 1 a substantial permanent deprivation of Claimant's <br> 2 investments or the enjoyment of those investments' <br> 3 economic benefits." <br> $4 \quad$ So, is there an agreement between you that <br> 5 that is essentially the standard we should be looking <br> 6 at for indirect expropriation. <br> 7 And then I guess the last issue I would <br> 8 really go back, although I think you've answered it, <br> 9 but it's still a question in my mind of why if the <br> 10 defect was in 143 and 158 so much time was spent on <br> 11 issues that involved 402 and 820 . In that respect my <br> 12 last question would be just factually, has either <br> 13 Party--my understanding is that under 802 there was an <br> 14 obligation on both Parties to pay under the Trust <br> 15 Fund. Did either Party pay under the Trust Fund and 16 when? <br> 17 I'm going to conclude with that, but I would <br> 18 be remiss if I didn't add one other personal thing, <br> 19 and that is I think that the quality of the legal <br> 20 presentations has been extraordinary on both sides. I <br> 21 think you've each done a tremendous job of <br> 22 representing your clients, both in the written |
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| PAGE 2140 <br> $03: 51: 53$ 1 <br> 2 required, and there is no way to get it, apparently, <br> 3 so if you could address that, that would be <br> 4 appreciated. <br> 5 Then I want to see if you can make our job a <br> 6 little bit easier on some of these standards if we <br> 7 have to get to it. Under the fair and equitable <br> 8 treatment standard there is a very vigorous debate <br> 9 about what customary international law means here, but <br> 10 for our purposes, is there essentially an agreement, <br> 11 and whether you look at a free-standing standard or <br> 12 others, that it'd be still applying a standard that <br> 13 would incorporate protections against arbitrariness, <br> 14 nontransparency, and frustration of legitimate <br> 15 expectations? And I would ask both Parties that. <br> 16 And the last issue where again you might be <br> 17 able to make our life a little easier, if we can <br> 18 narrow the differences, and that is the standard, if <br> 19 we were to find an indirect expropriation, the <br> 20 Respondent cites to a paragraph in RDC's Reply that <br> 21 quotes the following language from Vivendi III: "This <br> 22 Tribunal will have to determine whether they affected | PAGE 2142 <br> 03:55:17 1 <br> 2 presentations and the questions and the demeanor <br> 3 you've presented and the insightfulness of your <br> 4 very, very high quality of representation of your <br> 5 clients. <br> 6 $\quad$ That's not a question. <br> 7 $\quad$ (Laughter.) <br> 7 $\quad$ MR. FOSTER: But it deserves an answer. <br> 8 Thank you. <br> 10 $\quad$ David is looking at me as though he wants to <br> 11 take the second shot rather than the first shot, so I <br> 12 will take the first shot. <br> 13 And your first question was about a potential <br> 14 tension as between our themes, and I think it will <br> 15 come as no surprise to you when I say that I don't <br> 16 think that there is a tension. There was a perfect <br> 17 storm of confluence of interest here. on the one <br> 18 hand, Dr. Gramajo wanted control. He didn't like at <br> 19 all the fact that Ferrovias had control of assets that <br> 20 he wanted to have control of. <br> 21 on the other hand, Ramon Campollo, he didn't <br> 22 really care whether we invested the $\$ 50$ million or a |

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| 03:56:41 1 hundred million dollars or how much ever it was in 2 order to rebuild the South Coast for his benefit, or <br> 3 he took it away from us and could then do with it as <br> 4 he wanted for his benefit. He was clearly interested <br> 5 in the South Coast aspect of the line, and so he <br> 6 didn't care, and that coincided perfectly with <br> 7 Dr. Gramajo's interest because he wasn't interested in <br> 8 the south Coast because it was going to be a wide <br> 9 gauge railroad, and his interest was in the old <br> 10 locomotives and the old cars for the FEGUA Railroad Museum. <br> 12 So, I think that, in fact, the--and I think, <br> 13 as I read the evidence in any event, those paths, <br> 14 while they started out differently and perhaps without <br> 15 coordination, as time went on they converged, and I <br> 16 think what you see from the timeline of the <br> 17 Campollo/Pinto involvement, if you go back and look at <br> 18 it, that they started out, I think Mr. Campollo was <br> 19 pretty much a lone wolf back in 2001, and that was <br> 20 before Dr. Gramajo even got involved, but Campollo was <br> 21 interested in the deal, then Gramajo gets involved <br> 22 when he becomes the Overseer, and he has an interest | 03:59:56 1 we're focusing on here. <br> 2 And the fundamental issue, I think, is that <br> 3 they were, as the witnesses have, I think, on both <br> 4 sides have described, they were inextricably <br> 5 intertwined. If we don't have the equipment, we can't <br> 6 run the trains. If we can't run the trains, we <br> 7 default under default 402 because we can't provide <br> 8 service, so we lose the real estate one way or <br> 9 another. It doesn't make any difference. <br> 10 Now, turning to the press release itself, <br> 11 Kevin says, and I think he's right, that you really <br> 12 need to read this press release in its entirety so you <br> 13 get the flavor of what was being said. <br> 14 And one of the things that was said in this <br> 15 press release--and just before I say this, let me <br> 16 point out, that remember the press release when it was <br> 17 issued on August the 28th was in English, and it <br> 18 appeared only on RDC's Web site. It was not published <br> 19 in Spanish until the publication on September 4, in <br> 20 Prensa Libre. So, I point that out, not that I think <br> 21 it's critical for the question you're answering, but <br> 22 just to get the context right. |
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| 03:58:08 1 in getting rid of Ferrovías. Campollo has an interest <br> 2 in getting rid of Ferrovías, and their paths <br> 3 inexorably converge. <br> 4 Thank you, Kevin. Your second question had <br> 5 to do with the press release, and you said since the <br> 6 prime benefit was in Contract 402, why didn't we do <br> 7 more reassurance and so forth. Well, remember that a <br> 8 lot of, as you said, the financiers, suppliers and <br> 9 customers, well, the customers, the railroad customers <br> 10 as to which we presented evidence, they weren't <br> 11 concerned with 402, except in a way that I will <br> 12 explain, they were concerned in operation of the <br> 13 railroad and the Equipment Contract specifically would <br> 14 have been their interest. The financiers wouldn't <br> 15 have cared which contract was under threat, and all of <br> 16 this is if anyone really understood what was going on. <br> 17 You will notice in those various and sundry press <br> 18 Reports, the President doesn't say, "I'm declaring <br> 19 Contract 143/158 lesivo, but I want 50 million-dollar <br> 20 investment under Contract 402." Nobody was focusing <br> 21 upon that technicality at that time. That <br> 22 technicality or that difference is something that | PAGE 2146  <br> $04: 01: 24$ 1 $\quad$ But the press release goes on to say, "This <br> 2 is now more than an investment for us; it is a  <br> 3 struggle for justice. We remain convinced that the  <br> 4 railway plays an important role in a country that  <br> 5 abandoned its railway in 1996 and currently does not  <br> 6 depend on either unrealistic schemes or Government  <br> 7 subsidies. For this reason, we will not only continue  <br> 8 to advocate for the implementation of our Business  <br> 9 plan as we originally conceived it, but also to fight  <br> 10 for the right to do so against a Government that has  <br> 11 gone out of its way to obstruct our progress by  <br> 12 violating the terms of the railroad infrastructure  <br> 13 trust and begin something that will ultimately result  <br> 14 in the expropriation of our Usufruct. This is a  <br> 15 commitment we have to our 62 shareholders, our  <br> 16 customers, and our employees."  <br> 17 "We also have this commitment to our country,  <br> 18 not only as a company formed to provide much needed  <br> 19 strategic transportation infrastructure, but as  <br> 20 individuals opposed to a culture of corruption and  <br> 21 denial of justice."  <br> 22 So, this press release was saying two things:  |

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| 04:02:39 1 Number one, it was assuring our customers, our 2 suppliers, and others that we were committed to this <br> 3 fight. We weren't packing up and leaving, as Mr. Orta 4 would have you believe. We were saying publicly that <br> 5 we were not going to pack up and leave. We're going 6 to stay and fight. <br> 7 And, number two, I think that from the <br> 8 language of this press release, it is very obvious <br> 9 that the purpose that I described earlier today that <br> 10 we were trying to put pressure on the Government in <br> 11 order to cause the Government to reverse its decision. <br> 12 And that's the thrust, I think, that reading the press <br> 13 release as a whole and fairly interpreting it. <br> 14 Those are the two thrusts of the press <br> 15 release. <br> 16 Now, the third question was if the Government <br> 17 acted unreasonably but did not sufficiently impair the <br> 18 Usufruct, how do you look at the damages analysis, is <br> 19 it different, and how is it implicated by the <br> 20 obligation to mitigate? Let us suppose, for example, <br> 21 you concluded that the denial of fair and equitable <br> 22 treatment was such, and in particular that it was | 04:05:22 1 Number two, you have to give us what we would have 2 earned on that investment if we had had it, and we are <br> 3 in the business of doing what we do, and you have a <br> 4 Weighted Average Cost of Capital computation for that <br> 5 business, and I would suggest that you have to use <br> 6 that to bring the investment to its value in 2006. <br> 7 And the third thing, if you're putting us <br> 8 back in as though we hadn't made the investment, then <br> 9 we wouldn't have spent the legal fees and had the cost <br> 10 and expenses of the arbitration, either. <br> 11 So, I think there is--there are implications <br> 12 for the necessary components of the Award. In other <br> 13 words, I think that fees and expenses are a critical <br> 14 component if you look at it that way, whereas--and <br> 15 they don't even go to the question of looking at it to <br> 16 see, you know, the general balancing test that you <br> 17 would use for awarding fees and expenses. <br> 18 And mitigation, I think mitigation applies to <br> 19 everything. We're not contending that Professor <br> 20 Crawford intimated that an argument could be made that <br> 21 in a fair and equitable treatment analysis, if you <br> 22 found that it hadn't completely destroyed the value of |
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| PAGE 2148 <br> 04:03:58 1 based upon a frustration of legitimate expectations, <br> 2 and that in effect we had been led down the river and <br> 3 ambushed. And you concluded that in that case, for 4 example, you might conclude either one of two ways of looking at damages. One, you could conclude that that 6 denial of fair and equitable treatment was so complete 7 because the Declaration of lesivo so completely destroyed the business that you were going to award the budget of measure damages that we've urged you to 10 award, which is both the return of the investment and <br> 11 lost profits with the amortization of the investment. 12 On the other hand, you also could conclude <br> 13 that you were going to put us back in the position as <br> 14 if we had never made the investment. This was the <br> 15 suggestion that Professor Crawford made the other day <br> 16 as a potential way to look at a measure of damages, <br> 17 and I think it's particularly relevant to a fair and 18 equitable treatment analysis. <br> 19 Now, if you decided to do that, to put us <br> 20 back as if we hadn't made the investment, then it <br> 21 seems to me that you've got to do three things: <br> 22 Number one, you've got to give us our investment back. | PAGE 2150 <br> 04:06:55 1 <br> 2 the investment, that then in those circumstances we <br> 3 might be left in the position of continuing to collect <br> 3 under our leases. I think that is an accurate <br> 4 analysis if you came to that conclusion. But if you <br> 5 come to the conclusion that we are urging you to come <br> 6 to, that the denial of fair and equitable treatment <br> 7 essentially destroyed the investment, then I think <br> 8 mitigation always applies. <br> 9 So, the issue of mitigation will depend upon <br> 10 how you approach this whole question of what portion, <br> 11 if not all, of the investment was destroyed. <br> 12 Power and authority of the Overseer, I'm not <br> 13 sure whether that's a question you directed to us, but <br> 14 I will briefly say something about it. As you know, <br> 15 our expert has testified that this is an autonomous <br> 16 entity; and, as an autonomous entity, the overseer of <br> 17 FeGuA has all of those powers and authorities, and <br> 18 that's the reason why our Expert testified that no <br> 19 presidential approval was required, because it's not <br> 20 necessary. The Overseer has those powers. <br> 21 You asked the question about how many <br> 22 mistakes can be made, well, candidly, I don't think |

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| 04:08:17 1 they were mistakes, but that's more a question devoted 2 to Mr. Orta than to me. <br> 3 Trying to agree on a standard under customary 4 international law with regard to fair and equitable <br> 5 treatment, we certainly think--we certainly believe <br> 6 that both arbitrariness and bad faith--you didn't <br> 7 mention bad faith in your recitation of the standards, <br> 8 but we certainly think that bad faith is a part of it. <br> 9 Nontransparency and frustration of legitimate <br> 10 expectations, we believe all of those are important. <br> 11 Insofar as the standard of indirect <br> 12 expropriation, I believe the Parties agree that it's a <br> 13 substantial--I don't know that we agree it has to be <br> 14 permanent. I think it has to be of substantial <br> 15 duration. In fact, I don't think the cases support <br> 16 the idea that it has to be permanent, but it does have <br> 17 to be of substantial duration. Deprivation of the <br> 18 investment or the enjoyment of the reasonably <br> 19 expected. I believe the cases used the term <br> 20 "reasonably expected" benefits of the investment, and <br> 21 we think that's what the standard is. <br> 22 Your last question was, did we pay into the | 04:20:31 1 view is in relation to what the restoration <br> 2 obligations were under Contract 402 in relation to <br> 3 precisely what the contract says and, also I believe <br> 4 you asked about the letter in relation to Phase II <br> that had been--that's been a matter of record. <br> I will start with acknowledging that in the <br> Contract, it's Contract 402, and it's Paragraph 13 or <br> Article 13 of the Contract, every single one of the <br> Restoration Clauses in relation to Phase I through <br> 10 Phase 5 they all have the same verbiage, and they all <br> 11 state that the Usufructary has the obligation to <br> 12 begin--bear with me. Let's make sure I get the <br> 13 language correct--so, it's up on the screen now. It <br> 14 says--and notice it's the same in relation to Phase I <br> 15 which in the very first one as it is in relation to <br> 16 Phase II, III, IV, and $V$, and they have the exact same <br> 17 verbiage: "Shall begin restoration within $X$ period of <br> 18 time," and it defines a different period of time for <br> 19 each phase. <br> 20 And then at the end of each it says that--so <br> 21 it says that--bear with me--railway cargo <br> 22 transportation shall be offered in relation to the |
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|  | PAGE 2154 <br> $04: 22: 38$ 1 <br> 2 Phase, shall be offered in at least one segment within <br> 2 a six month term as of the date that that Phase is <br> 3 supposed to begin. <br> 4 Now, we start with the Clause doesn't say <br> 5 when the restoration is supposed to be completed--or, <br> 6 quite frankly, on its terms whether it's supposed to <br> 7 be completed. But from our understanding of what was <br> 8 bid out and what was negotiated, the Guatemalan <br> 9 Government put out a bid for restoration of its <br> 10 railway and gave the land to FVG in order to carry out <br> 11 the restoration. <br> 12 Now, it appears that in the drafting of this <br> 13 Contract there is a lacuna. It doesn't say when <br> 14 exactly the Phases are to be completed, but it doesn't <br> 15 say they're not to be completed, it doesn't say they <br> 16 are not to be completed. <br> 17 And it's our understanding, to start with <br> 18 what our understanding of Guatemalan law is, in a <br> 19 situation like this where you have a void in the terms <br> 20 of the Contract that make is such that--again, it's a <br> 21 stark difference between Civil Law systems and Common <br> 22 Law systems in relation to this issue in some regards, |

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| 04:24:04 1 and in Civil Law systems like Guatemala system, when <br> 2 you have a void like this, and when interpretation of <br> 3 the Agreement is--you're unable to do so or the <br> 4 interpretation would be unreasonable, given the void, <br> 5 and we contend that the interpretation that's been <br> 6 given here by Claimant, which is that they only had an <br> 7 obligation to begin rail restoration service in the <br> 8 first Phase and to complete it, but not in any other <br> 9 Phases, first of all, is internally inconsistent <br> 10 because, as I mentioned, the language is the same as 11 to Phase I. <br> 12 Phase I doesn't say you have to complete it <br> 13 by a certain date, but they take the position that <br> 14 they were obligated to complete Phase I. So if you <br> 15 look at just the language in the Contract, I suppose <br> 16 you could ask well, why are they concluding that they <br> 17 have to complete Phase I but not the other Phases when <br> 18 the language is precisely the same for each Phase. <br> 19 And going back to the interpretation point, <br> 20 given that there's a void here, and given that the <br> 21 purpose of the agreement was to restore the Guatemalan <br> 22 railway system, and that the land that was given--I | 04:26:29 1 pleased in Post-Hearing Briefs to talk about the issue 2 of how this would be interpreted under Guatemalan law 3 because I don't think that that has actually been 4 briefed by the Parties. <br> 5 On the issue of the letter as to Phase II, <br> 6 the letter, and I don't have it before me, but it says <br> 7 that they have completed with the initiation of Phase <br> 8 II and the rendering of service within six month of <br> 9 that initiation. That doesn't, however, in our view, <br> 10 answer the question that I just answered before, which <br> 11 is whether they have to complete it and what they have <br> 12 to do, and I believe that Phase II demonstrates the <br> 13 unreasonableness of the interpretation that's been <br> 14 given to this Clause by RDC because, as you've heard <br> 15 the uncontradicted testimony is, that there was some <br> 16 track that was laid down in relation to Phase II at <br> 17 the border of Mexico, and the Mexican train and the <br> 18 Mexican operator brings the train in for a certain <br> 19 amount of distance, unloads cargo and goes back out. <br> 20 To say that that fulfills RDC's--and FVG's <br> 21 responsibility to restore Phase II seems to me to be <br> 22 unreasonable. Now, I realize the letter there and the |
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| 04:25:17 1 should say the right to exploit the right of way was 2 an auxiliary or secondary right that was given in <br> 3 relation to the railway restoration, I think we have 4 to look to what the Parties intended. <br> 5 And when you look to what the Parties <br> 6 intended in order to fill that void, the only evidence <br> 7 that we have of record or I should say the evidence <br> 8 that we have of record that we think is most <br> 9 persuasive on this is the Overseer Porras' testimony, <br> 10 and he tells you both in his written statement and <br> 11 based on his testimony here before the Tribunal that <br> 12 it was always contemplated that they were going to not <br> 13 just start the Phases but carry them out, and that <br> 14 Guatemala would never have given all of this land to a <br> 15 third party to have them exploit for its benefit <br> 16 without also requiring that they carry out the <br> 17 restoration of the railway. <br> 18 So, that's as it relates to the issue of <br> 19 contract interpretation, and I'm obviously not a <br> 20 Guatemalan lawyer, but I understand that's how the <br> 21 issue would play itself out. And if the Tribunal is <br> 22 interested in hearing about that more, we would be | 04:27:58 1 letter--I don't know the circumstances under which it 2 was executed so I can't offer you any insights about 3 that, but I can say that to interpret that to mean that they then, therefore, get to conclude that they've carried out the restoration of Phase II and that they get to keep that land seems unreasonable, and therefore, we'd go back to the initial analysis. And I would also point out that they were looking into financing for funding Phase II, and it seems a bit contradictory to say they had nothing more to do in Phase II, but at the same time they were looking for financing and funding in order to carry out restoration in Phase II. <br> Now, in relation to the--I think the second question was the power and the authority of the FEGUA <br> 16 Overseer when he signed the letter authorizations and <br> 17 signed the different Contracts I believe you were <br> 18 asking about, so we would remit you there to the Legal 19 Opinion of Mr . Aguilar. <br> 20 In Public Law systems like this one, a public <br> 21 Official can only carry out whatever powers have been <br> 22 expressly given to him or her. The FEGUA Overseer is |

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| 04:29:24 1 part of the Executive Branch and the--FEGUA Overseer 2 is part of the Executive Branch. And I understand it <br> 3 there are certain powers that the Executive, it's <br> 4 Chief being the President, delegates to the FECUA <br> 5 Overseer. And those are set forth in FEGUA's Organic 6 Law. <br> 7 Article 3 of FEGUA's Organic Law states that <br> 8 the object and purpose of FEGUA is to provide rail <br> 9 transport service. And as I understand Mr. Aguilar's <br> 10 Opinion, nowhere in the Organic Law of FEGUA has there <br> 11 been a delegation of power to the FEGUA Overseer to <br> 12 contract out to third parties goods of the State. The <br> 13 FEGUA property, meaning the--the railway property, I <br> 14 should say, excuse me, the railway property, meaning <br> 15 both the land and the rail equipment is property of <br> 16 the State as defined by Article 121 of the Guatemalan <br> 17 Constitution. <br> 18 So, the Opinion of Mr. Aguilar is basically <br> 19 that FEGUA's Overseer was never delegated the right to <br> 20 contract out to third parties Government land or this <br> 21 Government property; and, hence, in order to do so, <br> 22 and for that to be valid, there has to be approval by | 04:32:19 1 believe that to be correct. <br> 2 And I should say I did not cite all of the <br> 3 provisions that Mr. Aguilar cited for his Opinion on <br> 4 this issue of Executive approval, but they are set <br> 5 forth in his Expert Report, and we would remit you to <br> 6 that, and we would know happy to provide you with <br> 7 those Clauses, if you would like to see them. <br> 8 The third question that was asked was in <br> 9 relation to the different contracts for the railway <br> 10 equipment, and I believe Secretary Eizenstat you <br> 11 referenced Contract 41 and Contract 143, and then you <br> 12 mentioned the Draft Settlement $\mathrm{C}-44$, and you mentioned <br> 13 that there were errors in relation to all three and <br> 14 had asked what--basically for me to try to explain <br> 15 what happened there. <br> 16 As I understand it, Contract 41 was signed, <br> 17 bids--it was signed by both Parties, required <br> 18 Executive approval, and the lack of Executive approval <br> 19 is the only thing that prevented that Contract from <br> 20 being perfected and entering into force. As we <br> 21 mentioned in the Closing Statements and as was <br> 22 mentioned by Mr. Aguilar yesterday, before there would |
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| PAGE 2160 <br> $04: 30: 59$ 1 <br> 2 the President of any such contracts. It's my <br> 3 understanding that that is why, when the first bid was <br> 4 approval in Section 6.4 of the Bidding Terms. <br> 5 So, what that means, and this is what <br> 6 Mr. Aguilar's Opinion is, is that when the letter <br> 7 authorizations were signed by the Fecua Overseer <br> 8 giving property rights, in essence to RDC, the right <br> 9 to use and benefit from the railway equipment, the <br> 10 FEGUA Overseer overstepped his bounds. He didn't have <br> 11 the--that authority had never been delegated to him to <br> 12 do that unilaterally. He can do that so long as he <br> 13 complies with the law, and the law requires that the <br> 14 Executive approve of any such--a grants of property <br> 15 interests in State property such as the land or the <br> 16 railway equipment. <br> 17 Proof of that in part is that when Contract <br> 18 402 was executed, it required Government Executive <br> 19 approval, and I believe this was a question that was <br> 20 posed by the Chairman yesterday, and it's my <br> 21 understanding that Contract 402 not only was approved <br> 22 by Congress but also had Executive approval. I | 04:33:58 1 be even an opportunity to obtain the requisite <br> 2 Executive approval, fVG approached the FEGUA Overseer <br> 3 and asked for authority to utilize equipment pursuant <br> 4 to letter authorize. You can see that in the record <br> 5 because you can compare the dates when the Contract <br> 6 was signed and you can see that not even 20 days later <br> 7 FEGUA receives a letter requesting the use of the equipment. <br> The why Contract 41 didn't get approved, I <br> don't have an answer to that. All we know is what's <br> in the record, which is Mr. Porras has said he asked <br> for Government approval. I don't know what <br> considerations were given to that by the President and why the President made that decision. You heard from <br> 15 Mr. Aguilar yesterday his understanding as to why he <br> 16 thought it might not have been approved, and he <br> 17 mentioned that it lacked a registration and that he <br> 18 thought that the President would not be able to <br> 19 approve that agreement for that reason. <br> 20 And you heard from Dr. Mayora that approval <br> 21 is not necessary at all, and that hence when it was <br> 22 sent to the President that there would be no juridical |

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| 04:35:16 1 basis upon which the President could approve it and so 2 he thought that the President couldn't approve it <br> 3 because there would be no basis in law for that. We <br> 4 disagree with that, and again we would point to <br> 5 Contract 402 as the example of approval that was <br> 6 obtained of a similar scenario where State property <br> 7 was given to a third party. But I don't have the <br> 8 answer for you on why it wasn't approved. <br> 9 As to Contract 143, my understanding, and, of <br> 10 course, the record, you could review it, and obviously <br> 11 the Tribunal will come to its own conclusions is, is <br> 12 that what Dr. Gramajo was testifying to yesterday is <br> 13 that the Agreement incorporated the terms--the Bidding <br> 14 Terms from Contract 41 which required Executive <br> 15 approval, but then expressly said that Executive <br> 16 approval would not be required for purposes of that <br> 17 Contract from entering into force. <br> 18 As I understood Dr. Gramajo's testimony, he <br> 19 was saying that he could not submit that agreement to <br> 20 the President for approval because it expressly said <br> 21 that Presidential approval was not required. That's <br> 22 not to say that he was of the understanding that that | 04:37:43 1 legal advisors of the President that that Contract 2 existed, their analysis of it, which we have in the 3 record was that the Contract suffered from defects <br> 4 that rendered it Lesivo, so I don't believe that <br> 5 agreement on its own would ever have been approved or <br> 6 could have been approved by the President, but a <br> 7 separate agreement, if they could have negotiated one <br> 8 that fixed the problems, including an agreement to <br> 9 celebrate a new public bid I think could have cured <br> 10 the issue. <br> 11 As to $\mathrm{C}-44$, on its face, it's a mistake. We <br> 12 all know that there was no bid that took place in <br> 13 relation to Contract 143 and 158 , and I submit to you <br> 14 that there are probably a number of other mistakes in <br> 15 the document. It's a Draft Agreement. And what we <br> 16 know from the testimony of Astrid Sosen, again she is <br> 17 a lawyer from the Ministry of Communications who was <br> 18 involved in relation to the drafting of that <br> 19 agreement, and Mr. Burduo, both of whom have submitted <br> 20 Witness Declarations here, they say that agreement was <br> 21 put together basically the night before, and then they <br> 22 were looking to negotiate it with Ferrovías, with FVG; |
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| 04:36:35 1 agreement didn't need to be approved. I hope that <br> 2 distinction is clear because he was told immediately <br> 3 upon, being made aware of that Contract that <br> 4 Presidential approval was required and as a result he <br> 5 wrote to Ferrovías and explained that that was a <br> 6 requirement that would require the Parties to <br> 7 renegotiate the Contract and enter into a different <br> 8 one that would be approved by the President. So, I <br> 9 think that's an important distinction. I'm not so <br> 10 sure how clear that came out in Dr. Gramajo's <br> 11 testimony, but that's what I understand the issue to 12 be. <br> 13 Why that agreement itself was never approved, <br> 14 Contract 143, which I believe was part of your <br> 15 question. It was never submitted to the President, as <br> 16 you heard from Dr. Gramajo because that agreement on <br> 17 its face can't be approved because it suffered from <br> 18 illegalities. It's my understanding if that agreement <br> 19 would have been elevated for Presidential approval, <br> 20 they never would have received it because it suffered <br> 21 from a number of legal defects, and we know that in <br> 22 part because once it came to the knowledge of the | PAGE 2166 <br> 04:38:55 1 <br> 2 on the day of the 24th, so it's not surprising to me <br> 2 that it has a mistake. <br> 3 The next question is on the issue of the <br> 4 standard under Fair and Equitable Treatment and <br> 5 Article 10.5 of carra. And the particular question, I <br> 6 believe that you posed Secretary Eizenstat, is whether <br> 7 we agree--whether Guatemala agrees that arbitrariness, <br> 8 non-transparency and legitimate expectations -- <br> 9 (Pause.) <br> 10 MR. ORTA: So, in relation to your question, <br> 11 so very succinctly, we do not agree that <br> 12 arbitrariness, arbitrary conduct or arbitrariness on <br> 13 its own is part of the minimum standard of treatment <br> 14 under customary International law. However, we do <br> 15 agree that manifestly arbitrary conduct is, and we <br> 16 cited the Tribunal there to a number of Opinions, <br> 17 Glamis Gold, which is at RL-102, Paragraph $616 ;$ <br> 18 Cargill, which is at RL-175, Paragraph 296; <br> 19 International Thunderbird, Paragraph 194; and Waste <br> 20 Management, Paragraph 98. <br> 21 I believe I gave you the wrong RL numbers. <br> 22 Just so the record is clear, Glamis Gold is RL-102, |

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| 04:41:17 1 Cargill is RL-175, International Thunderbird is $2 \mathrm{RL}-104$, and Waste Management is $\mathrm{RL}-136$. <br> So, manifestly arbitrary conduct, we believe, is within the minimum standard of treatment, for Fair and Equitable Treatment. <br> Now, non-transparency, we do not believe, is <br> part of the customary International law minimum <br> standard of treatment under Article 10.5, and neither <br> is the legitimate expectations of the--of the investor, and we would point you there to the text of Article 10.5 wherein it says that the customary International law minimum standard of treatment is the one that applies and that in particular the CAFTA Parties agreed that no additional substantive obligations are to be created beyond that minimum standard. <br> Now, having said that, Secretary Eizenstat, I believe, that and as we've argued already that the conduct at issue here would satisfy even those other standards, even though we don't believe they come within Article 10.5 . <br> 22 The second-to-last question, indirect | PAGE 2169 <br> $04: 44: 22$ 1 <br> 2 of the President to resolve the problems it had in <br> 3 of them, and there's a presentation--I don't know if <br> 4 any of my colleagues can get me--I don't want to put <br> 5 the presentation up, but just the cite to the <br> 6 presentation that was made by Mr. Posner during the <br> 7 meeting, but I think it's very telling because that <br> 8 will show you what the PowerPoint slides were and what <br> 9 issues he was raising at that meeting, and I think <br> 10 when you look at that PowerPoint slide and you look at <br> 11 the notes that were made by Mr. Posner following the <br> 12 meeting, what you'll see is that he was talking to the <br> 13 President about a number of issues. I believe C-33 is <br> 14 the cite to the PowerPoint presentation. And the <br> 15 issues under discussion were a number of them, and <br> 16 they included the lack of funding for Phase II, the <br> 17 problems with squatters, the problems with the Trust <br> 18 Fund and a number of things. <br> 19 So, it's no surprise that as a result of that <br> 20 meeting and starting then and afterward, when the <br> 21 President took up Mr. Posner on his request to <br> 22 intervene and help that the Government officials that |
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| PAGE 2168 <br> $04: 42: 43$ 1 <br> 2 expropriation, you asked whether under the Vivendi III <br> 3 substantial and permanent deprivation of Claimant's <br> 3 interests in the enjoyment of their property would be <br> 4 sufficient, and again we believe it has to be a <br> 5 substantial deprivation of their property interests in <br> 6 their investment, and it has to be sufficiently <br> 7 substantial such as to constitute the equivalent of a <br> 8 full expropriation, and I think we've cited a number <br> 9 of cases in our brief in relation to that issue. <br> 10 $\quad$ The last question I have already answered in <br> 11 some detail, so I'll try not to repeat much of what I <br> 12 said, but I'll leave you with this: The question, as <br> 13 I understand it, was why was the Government spending <br> 14 time focusing on issues in relation to Contract 402 <br> 15 and 820 in the settlement discussions leading up to <br> 16 the Lesivo Declaration? And the answer to that is <br> 17 what I stated earlier. There was a fundamental series <br> 18 of problems between these Parties, and Claimant, <br> 19 through their enterprise FVG and through Mr. Posner <br> 20 and others, asked President Berger for a meeting, and <br> 21 the purpose of the meeting, as I understand it, was <br> 22 Claimant wanted to get the intervention and assistance | 04:45:49 1 were involved were discussing all of those issues and 2 not just Contract 143 and 158 in isolation. <br> 3 As I also pointed out before, that's not the first time that FVG had sought intervention at a higher level in the Government. We pointed to $\mathrm{R}-9$, which is the letter to vice-Minister Diaz which was copied to President Berger, wherein they were seeking help with a number of issues, including funding for the Phase II southern coast, removal of squatters for <br> 10 Phase II, payment of - Trust Fund payments and <br> 11 remedying Contract 143 and 158. I think that letter <br> 12 is fairly instructive because Claimant in that letter <br> 13 puts all three issues on the table and asks for <br> 14 assistance from vice-Minister Diaz from the Ministry 15 of Communications. <br> 16 I hope that responded to your questions. <br> 17 ARBITRATOR EIZEISTAT: I had asked if regua <br> 18 ever factually made a payment into the 802 Trust Fund. <br> 19 MR. ORTA: My understanding is that FEGUA has <br> 20 not made payments into the 802 Trust Fund. That is <br> 21 the subject of the arbitrations--in Guatemala, excuse 22 me. |

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|  | PAGE 2173 <br> 04:50:20 1 been met, so it's not just saying that you began 2 service on a small segment. It is saying that what <br> 3 you have done so far meets your obligations under <br> 4 Clause 13 with regard to Phase II. <br> 5 Third, on Fair and Equitable Treatment and <br> 6 the standards, I would just refer you to the following <br> 7 slides in our Opening Presentation for our position <br> 8 with regard to what the standards are, and I won't <br> 9 take your time by going through them, but insofar as <br> 10 arbitrariness, if you will look at slide 62 and 63; <br> 11 bad faith, Slide 58; due process, Slides 59 through <br> 12 61; and legitimate expectations, slides 64 and 65. <br> 13 That sets forth what we believe the standard under <br> 14 customary International law is with regard to Fair and <br> 15 Equitable Treatment. <br> 16 Now, finally, on the issue of what went on at <br> 17 this meeting with the President and what that has to <br> 18 do with the whole inner play that was going on at that <br> 19 time, what is extraordinary about the meeting with the <br> 20 President is that not what was discussed but what <br> 21 wasn't discussed. There was never a mention of the <br> 22 fact that there were illegalities in Contracts 143 and |
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| PAGE 2172 <br> 04:48:51 1 <br> 2 understood in terms of the other provisions of the <br> 3 Contract. We were only obligated to invest <br> 4 \$10 million. For someone to say that there was a <br> 5 reasonable expectation regardless of the words of the <br> 6 Contract that somehow or another there was an <br> 7 expectation that we were going to renovate the entire <br> 8 railroad, that one doesn't pass the red-face test. <br> 9 Also, remember again it's a 50 -year contract. <br> 10 The Contract explicitly says that other actions in <br> 11 addition to the specific obligations of the contract <br> 12 will be done as business conditions permit, so the <br> 13 Contract explicitly contemplates that, as we go <br> 14 through the 50 years of this Usufruct, business <br> 15 conditions may well justify investments in addition to <br> 16 the minimum requirements under the Contract. <br> 17 Also, the letter from the Overseer doesn't <br> 18 just say that you've satisfied the beginning or <br> 19 anything--the startup obligation. It says that the <br> 20 obligations of subsection 3 of Clause $13--$ that's the <br> 21 Clause that refers to the obligation in connection <br> 22 with Phase II, says that all of those obligations have |  |

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| 04:53:14 1 Salvador. <br> 2 First, I would like to thank you and <br> 3 appreciate the effort of the Tribunal to preserve the <br> 4 right of non-disputing parties to make oral and <br> 5 written submissions to the Tribunal regarding issues <br> 6 of treaty interpretation. At this time El Salvador <br> 7 will not be making an oral submission, however, El <br> 8 Salvador would like to reserve the right to make a <br> 9 written submission on the issues of treaty <br> 10 interpretation that you will have to decide for this <br> 11 case. <br> 12 With regard to the time limit, we would just <br> 13 like to briefly express three factors that, in our <br> 14 view, are relevant for this time limit. One is the <br> 15 importance of the issues that will be considered by <br> 16 this Tribunal. As you know, this case is the first <br> 17 CAFTA arbitration that reaches the merits phase, and, <br> 18 therefore, you will be deciding for the first time <br> 19 very important issues of treaty interpretation that I <br> 20 think are very important not only for the Parties in <br> 21 the dispute but also for the non-disputing parties. <br> 22 The second is that there are four other | 04:55:34 1 State, on behalf of the United States, I would also <br> 2 like to thank the Tribunal, the Secretary to the <br> 3 Tribunal, and the Parties for accommodating our observation of the hearings over the past 8 days. <br> 5 We also will not be making an oral submission <br> 6 at this time on issues of treaty interpretation, but <br> 7 we also reserve the right to make a written submission <br> 8 on issues of Treaty interpretation under Article 1022. <br> Thank you. <br> 10 <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: Thank you, Mr. Bigge. <br> (Tribunal conferring.) <br> PRESIDENT RIGO: The Tribunal will send a <br> communication, as we did at the time of the Decision <br> 14 on Jurisdiction to the non-disputing parties, inviting <br> 15 them to make any comments that they wish to make. We <br> 16 consider January 31st as a reasonable, given the <br> 17 circumstances of the season we are in, as a reasonable <br> 18 time limit. And, of course, the disputing parties <br> 19 will have an opportunity to comment. I would suggest <br> 20 within 15 days of receipt of any communication in case <br> 21 we receive any from the non-disputing parties. <br> 22 Having said that, if there's nothing else, I |
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| 04:54:17 1 non-disputing parties, although they are not present here at the hearing, once they receive the transcript of the hearing, which will be shortly, what they may always be considering their participating with their own written submissions. And these written submissions by the non-disputing parties require a lot of coordination between different Ministries within the Government, and we are at a particularly busy time of the year not only because it's the end of the calendar year, but also because in many countries it's the end of the Fiscal Year. <br> Therefore, Members of the Tribunal, I would like to suggest a time limit of 31 January for the submissions, any written submissions by the non-disputing parties. Thank you very much. 16 PRESTDENT RIGO: Thank you, Mr. Parada. 17 Also with us is Mr. David Bigge of the State 18 Department of the United States, if you would come forward. <br> 20 MR. BIGGE: Thank you, Mr. President, Members 21 of the Tribunal. My name is David Bigge. I'm an 22 attorney adviser of the United States Department of |  |

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