	PUB
	Page 1
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETT DISPUTES	LEMENT OF INVESTMENT
In the matter of Arbitration	x : :
VESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS LLC,	:
Claimant,	:
and	: ICSID Case No. : UNCT/20/3
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,	:
Respondent.	:
VIDEOCONFERENCE: HEARING ON	X
	, July 14, 2021
	d Bank Group
	a bank Group
The hearing in the above-	-entitled matter
came on at 9:37 a.m. (EDT) before:	
MS. JULIET BLANCH, Presid	lent
MR. JAMES HOSKING, Co-Arł	pitrator
PROF. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, Co	-Arbitrator
B&B Reporters	
001 202-544-1903	3
	Page 3
ALSO PRESENT:	
On behalf of the Claimant:	
MR. ELLIOT FELDMAN	
MR. MICHAEL SNARR MR. PAUL LEVINE	
MS. ANALIA GONZALEZ	
MR. JIM EAST MR. JOHN LEHRER	
Baker & Hostetler, LLP	
1050 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 1100	NW
Washington, D.C. 20036	
United States of America	
MR. ALEXANDER OBRECHT	

MR. ALEXANDER OBRECHT Baker & Hostetler, LLP 1801 California Street Suite 4400 Denver, Colorado 80202

MR. ANDREW LAYDEN Baker & Hostetler, LLP SunTrust Center 200 South Orange Avenue Suite 2300 Orlando, Florida 32801

Party representative:

MR. MARTIN PURVIS MR. JEREMY COTTRELL ALSO PRESENT:


On behalf of ICSID:

MS. ANNELIESE FLECKENSTEIN Secretary of the Tribunal Page | 2

Realtime Stenographer:

MS. DAWN K. LARSON Registered Diplomate Reporter (RDR) Certified Realtime Reporter (CRR) B&B Reporters 529 14th Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 United States of America info@wwreporting.com

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903



B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
NON-DISPUTING PARTIES:
For the United Mexican States:
MR. DIEGO PACHECO MR. ARISTEO LOPEZ Ministry of Economy
For the United States of America:
MS. LISA GROSH MR. JOHN DALEY MS. NICOLE THORNTON MR. JOHN I. BLANCK Attorney-Advisers Office of International Claims and Investment Disputes Office of the Legal Adviser U.S. Department of State Suite 203, South Building 2430 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037-2800 United States of America MS. CATHERINE GIBSON Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 600 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 United States of America
MS. COURTNEY KIRMAN MS. CARA YI U.S. Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 United States of America
B&B Reporters

| 5

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 7	
1	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>	
2	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I propose that we start.	
3	So, I wanted to welcome everybody to Day 1	
4	of the Jurisdictional Hearing between Westmoreland	
5	Mining Holdings, LLC, and the Government of Canada in	
6	the ICSID Case Number UNCT/20/3.	
7	A couple of points, firstly, from the	
8	Tribunal. As a very initial point, I can absolutely	
9	guarantee we have read through everything we've been	
10	provided, and we've looked at it carefully.	
11	(Interruption.)	
12	(Stenographer clarification.)	
13	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Good. Thank you.	
14	It was just to reassure the Parties that the	
15	Members of the Tribunal have read everything. We	
16	haven't gone through the slides, the demonstratives,	
17	as they have only just arrived, but we have gone	
18	through everything else.	
19	Secondly, pursuant to Paragraph 30 of PO4, I	
20	confirm the only persons committed to attend this	
21	Hearing are those approved by the Disputing Parties	
22	and the Tribunal, and no unauthorized person shall	

PRELIMINARY MATTERS			Page
PRELIMINARY MATTERS	PRELIMINARY MATTERS	C O N T E N T S	
OPENING STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: By Mr. Douglas	OPENING STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: By Mr. Douglas		PAGE
ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: By Mr. Douglas	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: By Mr. Douglas	PRELIMINARY MATTERS	7
By Mr. Douglas. 9 By Ms. Zeman. 11 By Ms. Van den Hof. 22 By Ms. Dosman. 42 By Ms. Zeman. 54 By Mr. Douglas. 70 By Mr. Klaver. 81 ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT: 81 By Mr. Feldman. 10 By Mr. Snarr. 10 By Mr. Snarr. 10 By Mr. Snarr. 10 By Mr. Snarr. 17	By Mr. Douglas. .9 By Ms. Zeman. .15 By Ms. Van den Hof. .23 By Ms. Dosman. .47 By Ms. Zeman. .54 By Mr. Douglas. .70 By Mr. Klaver. .88 ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT: .101 By Mr. Snarr. .107 By Mr. Levine. .141 By Mr. Snarr. .177	OPENING STATEMENTS	
By Ms. Zeman. 11 By Ms. Van den Hof. 21 By Ms. Dosman. 21 By Ms. Zeman. 41 By Ms. Zeman. 57 By Mr. Douglas. 70 By Mr. Klaver. 83 ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT: 83 By Mr. Feldman. 101 By Mr. Snarr. 101	By Ms. Zeman. 15 By Ms. Van den Hof. 23 By Ms. Dosman. 23 By Ms. Zeman. 47 By Ms. Zeman. 54 By Mr. Douglas. 70 By Mr. Klaver. 88 ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT: 88 By Mr. Feldman. 101 By Mr. Snarr. 107 By Mr. Snarr. 107 By Mr. Snarr. 177	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:	
By Mr. Feldman. 101 By Mr. Snarr. 101 By Mr. Levine. 141 By Mr. Snarr. 171	By Mr. Feldman	By Ms. Zeman. By Ms. Van den Hof. By Ms. Dosman. By Ms. Zeman. By Mr. Douglas.	15 23 47 54 70
By Mr. Snarr	By Mr. Snarr	ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT:	
QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL	QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL158	By Mr. Snarr By Mr. Levine	107 141
		QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL	158
		B&B Reporters	

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 8
1	attend in violation of this agreement.
2	Thirdly, I confirm we've received the
3	confidentiality undertakings from the Non-Disputing
4	Parties.
5	And then, finally, in terms of timetable,
6	we'll need to take a break at about the two-hour point
7	for the Transcribers, for the Reporters.
8	To the extent that the Members of the
9	Tribunal ask questions during the course of the
10	presentation, it might mean for the Respondent, and
11	subsequently for the Claimant, that we have to have a
12	break before the Opening Presentation is completed.
13	If that's so, I apologize. I will try to remember to
14	ask after about an hour and 50 minutes where you are
15	in terms of progress as to whetheror to ask then for
16	you to choose a good time to stop.
17	And I would also ask that each time you move
18	to a new segment of your presentation, although it
19	should be, I hope, obvious to us, if you remember, if
20	you could mention it so that we can just see if we
21	have any questions that we want to ask on that
22	particular segment that has just been covered. Aside

	Page 9
1	from that, there is nothing else from the Tribunal.
2	Before we go into the Opening Submissions,
3	firstly, Claimant, is there any housekeeping?
4	MR. FELDMAN: Sorry. I have to push all the
5	buttons. But, no, I don't think so. Thank you very
6	much, and thank you for making sure we have everyone
7	here.
8	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Excellent. Thank you.
9	And Respondent? Any housekeeping from you?
10	Mr. Feldman, you're on mute.
11	MR. DOUGLAS: Nothing from Canada,
12	President Blanch. Sorry, we're still figuring out our
13	audio here, but I think we're sorted now.
14	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Excellent.
15	Well, in which case, then, I suggest at
16	2:41 English timeso I think that's 9:41 D.C. time,
17	Respondent, if you'd like to give us your Opening
18	Submissions.
19	OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
20	PRESIDENT BLANCH: And you're still on mute.
21	MR. DOUGLAS: Are you able to hear us now?
22	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Perfect.

	Page 11
1	Nonetheless, in its Notice of Arbitration
2	and Statement of Claim, the Claimant only alleges
3	breaches of NAFTA Chapter Eleven that occurred on or
4	before 2016, years before its existence as an investor
5	of a Party. In fact, the Claimant's Claim is nearly
6	identical to a NAFTA Claim filed by a previous
7	investor, Westmoreland Coal Company, also known as
8	wcc.
9	The Claimant thus seemingly files a claim on
10	behalf of WCC and WCC's investments. Even the amount
11	of claimed damages, \$470 million, is identical to the
12	amount that was claimed by WCC. In its Pleadings, the
13	Claimant offers various theories to explain why NAFTA
14	Chapter Eleven should allow it to allege breaches and
15	claim damages that predate its existence as an
16	investor. And these arguments are not always clear.
17	For example, the Claimant argues that it was
18	substantially the same investor as WCC, and that WCC $$
19	merely underwent a bankruptcy restructuring through
20	which the Claimant emerged on the other side.
21	However, elsewhere, the Claimant confirms that it was,
22	in fact, a different investor than WCC and thatbut

MR. DOUGLAS: We keep automatically being 1 2 muted for some reason, so just please wave your hands--well, actually, we can hear you, so let us know 3 if I'm talking and you're not able to hear me. 4 Good morning, President Blanch and Members 5 of the Tribunal. My name is Adam Douglas, and I'm 6 7 here on behalf of the Government of Canada. The 8 substantive obligations under Section A of NAFTA 9 Chapter Eleven are not owed to a prospective Claimant until it becomes, A, an investor of a Party. A 10 11 Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione temporis is limited to a claim for an alleged breach and resulting loss or 12 13 damage that occur after a Claimant becomes an investor 14 of a Party. The Claimant in this case does not contest 15 16 that it was constituted under the laws of Delaware on 17 January 31, 2019, and was not an investor of a Party 18 prior to this date. Nor does the Claimant contest that it first invested in Canada on March 15, 2019, when it 19 20 acquired Westmoreland Canada Holdings and Prairie Mines & Royalty, known together as the "Canadian 21 22 Enterprises."

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 12

Page | 10

1	has a continuity of interest with WCC that should
2	allow its NAFTA Claim to proceed on WCC's behalf.
3	The Claimant also argues, rather boldly,
4	that NAFTA allows one investor to file a claim on
5	behalf of another investor, and then alternatively,
6	that NAFTA in any event allows claims to be
7	transferred or assigned between investors. None of
8	the Claimant's various arguments can detract from the
9	simple, straightforward operation of NAFTA
.0	Chapter Eleven. The obligations under Section A of
.1	Chapter Eleven are owed to investors and their
2	investments, and if breached, those investors have
.3	standing to bring a claim under Section B.
4	Article 1116 does not allow a Claimant to
. 5	bring a claim alleging breach and loss incurred by
.6	another investor. Article 1117 does not allow a
7	Claimant to bring a claim alleging breach and loss
. 8	incurred by another investor's enterprise. No
9	Tribunal, under NAFTA or otherwise, has accepted a
20	request to allow one investor to bring a claim on
21	behalf of another investor and its investments.
22	To the contrary, Tribunals, including NAFTA

2

	Page 13
1	Tribunals, have routinely held that a prospective
2	Claimant must have been an investor of a Party at the
3	time of the alleged breach. If this Tribunal agrees
4	with the Claimant in this case, it would be the first
5	to chart that path.
6	You will likely hear the Claimant accuse of
7	Canada today of elevating form over substance.
8	In its Rejoinder, the Claimant proffered
9	examples of changes to corporate form, which they
10	allege would negate jurisdiction under Canada's
11	interpretation of NAFTA Chapter Eleven, but that is
12	not Canada's position, and you are not being asked to
13	address all possible scenarios today, just the case
14	before you. The case before you is clear. The
15	Claimant did not undergo a mere change in corporate
16	form. The Claimant was constituted as a new
17	enterprise to purchase certain WCC assets
18	(Interruption.)
19	(Stenographer clarification.)
20	MR. DOUGLAS: Yes. Thank you. Sorry about
21	that.
22	The Claimant did not undergo a mere change

Page | 15

under NAFTA Chapter Eleven. And Ms. Dosman will 1 explain that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction 2 ratione temporis over the Claimant's Damages Claim. 3 The presentation of Canada's affirmative 4 5 case will take about an hour, and depending on where we are at timing-wise, that may be a good place for a 6 7 short break, but we will leave it for the Tribunal to 8 decide when that is appropriate. 9 Canada's presentation will then turn to respond to the alternative arguments presented by the 10 Claimant. Ms. Zeman will explain that the Claimant 11

and WCC transacted at arm's length during WCC's 13 bankruptcy proceedings and are not the same investor of a Party. 14

12

I will then return with a discussion of the 15 assignment of claims, and my colleague Mr. Klaver will 16 then explain that the Claimant's continuity of 17 18 interest theory has no grounding in fact or in law. With that, I will turn things over to 19 20 Ms. Zeman.

MS. ZEMAN: Members of the Tribunal, a good 21 22 part of the day where you are.

in corporate form. The Claimant was constituted as a
new enterprise to purchase certain WCC assets in an
arm's-length transaction. You will also hear the
Claimant today accuse Canada of using WCC's bankruptcy
proceedings to seek a windfall. That is absolutely
not the case.
It is important to recall that it was WCC's
bankruptcy proceedings. It was not the Claimant's
bankruptcy proceedings. If anything, the Claimant is
trying to use WCC's bankruptcy proceedings as a cover
to hide the fact that it was not an investor and had
no investments at the time of the alleged breach. It
was WCC that was an investor at the time of the
alleged breach, not the Claimant. It was open to WCC
to continue its claim. The Company still exists as an
enterprise constituted under the laws of Delaware.
Canada's Opening Statement today will
proceed as follows: First, we will present our
affirmative case. My colleague Ms. Zeman will explain
the key facts relevant to the Tribunal's jurisdiction
ratione temporis. Ms. Van den Hof will then explain
Canada's position on jurisdiction ratione temporis

Page | 14

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1	My presentation on background facts will
2	begin by taking a brief look at how we got here today.
3	I will then pause to highlight the most fundamental
4	fact of this phase of the Arbitration: when the
5	Claimant became an investor of a Party.
6	As the Tribunal considers the relevant
7	questions of fact in this Jurisdictional Phase, Canada
8	urges the Tribunal to pay particular attention to the
9	evidence that has or has not been presented to
10	establish each proposition. Canada has put forward
11	evidence on the facts pertaining to how and when the
12	Claimant became an investor of a Party.
13	That evidence includes two Expert Reports
14	from Ms. Coleman on issues pertaining to U.S. law.
15	Those Expert Reports are largely uncontested. The
16	Claimant cites frequently to Ms. Coleman's evidence in
17	support of statements in its own submissions. It has
18	chosen not to cross-examine her.
19	Ms. Coleman has presented compelling
20	evidence on the matters within her ambit. The
21	Tribunal can comfortably rely on that evidence. By
22	contrast, the Claimant frequently makes unsupported

	Page 1'
1	assertions with respect to matters of fact. We will
2	highlight some of those for you today.
3	So, to begin, how did we get here? In 2014,
4	WCC purchased a number of Canadian assets in an
5	arm's-length sale from a Canadian company called
6	Sherritt International. These assets included an
7	Alberta enterprise called Prairie Mines & Royalty ULC.
8	WCC was a publicly traded Delaware corporation and
9	held its interest in Prairie in the manner you see on
10	the screen.
11	On November 22, 2015, the Government of
12	Alberta announced its decision to phase out emissions
13	from coal-fired power plants by 2030; and on
14	November 24, 2016, Alberta announced that it had
15	concluded agreements with certain coal-fired power
16	plant owners to effectuate its decision to allocate
17	voluntary Transition Payments.
18	On October 9, 2018, WCC filed for bankruptcy
19	in the United States under Chapter Eleven of the U.S.
20	Bankruptcy Code. As the Claimant explained at
21	Paragraph 57 of its Counter-Memorial, WCC's bankruptcy
22	process was unrelated to Alberta's 2015 and 2016

	Page 19
1	auction process to maximize the value of its assets
2	and "provide enhanced stakeholder recoveries."
3	To protect their interests in their
4	collateral, WCC's highest priority lenders, the First
5	Lien Lenders, agreed to provide a bid of last resort,
6	a stalking horse bid. If no one else wanted to
7	purchase the assets for sale, the First Lien Lenders
8	would purchase them through an acquisition vehicle.
9	As we know, no other bidders came forward.
10	On November 19, 2018, one month after WCC
11	began its bankruptcy proceedings and announced that it
12	planned to dissolve, it filed a claim against Canada
13	under NAFTA Article 1116 on its own behalf and
14	Article 1117 on behalf of its Canadian enterprise
15	Prairie. In its claim, WCC alleged that Canada had
16	violated NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1105 by virtue of
17	Alberta's 2015 Decision to phase out emissions from
18	coal-fired electricity generation by 2030 and its
19	2016 Decision to allocate Transition Payments to the
20	owners of the generating units. WCC claimed damages
21	exceeding \$470 million.
22	On January 31, 2019, the First Lien Lenders

Decisions. Instead, WCC filed for bankruptcy because 1 it was significantly overleveraged after a series of 2 acquisitions in the decade prior that nearly tripled 3 their debt obligations. These are words from WCC's 4 5 Chief Restructuring Officer, which the Tribunal can find at Exhibit R-49. They are also discussed at 6 Paragraph 50 of Ms. Coleman's First Expert Report and 7 Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Canada's Memorial. 8 With input from its lenders, WCC devised a 9 Plan to address its significant debt obligations in 10 11 the bankruptcy process. As required under U.S. bankruptcy law, WCC filed its Plan with the 12 13 U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 14 Texas. As WCC described it to the Bankruptcy Court, 15 16 its Plan provided for the sale and transfer of substantially all of its assets and equity interests, 17 efficient distributions to its creditors, and a 18 subsequent wind down of its businesses and affairs 19 upon distribution of the sale proceeds pursuant to the 20 Plan. 21 22 WCC planned to sell its assets in a public

Page | 18

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21 22

Page | 20 created the Claimant as a Delaware limited liability company, or LLC. The Claimant was the acquisition vehicle that would take title to the purchased assets on behalf of the First Lien Lenders. March 15, 2019, was WCC's bankruptcy Plan effective date. On that date, WCC and the Claimant executed the transactions contemplated by the Plan. This was the day the Claimant became the owner of two Alberta companies, the "Canadian Enterprises." The transaction also included a listed purchased asset entitled the "NAFTA Claim." The Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement defined this asset in the following terms: "'NAFTA Claim' means that certain claim filed with the Office of the Deputy Attorney-General of Canada on November 19, 2018, by Westmoreland on its behalf and on behalf of its Canadian subsidiary Prairie Mines & Royalty ULC against the Government of Canada pursuant to Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement (as such claim may be amended)." The term "Westmoreland" was defined in the agreement to mean "Westmoreland Coal Company."

	Page 21
1	As Ms. Coleman explained at Paragraphs 86 to
2	88 of her First Expert Report, U.S. bankruptcy law
3	defines property of the estate of a debtor in
4	bankruptcy very broadly and includes legal claims.
5	However, the Bankruptcy Code defers to applicable
6	non-bankruptcy law, whether state, federal, or, as
7	here, international law on the issue of
8	transferability itself and as to the merits of a claim
9	and who may assert it.
10	On May 13, 2019, Canada received an attempt
11	to amend WCC's Notice of Arbitration. The attempted
12	amendment was submitted on behalf of Westmoreland
13	Mining Holdings and the Canadian Enterprises. It
14	sought to substitute Westmoreland Mining Holdings as
15	the claimant. Canada objected to the attempted
16	amendment on the basis it was not a permissible
17	amendment under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
18	After some exchanges that my colleague
19	Mr. Douglas will discuss in greater detail later,
20	Canada and the Claimant agreed that this May 13, 2019,
21	submission would serve as the Claimant's Notice of
22	Intent to submit a claim to arbitration under NAFTA

	Page 23
1	Pending any questions from the Tribunal on
2	this aspect of my presentation, I'll pass the floor to
3	Ms. Van den Hof and then Ms. Dosman, who will address
4	the consequences of this fact for the Tribunal's
5	jurisdiction.
6	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you.
7	Let me just check whetherZac, do you have
8	any questions at this point?
9	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: No.
10	PRESIDENT BLANCH: And James?
11	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: No.
12	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Okay. In which case,
13	let's pass on. Thank you.
14	MS. ZEMAN: Thank you.
15	MS. VAN DEN HOF: Thank you, Members of the
16	Tribunal. At the core of Canada's objection in this
17	dispute is the principle that a claimant is only owed
18	Treaty protection under NAFTA Chapter Eleven after it
19	becomes an investor of a Party. NAFTA does not
20	protect investors against historical events, nor does
21	it free an investor of the need to conduct due
22	diligence into the enterprise forming the basis of its

	Page 22
1	Article 1119.
2	On July 23, 2019, WCC's NAFTA Claim against
3	Canada was withdrawn, and on August 12, 2019, 90 days
4	after the submission of its Notice of Intent, the
5	Claimant initiated these proceedings with Claims under
6	NAFTA Article 1116 on its own behalf and Article 1117
7	on behalf of both Prairie and Westmoreland Canada
8	Holdings Inc.
9	The Claimant's NOA challenges the same
10	Alberta Measures as alleged violations of the same
11	NAFTA obligations and claims the same amount of
12	damages as WCC claimed in its Claim.
13	It is this series of events that brings us
14	here today and to our moment to pause on the most
15	fundamental fact of this Jurisdictional Phase. It is
16	undisputed that the Claimant made an investment in
17	Canada on March 15, 2019. On that date, the Claimant
18	became the owner of the Canadian Enterprises. It held
19	these enterprises in the manner you see on the screen.
20	Prior to March 15, 2019, the Claimant did
21	not have an investment in Canada. Prior to
22	January 31, 2019, the Claimant did not exist.

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

4

	Page 24
1	investment.
2	My colleague Ms. Zeman has already explained
3	that the Claimant came into existence and made its
4	investment in 2019. It became an investor of a Party
5	on that date. We have also explained that the
6	breaches alleged by the Claimant occurred in 2016,
7	when Alberta provided Transition Payments to owners of
8	coal-fired electricity generating units.
9	The Claimant appears to be alleging that
10	Alberta should have provided WCC with a payment. But
11	under the definition of "an investor of a Party," WCC
12	and the Claimant are distinct investors. They are
13	separately constituted, one as a corporation, and the
14	other as a limited liability company. And, as
15	Ms. Zeman will explain later in our presentation, the
16	two companies are unrelated, unaffiliated entities and
17	transacted at arm's length in the bankruptcy process.
18	With these facts, Canada's objection is uncomplicated.
19	The Claimant did not exist and was not an
20	investor of a Party when it alleges it was deprived of
21	protection, and the Claimant has no standing to bring
22	a claim on behalf of WCC.

	Page 2:
1	In my presentation today, before turning to
2	the legal basis for Canada's jurisdictional objection,
3	I will recall that the Claimant bears the burden of
4	proving it has satisfied NAFTA's jurisdictional
5	requirements. I will then move on to Canada's legal
6	position in this Arbitration, explaining first that
7	the Claimant is incorrect that Articles 1116 and 1117
8	can be interpreted on their own. They must be read
9	together with Article 1101.
10	Second, under Article 1101, the challenged
11	measures must relate to the Claimant and its
12	investments. There must be an immediate and direct
13	connection between the Claimant and the challenged
14	measures.
15	Third, the protection afforded to the
16	Claimant's investment under Section A began when the
17	Claimant took a risk and made its investment. A
18	domestic enterprise is not protected independently of
19	its investor.
20	Four, under Section B, Articles 1116 and
21	1117 require that a Claimant be a protected investor
22	at the time of the alleged breach and resulting

Page | 27

1 defense, but a jurisdictional objection is not a
2 defense because there is no presumption in favor of
3 jurisdiction. The Claimant's Authorities and its
4 Expert agree that the Claimant has the burden of
5 proving jurisdiction.
6 For example, the Claimant cites *Gallo*, but

7 Gallo found on the same page the Claimant cites that: 8 "A Claimant bears the burden of proving that he has 9 standing and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the 10 Claims submitted. If jurisdiction rests on the 11 existence of certain facts, these must be proven at 12 the jurisdictional stage."

13 And on Page 26 of his First Report, 14 Professor Paulsson agrees that a NAFTA claimant must show the claim meets jurisdictional criteria. So, the 15 16 Claimant's new argument here cannot be supported, and, in any case, the Claimant has not materially disputed 17 the facts upon which Canada's jurisdictional objection 18 rests and which the Tribunal will evaluate to 19 20 determine whether it has jurisdiction. 21 I will now turn to explaining why the

Claimant has not met NAFTA's jurisdictional

22

damages. 1 2 Finally, I will address previous investment arbitration cases supporting Canada's position. These 3 4 cases are directly on point and contradict the Claimant's position in this Arbitration. For the 5 purposes of conserving time, I'll wait until the end 6 of my presentation to pause and ask for questions. 7 However, please feel free to stop me between these 8 sections if you have any questions. 9 I will now turn to briefly addressing the 10 11 Claimant's burden. In our Memorial on Jurisdiction, we explained that it is the Claimant's burden to 12 13 demonstrate the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Claimant did not address this issue in their 14 Counter-Memorial, and we noted the absence of 15 16 disagreement in our Reply. 17 The Claimant then changed course in the Rejoinder, arguing for the first time on Page 53 that: 18 "Canada has the burden of proof in its jurisdictional 19 objection." This is not correct. The Claimant cites 20 21 authorities to support its point, explaining that a party bears the burden of proving its claim or 22

Page | 26

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 28
1	requirements.
2	- First, the Claimant argues that
3	Articles 1116 and 1117 stand on their own, and
4	Article 1101 can be read without the context of the
5	remainder of the chapter, but Articles 1101, 1116, and
6	1117 must be read together. This is the only
7	conclusion consistent with the Vienna Convention's
8	mandate to read any individual provision in context.
9	In fact, the NAFTA text directs that they be read
10	together.
11	First, Article 1101 defines the scope of the
12	whole chapter. It circumscribes the scope of every
13	provision, including Article 1116 and 1117.
14	Second, Articles 1116 and 1117 refer
15	expressly to Section A, where Article 1101 is the
16	first provision, requiring a Claimant to allege that a
17	party has breached an obligation under Section A.
18	Finally, the NAFTA Parties agree that these
19	provisions must be read together.
20	I'll now turn to Article 1101, which
21	requires the challenged measures relate to the
22	Claimant.
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 29
1	(Interruption.)
2	(Stenographer clarification.)
3	MS. VAN DEN HOF: Luckily, that is the last
4	thing I said.
5	So, the Claimant argues that Article 1101 is
6	a general statement which simply requires that the
7	challenged measures relate to any investor or any
8	investment. This is incorrect.
9	In the context of Articles 1116 and 1117,
10	Article 1101 establishes that there must be a
11	connection between the measures alleged to have
12	breached Section A and the investor of a Party
13	bringing the claim. The NAFTA Parties agree that
14	Article 1101 requires a direct connection between the
15	challenged measures and the claimant, and every NAFTA
16	Chapter Eleven Tribunal evaluating Article 1101 has
17	come to the same conclusion.
18	Not a single NAFTA Decision supports the
19	Claimant's position. For example, the Apotex tribunal
20	found it necessary to evaluate Article 1101 in the
21	context of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven and the claimant's
22	substantive claims. It ultimately found the

	Page 31
1	measures must relate to the Claimant's investment, not
2	any U.S. or Mexican investor's investment.
3	The Claimant has suggested that the
4	challenged measures relate to it because they affected
5	the Canadian Enterprises prior to the Claimant's
6	acquisition of those enterprises. In doing so, the
7	Claimant ignores that the Canadian Enterprises are
8	domestic enterprises, Alberta companies. They are
9	only protected as an investor's investment.
10	Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, the protection
11	afforded to an investment of an investor of another
12	party begins when a particular investor takes a risk
13	and makes its investment. First, "investment of
14	investor of a Party" is a defined term in Article 1139
15	which requires that the investment be owned or
16	controlled by the relevant investor.
17	Second, the equally authentic French version
18	of NAFTA uses "les investissements effectués par les
19	investisseurs d'une autre Partie" in the place of
20	"investment of an investor of another party." The use
21	of the word "effectuer," or "to make," is clear that
22	an investment of an investor of another party begins

challenged measures must relate to the claimant and 1 2 their investment, not any investor or any investment. NAFTA Tribunals have also elaborated on the 3 4 degree of connection required between the challenged 5 measures and the claimant under Article 1101. For example, the Apotex tribunal found the relating-to 6 requirement means the challenged measures must have a 7 direct and immediate effect on the claimant. And the 8 Resolute tribunal found, under Article 1101, the 9 challenged measures must directly address, target, 10 11 implicate, or affect the claimant. As a result, Article 1101 is not simply a 12 13 general statement with little substantive importance, 14 at the Claimant alleges. Instead, it establishes that there must be a direct and immediate connection 15 16 between the particular measure attributable to the 17 Host State, the claimant, and the particular investment made by the claimant. 18 I will now explain why, under Section A, the 19 protection afforded to the Claimant's investment began 20 21 in 2019, when the Claimant acquired the Canadian 22 enterprises. This is important because the challenged

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 32

Page | 30

when a particular investor makes its investment. The 1 2 Spanish text also uses the word "realizar" (speaking Spanish), meaning "to make." 3 4 An investment can only be made once by one investor. This means the investment made by each 5 investor is unique. WCC's investment is distinct from 6 7 the Claimant's investment. 8 The Claimant has no response to this point and simply argues that the English text is also valid, 9 but Canada's interpretation is the only one consistent 10 11 with all three equally authentic versions of the text. The Tribunal should adopt the interpretation 12 13 consistent with the ordinary meaning, that an 14 investment begins when it is made by a particular investor. 15 16 Third, the scope of the Section A obligations relevant to this case reinforces Canada's 17 interpretation. The Claimant argues that respondents 18 owe obligations to foreign investment enterprises 19 20 under Articles 1102(2) and 1105, but this is not accurate. Under Articles 1102 and 1105, Canada owes 21 22 protection to investments of investors of another

	Page 33
1	Party. The underlying domestic enterprise receives no
2	independent protection.
3	As a result, the Claimant is incorrect that
4	it has an investment that was owed protection in 2016.
5	As my Colleague Ms. Zeman explained earlier,
6	the investment of WCC in the Canadian Enterprises
7	occurred in 2014 when WCC acquired its interest in
8	Prairie Mines & Royalty ULC from Sherritt. By
9	contrast, the investment of the Claimant in the
10	Canadian Enterprises occurred in 2019 when it
11	purchased those enterprises.
12	The two investments cannot be equated. They
13	were made at different times by different investors
14	and under different conditions. Because the Claimant
15	is different from WCC and its investment is different
16	from WCC's investment, the challenged measures cannot
17	relate to the Claimant and its investments.
18	The Claimant argues the measures breached an
19	obligation to the Claimant because it and its
20	investments were treated unfairly and in a
21	discriminatory manner. But how could Alberta possibly
22	have treated the Claimant or its investments unfairly

Page | 35 indirectly incurred damages arising out of that 1 2 breach. This is the only situation where there is a dispute between a Party and an investor that can be 3 settled under Section B. 4 5 For example, the EnCana tribunal defined a dispute as "the taking of measures in breach of the 6 7 Treaty which caused loss and damage to an investor." 8 The specific requirements of a disputing investor's claim are set out in Articles 1116 and 1117. 9 As our Pleadings explain, NAFTA's object and 10 purpose requires these provisions to be interpreted in 11 a way that maintains the effectiveness of the dispute 12 13 settlement procedures. Under Article 1116, the 14 Claimant argues it can bring a claim on behalf of WCC and WCC's investments. However, Article 1116's title 15 16 is clear that a claim under that provision is a claim by an investor on its own behalf. 17 In an Article 1116 Claim, there must be, A, 18 a Measure alleged to have breached an obligation to 19 20 the Claimant; and, B, loss or damage to the Claimant 21 arising out of that breach. All three NAFTA Parties

or in a discriminatory manner in 2016? The Claimant 1 2 did not exist or have any investments at that time. The challenged measures cannot relate to the Claimant 3 4 or its investments. 5 This concludes my submissions on Section A, and I will now move on to address Section B. 6 PRESIDENT BLANCH: Just before you do, let 7 me just check whether there are any guestions from 8 either Zac or from James. 9 Okay. Please do continue. 10 11 MS. VAN DEN HOF: Okay. Thank you. The Claimant argues that it has standing 12 13 under Section B because it is currently an investor of a Party and has a grievance against Canada's treatment 14 of the Canadian Enterprises prior to its investment in 15 16 them. But the procedures in Section B do not pertain 17 to any investor of a Party or any investment. Instead, they pertain to the disputing investor, or 18 the claimant, with whom Canada consents to arbitrate 19 and who is, A, alleging the breach of an obligation 20 under Section A owed with respect to that claimant and 21 its investment; and, B, alleging it directly or 22

Page | 34

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 36 to bring a claim on behalf of another investor who 1 2 suffered loss or damage as a result of the alleged breach. 3 For example, the United States' Tennant 4 5 Article 1128 Submission explains that a Claimant must be the same investor who sought to make, was making, 6 7 or made the investment at the time of the alleged 8 breach and incurred loss or damage thereby. There is no provision in Chapter Eleven 9 which authorizes an investor to bring a claim for an 10 11 alleged breach relating to a different investor. My colleague Ms. Dosman will establish later today that 12 13 the Claimant does not even plead any damages that it 14 could have incurred. Canada's interpretation is also consistent 15 16 with the tribunal's decision in Mesa. That tribunal found its jurisdiction limited to measures that 17 occurred after the claimant became an investor holding 18 an investment. 19 20 In response, the Claimant says Mesa finds that "foreign investment protections apply only where 21 22 a foreign investment exists." But the Claimant

agree that Article 1116 does not authorize a claimant

22

	Page 3
1	ignores that Mesa was based exclusively on whether the
2	claimant had sought to make or made each of its
3	investments at the time of the alleged breach and so
4	qualified as an investor of a Party with respect to
5	those investments. It found: "The investor must
6	establish that it was seeking to make the very
7	investment in respect of which it makes its claims at
8	the time of the challenged Measures." The Claimant
9	would not satisfy the test articulated by the Mesa
10	tribunal.
11	The Claimant's theory of Article 1116 leads
12	to unreasonable outcomes. First, Article 1116(2)
13	establishes that a claimant may not bring a claim if
14	more than three years have elapsed from the date on
15	which the investor first acquired, or should have
16	first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and
17	knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or
18	damage.
19	An investor cannot acquire knowledge of
20	breach or loss before it even exists. When a new
21	investor comes into existence, it could only acquire
22	knowledge of an alleged breach at that moment. If an

Page | 39

measure. As the United States explained in its 1 Tennant Article 1128 Submission, this would 2 potentially subject the respondents to two proceedings 3 for the same alleged breach, defeating the purpose of 4 5 Article 1121(1)(b). The Claimant's Rejoinder offered no response 6 7 to Canada's arguments on Article 1121. Its only 8 argument is that the window for NAFTA claims is "nearly closed anyway." This does not make sense. 9 The fact that NAFTA has been replaced cannot affect 10 the interpretation of the Treaty. 11 For these reasons, the Claimant cannot bring 12 13 a claim on behalf WCC. And the Claimant's theory of Article 1117 is equally flawed. It cannot bring its 14 claim under Article 1117. 15 The Claimant argues that the enterprise is 16 owed obligations under NAFTA independent of the 17 particular investor that owns it. This cannot be 18 true. As I explained earlier, an investment begins 19 20 when a particular investor acquires its interests in

an enterprise. The domestic enterprise itself is not
 owed any Treaty protection. In fact, under customary

	Page 3
1	investor could file a claim under Article 1116
2	alleging breach and loss that occurred prior to its
3	existence, the limitation period could, therefore, be
4	tolled indefinitely, and this would render the
5	limitation period meaningless.
6	This shows that Article 1116(2) exclusively
7	contemplates that a claimant's existence coincides
8	with the alleged breach and loss or damage. The
9	Claimant's interpretation of Article 1116 cannot be
10	correct.
11	Second, the Claimant's interpretation of
12	Article 1116 renders Article 1121(1) meaningless.
13	Article 1121 requires only the disputing investor to
14	waive its right to international or domestic
15	proceedings for damages with respect to the challenged
16	measure. This provision minimizes the risk of double
17	recovery and inconsistent outcomes.
18	If Article 1116 allowed a disputing investor
19	to file a claim alleging breach and loss incurred by
20	another investor, as the Claimant contends, nothing
21	would prevent the original investor from also pursuing
22	a proceeding for damages with respect to the same
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 40

Page | 38

international law, the Claimant would not be entitled 1 2 to claim any damages to the enterprise arising out of any alleged breach of the Treaty. 3 Article 1117 creates a limited derogation 4 from customary international law to allow investors to 5 claim indirect damages incurred by a domestic 6 7 enterprise the claimant owns or controls. However, it 8 does not derogate further from customary international law to permit a claimant to submit a claim for an 9 alleged breach of an obligation owed with respect to a 10 11 different investor or its investment. As a result, in an Article 1117 claim, the 12 13 claimant must show, A, a Measure alleged to have 14 breached an obligation owed with respect to the Claimant, and that it owned or controlled the 15 16 enterprise that allegedly incurred a loss arising out of that breach at the time of the breach and at the 17 time of the submission of the claim. 18 Canada's interpretation is consistent with 19 20 every NAFTA decision looking at when ownership or 21 control must exist under Article 1117. 22 In Gallo, the tribunal found a claimant must

	Page 41
1	own or control the enterprise at the time of the
2	alleged breach. The tribunal observed that previous
3	investment arbitration tribunals have been unanimous
4	on this point. The Claimant responds by arguing that
5	this case dealt with an abuse of process claim. This
6	is just not true.
7	It is also just not true that the tribunal
8	found that Article 1117 is satisfied when the
9	enterprise was held by any foreign investor at the
10	time of the alleged breach, as the Claimant alleges.
11	Instead, the tribunal found that Mr. Gallo had not
12	satisfied the quid pro quo necessary to access NAFTA
13	dispute settlement, which requires the claimant
14	seeking protection to show that it is a "protected
15	foreign investor who at the relevant time owns or
16	controls an investment in the host country."
17	The Claimant has not satisfied the test
18	articulated by the Gallo tribunal.
19	The $B-Mex$ tribunal also found that a
20	claimant must own or control the enterprise at the
21	time of the alleged breach. The Claimant agrees with
22	Canada that the $B-Mex$ parties and tribunal agreed that

Ī

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 43
1	another party, not investments by themselves.
2	Second, by abandoning the requirement that
3	the challenged measures bear any relationship to the
4	claimant, the Claimant's theory encourages
5	claim-shopping. The interpretation makes it possible
6	for a claimant to purchase an enterprise with a
7	potential nascent NAFTA claim, making the claim an
8	asset that can be purchased rather than a right
9	arising out of the quid pro quo of investment.
10	The Claimant argues that this may be an
11	abuse of process without explaining how it might be
12	abusive. This situation has never arisen before, and
13	it's not clear the abuse of process doctrine would
14	apply.
15	Third, the Claimant's theory could lead to a
16	multiplicity of proceedings under Article 1116 and
17	1117 with respect to the same enterprise and arising
18	out of the same measures. This could lead to the
19	undesirable prospect of overlapping claims and
20	divergent outcomes with respect to the same measure.
21	The simpler explanation, which avoids all of
22	these issues, is that the claimant's interests in an

1	the claimant had to own or control the enterprises at
2	the time of the alleged breaches. The Claimant argues
3	that this is irrelevant because the tribunal did not
4	resolve any factual issues on this position. That's
5	not true.
6	As you can see on this slide, the tribunal
7	did find that the claimant owned the enterprises at
8	all relevant times, including at the time of the
9	alleged breach, andrather, they found that they
10	controlled the enterprise at all relevant times. In
11	this case, the Claimant did not own or control the
12	enterprise at all relevant times.
13	The Claimant's theory of Article 1117 leads
14	to unreasonable outcomes, demonstrating that it cannot
15	be correct.
16	First, the Claimant's argument that
17	investments are owed obligations and can bring claims
18	independent of their particular investor is
19	inconsistent with Article 1117(4), which states that
20	"an investment may not make a claim." It is also not
21	consistent with the NAFTA obligations, which
22	consistently protect only investments of investors of
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 42

Page | 44

enterprise must exist at the time of the alleged
breach. For these reasons, the Claimant cannot bring
a claim on behalf of the Canadian Enterprises because
it did not own or control them at the time of the
alleged breach.
I'll now move on from the NAFTA text to
previous investment arbitration cases.
As we've shown in our submissions, tribunals
have consistently found they have no temporal
jurisdiction over alleged breaches that occurred
before a claimant became an investor of a Party. The
Claimant accuses us of reading these cases in search
of a rule without a reasoned explanation, but the
cases provide a consistent rationale. A claimant has
no access to dispute settlement where the claimant
couldn't have deprivedsorry, the State, rather,
couldn't have deprived the claimant or its investment
of any protection.
I have already explained that Mesa, Gallo,
and $B-Mex$ are cases where NAFTA tribunals have agreed
that a claimant must have been an investor of a Party
at the time of the alleged breach. Now I will respond

	Page 4
1	to the cases where the Claimant focused its attention
2	in the Rejoinder, STEAG and GEA Group. I am happy to
3	address questions concerning any other cases if you
4	have them.
5	Both STEAG and GEA Group found that a
6	claimant must be a protected investor at the time of
7	the alleged breach in a situation where the claimant
8	and the previous owner of its investment held the same
9	nationality.
10	In STEAG, the tribunal found under the
11	Energy Charter Treaty, in Canada's translation from
12	Spanish, that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to
13	resolve the dispute between the Parties only if said
14	dispute arises from a claim for violation of the
15	Treaty that is related to the Claimant's investment in
16	Spain." The tribunal found the relevant date for
17	determining its jurisdiction to be the date that the
18	claimant invested in Spain. It made this finding even
19	though an investor of same nationality had previously
20	held the investment at issue.
21	The Claimant has completely ignored this
22	portion of the tribunal's decision. Instead, it

	Page 47
1	breach.
2	For all of these reasons, the Claimant has
3	not shown that the Tribunal has jurisdiction under
4	Articles 1101, 1116, and 1117. For the Tribunal to
5	have jurisdiction, the Claimant would have to show
6	that it was a protected investor in 2016. It has not
7	done so.
8	My colleague Ms. Dosman will explain shortly
9	that, in fact, the Claimant has not even claimed any
10	damages it could have incurred.
11	Thank you for your attention today. I
12	welcome any questions from the Tribunal on these
13	issues before turning the microphone over to
14	Ms. Dosman.
15	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you.
16	James?
17	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: No.
18	PRESIDENT BLANCH: And Zac?
19	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: No.
20	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you very much.
21	Moving on to Ms. Dosman.
22	MS. DOSMAN: Members of the Tribunal, hello.

1	focuses on the fact that the tribunal considered
2	additional injections of capital from the same
3	claimant to be the same investment. We didn't refer
4	to this finding in our submissions. The claimant
5	cannot meaningfully distinguish this case.
6	Similarly, the GEA Group tribunal found
7	that, in order for the tribunal to hear the claimant's
8	claims, the claimant must have held an interest in the
9	alleged investment before the alleged Treaty
10	violations were committed. The Claimant argues that
11	GEA Group is distinguishable because there was no
12	evidence of a continuity of interest.
13	My colleagues will address the Claimant's
14	misguided continuity of interest theory shortly. For
15	now, I will just say that the Claimant has not
16	meaningfully distinguished GEA Group, either.
17	There is nothing in any of the many cases we
18	have cited to suggest that, if a claimant can
19	demonstrate it has an untethered concept of continuity
20	of interest, a tribunal has jurisdiction. Instead,
21	each of these cases support that the claimant must be
22	a protected investor at the time of the alleged
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903
	Page 48
1	My name is Alexandra Dosman.
2	Ms. Van den Hof has explained that the NAFTA

Page | 46

does not permit claims by an investor of a Party prior 3 to its existence and investment in the territory of 4 5 another Party. I will complement her submissions by 6 7 addressing the Claimant's failure to plead a cognizable damages case. 8 9 The requirement for a claimant to show damages prima facie at the jurisdictional stage is 10 evident from the language of the NAFTA. The Treaty 11 12 requires a claimant to plead that it has incurred loss 13 or damage by reason of, or arising out of, the alleged breach, either directly, under Article 1116(1), or 14 indirectly, on behalf of its domestic enterprise under 15 Article 1117(1). 16 Where a claimant or its investment could not 17 18 have incurred damage arising out of the alleged breach, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over 19 the claim. Tribunals have confirmed this principle. 20 For example, in UPS v. Canada, the tribunal noted that 21 a claimant is required to "state a prima facie case of 22

	Page 49
1	damage at the jurisdictional stage."
2	Similarly, in Saluka v. Czech Republic, the
3	tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction in respect
4	of claims for damage prior to the claimant's
5	acquisition of the underlying investment.
6	The other NAFTA Parties agree that the
7	possibility of establishing damages is a prerequisite
8	to the submission of a claim to arbitration. México
9	at Paragraph 4 of its Article 1128 Submission in this
10	case states that an investor of a Party may only
11	submit a claim to arbitration if that investor has
12	incurred a loss. As Ms. Van den Hof noted, the United
13	States in its Article 1128 Submission in Tennant
14	agrees at Paragraph 10 that the investor bringing a
15	claim under Article 1116 must "be the same investor
16	who suffered loss or damage as a result of the alleged
17	breach."
18	Here, the Claimant cannot establish a prima
19	facie case of damage either to itself or to its
20	investment because it did not exist at the time the
21	alleged damages crystallized, and it had no investment
22	at that time.

	Page 51
1	Second, the Claimant argues that it can
2	claim losses under Article 1117(1) that were incurred
3	by Prairie in 2016, years prior to the Claimant's
4	acquisition of the Canadian Enterprises in 2019. This
5	is also not permitted. An investor cannot make a
6	claim on behalf of another investor's enterprise.
7	Canada does not independently owe obligations to
8	Prairie, the domestic enterprise.
9	NAFTA distinguishes between an investor's
10	direct damages under Article 1116 in its capacity as
11	owner and indirect damages under Article 1117 in
12	itson behalf of that investor's enterprise.
13	Damage to Prairie is only cognizable as
14	indirect damage to an investor that has standing to
15	bring a claim under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.
16	And, finally, the Claimant appeals to
17	so-called "pending damages" in an attempt to save its
18	claim. However, there are no pending damages here.
19	As you can see on the slide, the Claimant is claiming
20	losses as a result of Alberta's conclusion of the
21	Off-Coal Agreements with electricity generators in
22	November of 2016. These are exactly the same alleged

In its Notice of Arbitration, the Claimant's 1 2 allegations of loss or damage concern WCC. There is nothing specific to the Claimant. What is more, the 3 4 Notice of Arbitration makes no allegations of indirect 5 damage specific to the Canadian Enterprises. In its pleadings on jurisdiction, the 6 Claimant attempted, belatedly, to establish a link 7 between itself, its investment, and the alleged loss 8 or damage. It makes three new arguments, none of 9 which is grounded in its Notice of Arbitration, and, 10 11 in any event, none of these new arguments has merit. First, the Claimant argues that it can claim 12 13 losses on behalf of WCC under Article 1116(1). For example, at Paragraph 127 of its Rejoinder on 14 Jurisdiction, the Claimant states that "Prairie's 15 16 mine-mouth operations were purchased in 2013-14 by WCC on the expectation that they would have a 50-year life 17 span." 18 It argues that it can claim losses on behalf 19 of WCC for an alleged violation of WCC's expectations 20 21 in 2016. This is not permitted. An investor cannot 22 make a claim for loss to another investor.

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 52

Page | 50

\$470 million in damages that WCC claimed in 2018. As 1 2 you can see on the screen, the Claimant alleges that: "Payments pursuant to the Off-Coal Agreements 3 established that Prairie and its investors would be 4 5 harmed." It also states that the alleged harm was certain. 6 7 Indeed, the Claimant states that it "had to 8 file claims within three years of the November 2016 Off-Coal Agreements" in order to fall within the 9 Limitation Period. That is at Paragraph 102 of its 10 Counter-Memorial. That is, the Claimant acknowledges 11 that the alleged damages crystallized prior to its 12 13 formation and prior to its investments. There's 14 nothing new or pending here. The Claimant then points to the fact that 15 16 the Off-Coal Agreements provided for the distribution of Transition Payments in annual installments. This 17 is true; it is also unhelpful to the Claimant's case. 18 Alberta decided how to allocate the 19 20 Transition Payments once in 2016. The Transition 21 Payments contemplated by the OCAs were fully 22 documented and accounted for in 2016. The OCAs and

	Page 53
1	any alleged resulting damage were certain on the
2	Claimant's case in 2016.
3	Moreover, the Claimant made its investment
4	in 2019 with full knowledge of the alleged losses.
5	The Claimant would have made its own determination of
6	what the Canadian Enterprises were worth in 2019 and
7	decided to proceed on that basis.
8	Canada is not responsible for the valuation
9	made by WMH when it invested in the Canadian
10	Enterprises in 2019 with full knowledge of the
11	regulatory landscape. WMH must make its own claim for
12	prima facie damage arising out of the breach it
13	alleges, but it has failed to meet this low bar.
14	Along with Ms. Van den Hof's submissions,
15	this concludes Canada's affirmative case.
16	Following any questions from the Tribunal
17	and pending any desire for a break, I will turn the
18	microphone back to Ms. Zeman, Mr. Douglas, and
19	Mr. Klaver, who, together, will explain why the
20	Claimant has failed to establish the Tribunal's
21	jurisdiction on the basis of its alternative theories.
22	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you very much.

Page | 55

Jurisdictional Phase, the Claimant has characterized 1 its relationship to WCC as one of "associated 2 companies", "corporate affiliates", reflecting a 3 "continuity of beneficial interests" and dropping the 4 beneficial in its Rejoinder as reflecting a continuity 5 of nondescript interests. 6 7 It asserted at the Bifurcation Hearing that 8 it is "substantially the same" as WCC, and in its Rejoinder that WCC merely "changed form" to become 9 WMH. However, it also indicated in its 10 Counter-Memorial that it is a "distinct legal entity" 11 and that it and WCC are separate investors, in the 12 13 plural. 14 The Claimant has asserted that it is a new owner of a foreign investment and a "new investor 15 parent" and that it is "not a 'new' investor in 16 Canada". It has further stated that WCC created the 17 Claimant as a wholly owned subsidiary and was the 18 Claimant's parent, but also that it was the Claimant 19 20 that had a "continuous interest" in WCC. These 21 statements cannot be reconciled, either with each 22 other, the evidence on the record, or with existing

	Page 54
1	Let me just check.
2	Zac, do you have any questions?
3	And James? No?
4	A question for the reporter: Are you happy
5	if we continue, or would you like to have a short
6	break now?
7	REALTIME STENOGRAPHER: I'm just fine, Madam
8	President. Thank you.
9	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Excellent. Then I
10	propose we continue.
11	MS. ZEMAN: Okay. We have heard from both
12	Ms. Van den Hof and Ms. Dosman that the fact that the
13	Claimant was not an investor of a Party at the time of
14	the alleged breach is fatal to its claim. The
15	remainder of our statement today will address the
16	Claimant's attempts to avoid that result by positing
17	rules of international law that do not exist and
18	failing to establish that it meets those rules as a
19	matter of fact.
20	The Claimant's alternative theories of
21	jurisdiction are largely premised on an alleged
22	connection with WCC. Over the course of this

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 56

rules of international law on which this Tribunal's 1 2 jurisdiction could be based. In some places, the Claimant additionally 3 ties these various factual allegations to the 4 5 bankruptcy context that facilitated its purchase of the Canadian Enterprises. For example, it has alleged 6 7 what it calls a "simple proposition" that the entity 8 emerging from bankruptcy, as the owner of the debtor company's investment, should be allowed to pursue a 9 NAFTA Chapter Eleven claim for harm to the investment. 10 11 But the Claimant does not tie its theory to the text of NAFTA. 12 13 On its most generous reading, the Claimant's 14 theory appears to be that any entity emerging from a bankruptcy process should automatically be viewed as 15 16 the same investor of a Party that entered. But as Canada explained in its Reply, there is no magic in 17 the bankruptcy context. The characteristics of each 18 particular transaction and the relationship between 19 20 investors purporting to be the same must be assessed 21 on a case-by-case basis. 22 In this case, the evidence establishes that

Page | 57 the Claimant and WCC were at arm's length and that WCC 1 2 did not simply become the Claimant. They are not the same investor of a Party as would be required in order 3 4 for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction over the 5 Claimant's claim. Today I will take the Tribunal through key 6 evidence on the record that contradicts the Claimant's 7 theories of connection to WCC as a factual matter; in 8 particular, that it is a corporate affiliate of WCC 9 and that it is the same as WCC. We will revisit four 10 11 key facts: First, the Claimant's formation; and, second, the Bankruptcy Court's arm's length and 12 13 no-insider findings. This evidence establishes that the Claimant's assertion that it was a corporate 14 affiliate of WCC cannot be supported. 15 16 We will then revisit the Bankruptcy Court's 17 determination that the Claimant would not have successor liability to WCC and the fact that the 18 Claimant did not take on all of WCC's assets or 19 liabilities through the Stalking Horse Purchase 20 Agreement. All of this evidence establishes that the 21 Claimant is not, and has not ever been, the same 22

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 59

affairs of the company shall be conducted by the 1 2 Member. Mr. Mayer was a partner at the law firm that represented the First Lien Lenders in WCC's bankruptcy 3 4 process.

In its Rejoinder, the Claimant protested 5 that Canada did not "explain why the fact WMH was 6 7 created by an attorney for the secured creditors 8 should matter."

Well, it matters for two reasons: First, 9 the Claimant repeated its incorrect statement about 10 WCC creating it as a wholly owned subsidiary no less 11 than five times in its Counter-Memorial. The fact 12 13 that the Claimant was not created by WCC thus serves 14 as an important illustration of the need for caution when approaching unsubstantiated statements about 15 16 matters of fact.

Second, it indicates the absence of a 17 corporate link from the outset between WCC and the 18 Claimant. And the Description of Transaction Steps, 19 20 which set out the steps that would be taken to execute the transactions contemplated by WCC's Plan. further 21 confirms the First Lien Lenders' nominee continued to 22

investor of a Party as WCC. The two companies are not 1 2 the same entity, nor do they share the same legal personality. 3 4 We will begin our highlights with the time 5 the Claimant was created, three years after the alleged breach. The Claimant argues that it was a 6 corporate affiliate of WCC because it was created by 7 WCC as a wholly owned subsidiary of WCC. But the 8 evidence shows that it was not WCC who created the 9 Claimant; it was the First Lien Lenders. And it was 10 11 not WCC who owned the Claimant at its creation; it was a nominee of the First Lien Lenders. It is undisputed 12 13 that the First Lien Lenders were adverse in interest to WCC. The evidence, thus, establishes that there 14 was no corporate link between the Claimant and WCC 15 16 when the Claimant was formed. 17 Let's take a guick look at the Claimant's formation document, which is Exhibit R-081. An 18 excerpt is on the screen in front of you. It defines 19 Thomas Moers Mayer as the Member, or owner, and 20 21 indicates that the Claimant was initially wholly owned

by the Member and that the property, business, and 22

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 60

Page | 58

1	hold the Claimant until the beginning of the
2	transaction, and the First Lien Lenders held the
3	Claimant at the end of the transaction. That's at
4	Exhibit R-043, and that specific confirmation can be
5	found at Bates Pages R-043.13 and R-043.14.
6	As Ms. Coleman explained at Paragraph 11 of
7	her Second Expert Report: "Lenders are inherently
8	adverse to their borrowers." They have claims to
9	repayment of their lent money. The First Lien Lenders
10	and their borrower, WCC, were no exception. The fact
11	that the First Lien Lenders created and owned the
12	Claimant confirms that the Claimant was adverse in
13	interest to, rather than a corporate relation of, WCC.
14	This is further confirmed by Mr. Mayer's
15	continued representation of the Claimant in WCC's
16	bankruptcy process. Canada refers the Tribunal to
17	Footnote 35 of its Reply for references to the
18	evidence establishing the parties' legal
19	representation in the bankruptcy process.
20	Before I move to the Bankruptcy Court's
21	findings with respect to the relationship between the
22	Claimant and WCC, it is worth pausing on the

Page	6

Claimant's Rejoinder assertion that it is a mere 1 2 change in corporate form from WCC. If the Claimant were serious about this 3 4 allegation, it would have presented evidence on the 5 rules of Delaware law pertaining to corporate form changes; it did not. On its face, the Claimant's 6 formation document does not establish that its 7 creation amounted to an amendment of WCC's corporate 8 form. In fact, it indicates the opposite. WCC and 9 the Claimant have coexisted as independent corporate 10 11 entities since the Claimant's creation. To this day, they both remain separately in existence: WCC as a 12 13 corporation, continuing to wind down its affairs; and the Claimant as an LLC. There is no evidentiary basis 14 on which to reach the Claimant's conclusion on 15 16 corporate form. 17 The next piece of evidence I'd like to highlight today are the Bankruptcy Court's legal 18 findings that the Claimant and WCC were transacting at 19 arm's length and were not insiders. 20 On the screen before you is Exhibit R-063. 21 the Bankruptcy Court's Order confirming the WCC Plan. 22

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 63

1 its translation into slightly plainer English--"an 2 entity owning or controlling the debtor, that is owned 3 by the debtor, or that is owned by an entity owning or 4 controlling the debtor."

The Tribunal can find the references to the
full Bankruptcy Code definitions at the bottom of this
Slide 49.

8 According to Ms. Coleman, by determining 9 that the Claimant was not an insider or affiliate of 10 WCC, the Bankruptcy Court effectively determined that 11 the Claimant did not own or control WCC, that WCC did 12 not own or control the Claimant, and that the Claimant 13 was not owned or controlled by an entity that also 14 owned or controlled WCC.

15 The Claimant did not address the Court's 16 determination, at all, in its Counter-Memorial, and 17 spent a single paragraph attempting to downplay its 18 significance in its Rejoinder.

19 There, the Claimant argued that the 20 "Bankruptcy Court statement had nothing to do with the 21 transaction steps." Under those steps, there was a 22 finite and fleeting moment in time when WCC held

1	This Order authorized WCC to enter into the
2	transaction contemplated to effectuate the Plan. In
3	Paragraph 47, the Court determined that the Claimant
4	and WCC negotiated, proposed, and entered into the
5	Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement, which set out the
6	terms of the Claimant's purchase of the Canadian
7	Enterprises, from arm's length bargaining positions.
8	The Claimant never confronts the Bankruptcy Court's
9	findings in this respect. The term "arm's length" did
10	not appear once in the Claimant's Counter-Memorial.
11	It appeared only in a footnote in its Rejoinder
12	Memorial that responded to a different argument. It,
13	thus, stands uncontested.
14	In the same paragraph, the Court goes on to
15	find that the "purchaser is not an insider of the WLB
16	debtors as that term is defined in Section 101(31) of
17	the Bankruptcy Code."
18	The Claimant is the purchaser, and the WLB
19	debtors are WCC and certain of its debtor affiliates.
20	Ms. Coleman explained in her Expert Report that the
21	Bankruptcy Code defines "insider" to include
22	"affiliate." The Code also defines "affiliate" asin

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 64

Page | 62

equity in the Claimant immediately before that equity 1 2 was distributed to the First Lien Lenders to satisfy their claims. The Claimant has indicated that this 3 4 step was for the purpose of obtaining favorable tax treatment for the Claimant. The Claimant argues that 5 the Court found these steps "integral to [its] 6 7 Confirmation of the Bankruptcy Plan." As a result, so 8 savs the Claimant, the Court's determination that the Claimant was not an affiliate of WCC is irrelevant. 9 But the Claimant's logic emphasizes just how 10 striking the Court's no-insider finding is. Despite 11 knowing all aspects of the transaction, including the 12 13 micro step undertaken for tax purposes that the 14 Claimant focuses on, the Court still determined that the Claimant was not affiliated with WCC. 15 16 As Ms. Coleman explained: "At no point did WCC have a meaningful role or relationship with 17 18 respect to the management or operations of the Claimant that would lead to a different conclusion 19 20 than the one in which the WCC Bankruptcy Court arrived." 21 22 The Claimant has expended significant effort

	Page 65
1	in this phase of the Arbitration, accusing Canada of
2	prioritizing form over substance. Yet, that is
3	precisely the approach that it takes on this question
4	of corporate affiliation. It attempts to cast the
5	transaction as a mere reshuffling of equity between
6	corporate affiliates because the "formal transfer
7	outlined in the description of transaction steps is
8	between WCC, the parent company; and WMH, its wholly
9	owned subsidiary."
10	Contrary to the Claimant's suggestion,
11	Canada is not trying to read out this step from the
12	transaction. Canada is asking the Tribunal to view
13	this step in its proper context and draw the
14	appropriate conclusion, that this was not a mere
15	reshuffling of equity interest among members of a
16	corporate family. It was a sale between Parties that
17	a U.S. Court determined were transacting at arm's
18	length. The Court reached its conclusion on the basis
19	of a full evidentiary record.
20	Consistent with this finding, Ms. Coleman
21	sums up that the Claimant was an unaffiliated third
22	party to WCC, formed as a new entity on behalf of the

Page | 67

22

the excerpt is quite comprehensive. 1 2 Ms. Coleman explained, in her First Expert Report, that this determination means that the 3 Claimant could not be held liable for the obligations 4 of WCC solely by virtue of acquiring its assets. This 5 result would not have been possible had the Claimant 6 7 purchased equity interest in WCC. 8 It's worth noting that WCC viewed obtaining protection against successor liability as a selling 9 feature for any potential buyer of its assets in the 10 bankruptcy process. WCC described its expectations in 11 this regard in the sales notice that went out to 12 13 prospective buyers. In particular, the expectation 14 was: To the greatest extent possible, the successful bidder would not be deemed to be a legal or other 15 16 successor, to have merged in any way with or into WCC, or to be an alter ego or mere or substantial 17 continuation of WCC. 18 WCC further explained in this sales notice 19 20 that the First Lien Lenders would not have entered 21 into the Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement without this kind of protection. The bankruptcy Court's "no 22

First Lien Lenders for the purposes of taking title to 1 2 assets that would partially satisfy their claims, and the transaction both began and ended with the First 3 4 Lien Lenders or their nominee owning the Claimant. As a result, the Claimant's attempts to 5 connect itself to WCC by claiming an affiliation are 6 unsupported by the record. The Claimant was not an 7 affiliate of WCC when the alleged breach occurred, 8 when WCC entered bankruptcy, when WCC emerged from 9 bankruptcy, or when the Claimant initiated these NAFTA 10 11 proceedings. That brings us to the third fact to 12 13 highlight, which pertains to the Claimant's assertion that it is the same as WCC. In particular, the 14 Bankruptcy Court determined that the sale of WCC's 15 16 assets was free and clear of preexisting liens and 17 claims, and the Claimant would not face successor liability with respect to WCC. 18 We've pulled up, on Slide 53, an excerpt of 19 the language from Paragraph 49 of the Bankruptcy 20 21 Court's Confirmation Order on Successor Liability. I

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

won't read the excerpt out, but, as you can see, even

Page | 68

Page | 66

successor liability" finding, thus, confirms the 1 2 Claimant and WCC are not the same entity and do not have the same legal personality. 3 The fourth fact to highlight is that the 4 Claimant did not acquire all of WCC's assets or assume 5 all of its liabilities. The Stalking Horse Purchase 6 7 Agreement that Claimant and WCC executed was express. 8 Only assets and liabilities that were expressly identified in the agreement were purchased or assumed. 9 For example, while equipment and coal 10 11 inventory were included assets, director and officer insurance policies, certain specific real property 12 13 leases, and certain employee benefit plans were 14 excluded assets. On the liability side, workers' compensation liabilities for occupational injuries to 15 16 transferred employees arising after the closing were assumed, but certain statutory liabilities for workers 17 arising prior to the closing were excluded. 18 An agreement can be found at Exhibit R-053 19 20 and is discussed in Ms. Coleman's First Expert Report 21 at Paragraphs 65 and 66. 22 It establishes that the Claimant did not

	Page 69
1	inherit all of WCC's characteristics when it purchased
2	certain assets and assumed certain liabilities in the
3	asset sale. It establishes that the Claimant is not
4	the same entity and does not have the same legal
5	personality as WCC.
6	As a final note on these issue, Ms. Coleman
7	explained, at Footnote 98 of her First Expert Report,
8	that "Orders such as the WCC Plan Confirmation Order
9	are typically drafted and proposed by the Debtors
10	before being filed with the Bankruptcy Court."
11	This means that the findings made by the
12	Bankruptcy Court's Confirmation Orderincluding on
13	arm's-length transacting, no insider relationship,
14	taking the assets free and clear, and no successor
15	liabilitywere specifically sought by WCC and likely
16	negotiated with the First Lien Lenders. Indeed, the
17	First Lien Lenders retained the right to terminate the
18	Restructuring Support Agreement with WCC, and,
19	correspondingly, their support of WCC's Plan, if WCC
20	made changes to the draft confirmation order that was
21	inconsistent with their agreement. This confirms that
22	the Parties specifically sought these arm's-length,

	Page 71
1	That's because there's a big screen over top of here,
2	which has our slide presentation, as well as you, on
3	the screen. That is kind of the layout here a little
4	bit, in case you were wondering. Sometimes we might
5	look at you up there, even though you are more
6	directly in front of us.
7	Today I will be speaking to the assignment
8	of claims. The Claimant maintains that both an
9	investment claim and an investment may be assigned
10	between investors without affecting the jurisdiction
11	of a tribunal, but only in two circumstances: First,
12	when the transfer is between investors who are
13	affiliates; or, second, when the transfer is between
14	investors that share a close continuity of interest
15	between them. That's at Paragraph 56 of their
16	Rejoinder.
17	My colleague Ms. Zeman has already explained
18	that the Claimant and WCC were not affiliates but,
19	instead, transacted at arm's length. My colleague
20	Mr. Klaver will later explain that the Claimant's
21	continuity-of-interest theory has no grounding in fact
22	or in law. I will address the legal aspects of

1	no-insider, and no-successor-liability findings for
2	the Claimant.
3	The Claimant cannot have it both ways. It
4	cannot be a non-affiliate and non-successor to WCC to
5	escape unwanted liabilities but assert that same
6	affiliation and successor status to pursue a NAFTA
7	claim.
8	The evidence establishes that the Claimant
9	is not the same investor of a Party as WCC.
10	I'd be happy to take any questions that the
11	Tribunal may have on the evidence. Otherwise, I'll
12	pass the floor to my colleague, Mr. Douglas, who will
13	address the Claimant's arguments with respect to
14	assignment of claims.
15	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you. Let me just
16	check.
17	Zac? And James? No. Thank you very much.
18	MS. ZEMAN: Thank you.
19	MR. DOUGLAS: Good morning again, President
20	Blanch and Members of the Tribunal.
21	Just to explain Canada's setup here, you
22	might see us, from time to time, look up this way.

Page | 70

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Γ

	Page 72
1	assignment of claims more generally.
2	First, I will explain that the Claimant
3	cannot establish this Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione
4	temporis because WCC sold its investment claim under
5	NAFTA to the Claimant.
6	Second, I will explain that the Claimant
7	cannot establish this Tribunal's jurisdiction because
8	WCC sold the Canadian Enterprises to the Claimant.
9	Now, before getting started, a quick note on
10	terminology. As my colleague Ms. Zeman has explained,
11	the NAFTA claim and the Canadian Enterprises were
12	unequivocally sold by WCC to the Claimant. However,
13	in its Pleadings, the Claimant refers to the sale as
14	an assignment or transfer.
15	The Claimant's usage of these terms cannot
16	be used to mask the market-based arm's length nature
17	of the transaction. Canada will refer to the
18	transaction as a "sale," which is what, in fact,
19	transpired through WCC's bankruptcy process.
20	First, the sale of WCC's investment claim
21	under NAFTA Chapter Eleven to the Claimant. Canada
22	provides a full answer to the Claimant's argument at

	Page 73
1	Paragraphs 90-95 of its Memorial and
2	Paragraphs 126-135 of its Reply.
3	In particular, Canada explained that WCC's
4	Claim cannot establish this Tribunal's jurisdiction
5	because it is not the Claim that is before this
6	Tribunal. It is important to recall the chronology.
7	WCC entered into bankruptcy in October of 2018. WCC
8	then filed a NAFTA claim in November of 2018. WCC
9	then sold its NAFTA claim to the Claimant four months
10	later, in March of 2019. WCC's NAFTA claim was then
11	withdrawn in July of 2019, and the Claimant filed its
12	own NAFTA claim in August of 2019.
13	The Claimant does not dispute these facts.
14	Thus, as a question of fact, whether or not WCC's
15	NAFTA claim was sold, transferred, or assigned, the
16	claim no longer exists. It was withdrawn.
17	Moreover, as a question of law, this
18	Tribunal only has the competence to adjudicate the
19	Claim that is before it. That is the Claim that was
20	filed by the Claimant. This Tribunal has no
21	competence over WCC's Claim. Nowhere in its Pleadings
22	does the Claimant explain how WCC's Claim can still be

Page | 75

concerning a motion to add a new party. In that case, 1 2 Merrill & Ring brought a motion to add a new party, Georgia Basin, as a claimant. Merrill & Ring and 3 Georgia Basin were affiliated companies, and 4 Merrill & Ring claimed that Georgia Basin was also 5 affected by the measure it was challenging in that 6 7 case. 8 The motion was made pursuant to Article 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the same provision through q which the Claimant in this case sought to substitute 10 itself for WCC in WCC's after-claim. 11 Canada opposed the motion in Merrill & Ring 12 13 because the challenged measures in that case did not 14 relate to Georgia Basin under Article 1101. Georgia Basin was not the subject of an alleged breach of 15 16 Section A, and Georgia Basin could not have incurred any loss or damage. 17

18 The tribunal in that case agreed with 19 Canada's analysis. They wrote: "the Tribunal must 20 accordingly begin by examining whether the amendment 21 requested by the Claimant's motion to add a new party 22 is compatible with the scope of the arbitration

Page | 74 factually or legally relevant. 1 2 Even if WCC's NAFTA Claim was somehow relevant, there is no mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 3 4 Eleven to allow a disputing investor to sell or 5 transfer its claim to another investor of a Party. A state's consent to arbitrate under NAFTA Chapter 6 Eleven is specific to the investor of a Party that 7 brings the claim, except in narrow circumstances, like 8 subrogation, which I will speak to in just a moment. 9 To establish consent, a NAFTA claim must be 10 11 brought by the investor of a Party to whom the measure relates, who is the subject of an alleged breach of 12 13 Section A, and who incurred loss or damage. 14 Canada alerted the Claimant to these issues in July of 2019, when the Claimant approached Canada 15 16 seeking to substitute itself for WCC in WCC's NAFTA claim. That is Exhibit R-076. In that letter, Canada 17 explained that an investment claim cannot be amended 18 if it would cause the amended claim to fall outside of 19 the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 20 21 Canada provided the Claimant with the decision of the NAFTA tribunal in Merrill & Ring 22

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 76 clause, i.e., do the impugned measures relate to 1 2 Georgia Basin and are there credible allegations that it has been damaged by reason of the alleged breaches 3 of Section A." 4 The Merrill & Ring tribunal denied the 5 motion to add Georgia Basin as a claimant because 6 7 doing so would not comport with the terms of the NAFTA 8 or Article 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules. The tribunal's decision in that case 9 confirms Canada's position in this arbitration. 10 11 The challenged measures in this case do not relate to the Claimant or its investments. The 12 13 Claimant and its investments have suffered no breach 14 of Section A and could not have incurred any loss or 15 damage. 16 In its Rejoinder, the Claimant accuses Canada of acting in bad faith because in our Reply, we 17 wrote that it was "open to WCC to continue its NAFTA 18 claim." 19 20 There is no bad faith here. The Claimant 21 approached Canada requesting to substitute itself for 22 WCC in WCC's NAFTA claim. It was the Claimant that

	Page 77
1	sought to have WCC removed. In fact, what Canada did
2	not know at the time was that the Claimant had already
3	purchased WCC's NAFTA claim. Presumably, WCC was thus
4	already out of the picture well before the Claimant
5	approached Canada to substitute itself in for WCC.
6	These were not decisions made by Canada.
7	These were decisions made by the Claimant, and if the
8	Claimant wasn't directly aware, it should have been
9	aware that there is no mechanism under NAFTA Chapter
10	Eleven that allows a purported claimant to buy a NAFTA
11	claim from another investor and then pursue it.
12	For example, there is no case law under
13	NAFTA or otherwise that has allowed an investment
14	claim to be sold or transferred from one investor to
15	another; not one. Moreover, when Treaty partners wish
16	to establish a mechanism for the transfer of a claim,
17	they do so expressly such as in the case of
18	subrogation.
19	Canada made this point at Paragraph 130 of
20	its Reply, yet, like with so many other points raised
21	by Canada, the Claimant provides no response in its
22	written Pleadings.

Page | 79

under Section B transfers with the investment to the 1 2 new investor so long as the new investor is an affiliate or there is a continuity of interest. 3 And my colleagues Ms. Van den Hof and 4 5 Ms. Dosman have already explained the proper interpretation of Articles 1101, 1116 and 1117, which 6 7 leads to the conclusion we set out earlier, namely, that the alleged breach must relate to the Claimant 8 and its investments. The Claimant and its investments 9 must be the subject of an alleged breach of Section A, 10 and the Claimant or its investments must have incurred 11 loss or damage. 12 13 I will not repeat what my colleagues have already laid out, but I will address the case law the 14 Disputing Parties have filed concerning investments 15 16 that were sold or transferred after the date of an alleged breach. And the case law is clear: When an 17 investor disposes of its investment after an alleged 18 Treaty breach arises, the transfer does not imbue the 19 20 subsequent owner with a right to advance the Treaty

For example, Daimler v. Argentina, the

21

22

claim.

Subrogation allows an investment claim to be 1 2 transferred by an investor to its insurer. The Host State consents to the transfer, typically in the 3 4 investment treaty. An example of such a provision can 5 be found at Article 14.15 of the Canada-United States-México Free Trade Agreement, which is RLA-066. 6 Subrogation provides an exception to the 7 general rule that a claim cannot be transferred. If 8 claims could be sold or transferred as in due course 9 or as a matter of course, a provision allowing 10 11 subrogation would not be necessary. The Claimant should have been aware of NAFTA Chapter Eleven's 12 13 limitations, in particular with respect to the consent to arbitrate before it decided to purchase WCC's NAFTA 14 claim. 15 16 But as I mentioned at the outset, the point is moot in any event because WCC's NAFTA claim was 17 withdrawn and the Claimant filed its own. 18 I'd like to now discuss the sale of an 19

investment from one investor to another after the date 20 21 of an alleged breach. As I've mentioned, the Claimant argues that under NAFTA the right to file a claim 22

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 80

Page | 78

1	Claimant had transferred its investment after the date
2	of an alleged breach, and subsequently filed the claim
3	relating to that investment. Argentina argued that
4	the right to file a claim transferred with the
5	investment. And, thus, the tribunal did not have
6	jurisdiction. The tribunal rejected that argument.
7	You can see up on the screen, the tribunal
8	recognizes the severability of a claim from the
9	underlying investment. The tribunal says that a
10	strong argument can be made that only an investor with
11	an investment prior to the dispute has standing to
12	file the claim. For this reason, the tribunal
13	rejected Argentina's argument that the right to file a
14	claim transferred with the investment.
15	The tribunal held at Paragraph 145 that it
16	should grant standing to the investor who suffered
17	damages as a result of the alleged breach.
18	The tribunal in EnCana v. Ecuador reached
19	the same result. In that case, the tribunal disagreed
20	with Ecuador and concluded that the right to advance a
21	claim remained with the investor that held the
22	investment at the time the dispute arose.

	Page 81
1	You can see on the screen it defined a
2	dispute at Paragraph 131 as "the taking of measures in
3	breach of the Treaty which cause loss and damage to an
4	investor." Canada notes that Professor Paulsson cites
5	the same paragraph with approval at Page 5 of his
6	Second Report.
7	In its Rejoinder, the Claimant argues that
8	the EnCana tribunal did not address whether the
9	purchaser of the investment could also assert a claim.
10	That is not what the Tribunal said. It said that the
11	investor that held the investment at the time of the
12	dispute could file a claim. Given that language, it
13	is hard to imagine how the purchaser of an investment
14	could also have a dispute.
15	Moreover, the Claimant's assertion that any
16	would-be purchaser of an investment should also be
17	able to file a claim would lead to an absurd result.
18	What if there are multiple subsequent
19	purchasers of the investment? Does each subsequent
20	purchaser get to file a claim?
21	In Canada's view, that does not make sense,
22	and is not what the tribunal in <i>EnCana</i> decided.
	B&B Reporters

1

2

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 83

transfers with an investment when it is sold or 1 2 transferred after the date of an alleged breach. The Claimant is mistaken. Its four cases 3 4 are Autopista, Koch Minerals, African Holdings, and CME. Neither Autopista nor Koch Minerals involve the 5 transfer of an investment after the date of an alleged 6 breach. There was, thus, no ratione temporis issue in 8 those cases. They are not applicable here. In fact, in Koch Minerals--and Arbitrator 9 Douglas, I know vou're on the tribunal, so vou can let 10 me know if I get this wrong--but in Koch Minerals the 11 case--which is a case that Claimant relies on 12 13 heavily--the issue facing the tribunal was whether two 14 investments held individually by two investors could nonetheless be considered as one integrated 15 16 investment. The tribunal agreed that it was one integrated investment because the two investments had 17 18 a close nexus. In the paragraph the Claimant cites, the 19 20 tribunal considers whether the investment could have 21 been integrated had the two investors not been affiliated companies, but concluded that such an issue 22

There are other examples as well. For 1 2 example, in Mondev v. The United States, the question was whether Mondev had lost standing--sorry, lost 3 4 standing to bring a claim because it no longer owned 5 or controlled the investment. The tribunal found that Mondev's loss of its investment did not also mean that 6 it lost its right to pursue a NAFTA claim. Canada raised this case in its Reply, but 8 the Claimant did not address it in its Rejoinder. The 9 same result occurred in Gemplus v. México, where the 10 11 tribunal found that the investor that owned or controlled the investment at the time of the alleged 12 13 breach retained the rights to bring the claim, despite the fact that it had transferred the shares 14 constituting the investment after the alleged breach. 15 16 These cases all support the view that, when 17 a claimant sells its investment after the alleged breach, the right to advance the claims remains with 18 the investor that owned and controlled the investment 19 at the time of the alleged breach. In contrast to 20 21 these cases, the Claimant cites four of its own, which it argues establishes a rule the right to file a claim 22

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

> > Page | 84

Page | 82

was not present in the case. 1 2 The Claimant, thus, inaccurately cites Koch Minerals for a proposition that it does not stand for. 3 4 The same is true in the next case they cite, which is African Holdings v. Congo. The tribunal in that case 5 found that neither Claimant was an investor on the 6 7 date of the alleged breach. The tribunal, thus, denied the claims on grounds of jurisdiction ratione 8 temporis. 9 The case, thus, supports Canada's position 10 11 in this Arbitration. In obiter dicta, which Professor Paulsson confirms at Paragraph 60 of its First Report, 12 13 the tribunal opined that African Holdings, as assignee 14 of the Contract debts, could have had the same interests as SAFRICAS, including with respect to the 15 16 investment claim. However, the tribunal's statement is not 17 applicable here because, well, it is obiter and, 18 second, the tribunal made that comment because 19 20 SAFRICAS and African Holdings were affiliated 21 companies continuously owned by the same family. 22 Thus, even if the tribunal's comments in obiter are

relevant, the factual circumstances of that case are 1 different. 2 3 That leaves the Claimant with one last case, which is CME v. Czech Republic. This is the only case 4 5 the Claimant cites that involved the transfer of an investment from one investor to another after an 6 7 alleged breach. However, the facts and investment treaty in that case are unique. 8 9 The investment in that case were shares in an enterprise. The share transfer occurred from a 10 11 parent company to its subsidiary. The challenged measures occurred both before and after the share 12 13 transfer. The Czech Republic argued for the first time at the hearing that the claimant CME could only 14 challenge measures that occurred after it had acquired 15 16 the shares. The tribunal disagreed on several grounds. 17 18 First, the tribunal recognized that the Czech Republic had prospectively authorized the parent company to 19 20 transfer its shares to its subsidiary. It was, thus, questionable for the Czech Republic to oppose 21 22 jurisdiction when it had authorized the share

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 87
1	In other words, the parent company remained
2	protected as an investor from the moment of the
3	alleged breach through to the filing of the claim.
4	Those are not the circumstances here. For these
5	reasons, factually and legally specific to that case,
6	the tribunal rejected the Czech Republic's argument.
7	It is also worth noting that the tribunal's
8	decision is from nearly 20 years ago and has not been
9	followed by any tribunal, likely because the decision
LO	was tailored to the unique facts and investment treaty
11	in that case.
2	In conclusion, the Claimant advocates for a
13	law on assignment of claims between two investors that
L4	does not exist.
15	That is true whether the two investors are
L6	affiliates or have a close continuity of interest.
L7	I will now turn things over to my colleague,
L 8	Mr. Klaver, who will discuss the Claimant's continuity
L 9	of interest theory, barring any questions from the
20	Tribunal.
21	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Zac? And James? Thank
22	you.

1	transfer.
2	Second, the definition of "investment" under
3	the Treaty, which was the Dutch-Czech Republic BIT,
4	allowed for the rights derived from acquired shares to
5	qualify as part of the investment. The tribunal,
6	thus, found that by acquiring the shares, CME had
7	acquired all of the liabilities, rights, and
8	obligations of its parent company. There is no
9	similar definition of an "investment" under NAFTA.
10	Third, the tribunal concluded that the
11	investment treaty did not specify whether the
12	investment had to be owned or controlled by the
13	claimant at the time of the alleged breach. The
14	Treaty itself used quite loose language. This is in
15	contrast to NAFTA, which requires that a challenged
16	measure relates to the Claimant under Article 1101.
17	Moreover, the tribunal found that because
18	the parent company continued to hold the investment
19	indirectly, it did not matter under the Treaty that
20	the parent had transferred its shares to its
21	subsidiary because the parent remained protected
22	indirectly.

Page | 86

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 88
1	SECRETARY FLECKENSTEIN: If I may, Madam
2	President, can I just update on time. I did update in
3	the chat function, and now Canada has about 13 minutes
4	left of its two-hour allotment.
5	MR. DOUGLAS: Okay. I think that is fine.
6	I think our last presentation is about 15 minutes. I
7	thoughtwell, we don't want you to talk fast, Mark.
8	Our tally is slightly shorter just given some of the
9	technical issues in theso, with the grace of the
10	Tribunal, if we do go over by ICSID's count by a
11	couple of minutes, would that be okay?
12	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I'm going to make a
13	unilateral decision here and say that's fine, if it's
14	just a few minutes. And obviously, will grant the
15	same discretion to Claimants.
16	MR. DOUGLAS: Yes. Thank you very much.
17	Appreciate that.
18	MR. KLAVER: President Blanch, Arbitrator
19	Douglas and Arbitrator Hosking, as my colleague
20	Mr. Douglas explained, the Claimant contends that an
21	investment claim may be assigned in one of two
22	circumstances, first, between affiliates or, second,

	Page 89
1	between entities with a continuity of interest. I
2	will address the Claimant's asserted continuity of
3	interest. It is worth noting at the outset that the
4	Claimant's continuity-related arguments have shifted
5	significantly during this arbitration.
6	In its Counter-Memorial, the Claimant argued
7	the Tribunal had jurisdiction because the First Lien
8	Lenders provided a continuity of beneficial interest.
9	It did not specify what this meant or how it connected
10	to the applicable law. For his part, Professor
11	Paulsson referred to a continuity of beneficial
12	ownership. The Claimant also alleged the First Lien
13	Lenders controlled WCC and its assets without
14	specifying the timeline of this control.
15	In the Reply, Canada demonstrated that the
16	First Lien Lenders never beneficially owned WCC or its
17	assets.
18	In its Rejoinder, the Claimant did not
19	attempt a rebuttal to this point. It even withdrew
20	its reference to a beneficial interest.
21	Canada also showed that the First Lien
22	Lenders never controlled WCC or its assets. In its

Page | 91

the First Lien Lenders controlled WCC but now appeared 1 2 to limit the time of such control to the bankruptcy process, not during the alleged breach. 3 Overall, then, the Claimant appears to use 4 5 the term "continuity of interest" in two ways: First, as a term of art relating to its tax treatment and, 6 7 second, as a de facto notion of continuing interest 8 based on the First Lien Lenders' alleged control of WCC and the bankruptcy process. 9 I will explain that both formulations of a 10 continuity of interest are irrelevant to establishing 11 this Tribunal's jurisdiction and, in any event, the

12 this Tribunal's jurisdiction and, in any event, the 13 Claimant has not substantiated these assertions. I 14 will address the Claimant's assertions on tax 15 treatment and control separately.

Now, the Claimant does not explain how the concept of a continuity of interest under U.S. tax law is part of the applicable law to find jurisdiction here. U.S. tax law is not the applicable law, which of course is NAFTA and international law. NAFTA does not contain a renvoi or a reference to domestic tax laws for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction on

Rejoinder, the Claimant next argued that the NAFTA 1 2 claim could be assigned due to a close continuity of interest. 3 4 The term "continuity of interest" derives 5 from U.S. tax law. It relates to a Type G reorganization, which the Claimant asserts, allows an 6 entity to restructure tax free. The Claimant never 7 referenced a continuity of interest in its 8 Counter-Memorial. It merely mentioned in two 9 sentences in the last paragraph of its Appendix A that 10 11 the transaction was structured to qualify as a Type G reorganization. The Claimant did not explain how this 12 13 point related to its arguments on jurisdiction. Yet, in its Rejoinder, the Claimant now 14 places much weight on the alleged continuity of 15 16 interest. If the Claimant was serious about this argument, it would have fully presented it in the 17 Counter-Memorial. 18 Canada has had no opportunity to provide 19 Expert or other evidence on the Claimant's alleged 20 21 continuity of interest under U.S. tax law. 22 In addition, the Claimant again alleged that

Page | 90

Page | 92

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1	an assigned claim.
2	In fact, NAFTA Chapter Eleven does not use
3	the term "continuity of interest" at all. Moreover,
4	despite the Claimant insinuating that international
5	law applies this concept, not a single investment
6	decision on the record uses the term "continuity of
7	interest," not one, including any NAFTA case, nor does
8	any international law scholarship on the record use
9	the term "continuity of interest."
10	The Claimant has made up its own legal test
11	for the assignment of investment claims based on
12	concepts selectively chosen from domestic tax laws
13	that are not the applicable law here. It cannot
14	establish the Tribunal's jurisdiction on this basis.
15	Nonetheless, even if the Tribunal considered
16	that the Claimant's asserted tax treatment was somehow
17	relevant to the applicable law to find jurisdiction,
18	the Claimant did not submit reliable evidence to
19	establish the alleged continuity of interest. The
20	Claimant relies on its own self-judging and, frankly,
21	self-serving position that it had a continuity of
22	interest under U.S. tax law.

	Page 93
1	In its Rejoinder, it states the U.S.
2	Government views WCC and WMH as having a continuity of
3	interest. This is misleading. As with many areas of
4	tax, taxpayers make their own judgment calls about
5	which provisions they may qualify for. Only if they
6	are audited or a specific decision is sought from a
7	tax authority or court might there be an actual ruling
8	on the question.
9	WCC appears to have had no intention of
10	seeking a ruling from the Internal Revenue Services,
11	the IRS, or a Court on its tax treatment.
12	On the screen is an excerpt of the
13	disclosure statement that WCC filed with and was
14	approved by the Bankruptcy Court. This is
15	Exhibit C-044. The Claimant cites to this document to
16	support its new argument that the transaction was
17	designed to qualify for tax-free treatment.
18	Yet, the document states no opinion of
19	counsel was obtained on tax issues, there was no
20	intention to seek a ruling from the IRS, and WCC's
21	statements about the potential tax treatment were not
22	binding on the IRS or the courts, which could take a

	Page 95
1	Accordingly, the Claimant's asserted tax
2	treatment do not establish this Tribunal's
3	jurisdiction. It is untethered to NAFTA, and the
4	Claimant does not offer reliable evidence to support
5	it.
6	And moving to the Claimant's de facto notion
7	of continuity, it argues that the First Lien Lenders
8	controlled WCC and the bankruptcy process without
9	explaining why this would be relevant to establishing
10	jurisdiction under NAFTA.
11	In fact, its assertions on control are
12	irrelevant for two reasons: First, the bankruptcy
13	occurred years after the alleged breach occurred, even
14	if the First Lien Lenders controlled WCC in the
15	bankruptcy in 2019, this could not establish that when
16	the alleged breach occurred in 2016 the Claimant was a
17	protected investor.
18	Second, the Claimant cannot establish
19	jurisdiction based on the First Lien Lenders' alleged
20	control because they are not the Claimant. The NAFTA
21	Parties offer their consent to arbitrate with only a
22	disputing investor. That is the claimant that files a

1	different view. This completely undermines the
2	Claimant's assertion about the U.S. Government finding
3	a continuity of interest here.
4	Moreover, the Claimant filed no Expert
5	Report, judicial Decision, or other independent
6	evidence to confirm its alleged tax treatment. It
7	simply asks the Tribunal to take it at its word. Yet,
8	its unsupported assertions on self-judging tax
9	treatment do not constitute a reliable evidentiary
10	basis to find jurisdiction.
11	In this respect, it is revealing that the
12	Claimant never once mentions the Internal Revenue Code
13	by name. Instead, it refers generically to federal
14	law regarding reorganization in an apparent attempt to
15	blur the line between U.S. bankruptcy law on which
16	
	there is ample evidence before the Tribunal and U.S.
17	there is ample evidence before the Tribunal and U.S. tax law on which there is paltry evidence.
17 18	*
	tax law on which there is paltry evidence.
18	tax law on which there is paltry evidence. The Claimant's inadequate evidence on its
18 19	tax law on which there is paltry evidence. The Claimant's inadequate evidence on its tax treatment stands in stark contrast to the
18 19 20	tax law on which there is paltry evidence. The Claimant's inadequate evidence on its tax treatment stands in stark contrast to the legally-binding findings of the Bankruptcy Court on

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 96

Page | 94

claim under Section B. Here, the disputing investor 1 is WMH, which has separate legal personality from its 2 owners. 3 NAFTA offers no mechanism for a tribunal to 4 5 derogate from customary international law by piercing the corporate veil of a claimant to find jurisdiction 6 7 based on other parties who might have an interest in 8 the arbitration, such as a claimant's owners. 9 Canada and the Claimant both observe that the definition of "investment of an investor of a 10 11 Party" refers to investments held indirectly by an 12 investor. 13 As the slide illustrates, the term "indirectly" means a tribunal can look down the 14 corporate chain to determine if the claimant, the 15 relevant investor of a Party, owned or controlled the 16 investment through intermediaries. This is what the 17 18 tribunal did in Waste Management II. However, this definition does not enable a 19 20 tribunal to look up the corporate chain to find jurisdiction based on a claimant's owners. In this 21 22 respect, NAFTA is unlike the Treaty in Perenco between

	Page 97
1	France and Ecuador, which expressly authorized that
2	tribunal to find jurisdiction over a claimant of a
3	non-party if French shareholders control it.
4	This Tribunal, by contrast, has no basis
5	under NAFTA to pierce the Claimant's corporate veil to
6	find jurisdiction. Nonetheless, even if the Tribunal
7	sought to rely on the First Lien Lenders to find
8	jurisdiction, it would be unable to do so for three
9	main reasons: First, Ms. Coleman explained that on
10	the facts, the First Lien Lenders did not control WCC
11	or the bankruptcy process.
12	And rather than repeating her Expert
13	analysis here, I would point the Tribunal to
14	Paragraphs 12-14 and 20-27 of her Second Expert
15	Report. There, she also discusses how the Bankruptcy
16	Court confirmed that the First Lien Lenders did not
17	control WCC through the debt instruments. The
18	Claimant has not addressed the Court's determination
19	here.
20	Instead, it attempts to discredit
21	Ms. Coleman by misreading her comments on discussion
22	panels. This is completely ineffective. The Claimant

	Page 99
1	Its case rests on unsupported claims of control by an
2	unspecified group of entities whose nationality it has
3	not proven. This is no way to establish jurisdiction
4	under NAFTA.
5	Thus, the Claimant's assertions of a
6	continuity of interest are unavailing because its
7	claims about tax treatment and control are irrelevant
8	and unsubstantiated.
9	To conclude Canada's Opening today, the
10	Claimant cannot establish this Tribunal's jurisdiction
11	because it was not an investor of a Party when the
12	alleged breach occurred, nor can the Claimant overcome
13	this fundamental flaw in its claim with its shifting
14	various bits to find a connection with WCC, a separate
15	enterprise with which it was unaffiliated.
16	Thank you. I would now welcome any
17	questions from the Tribunal.
18	PRESIDENT BLANCH: What I suggest we
19	dounless there is any imminent burning
20	questionsJames? And Zac? I suggest we now take our
21	10-minute break. And then, if the Tribunal have any
22	questions after the break, we will raise them.

1	took her words out of context and chose not to
2	cross-examine her, revealing the frailty of its
3	arguments that the First Lien Lenders controlled WCC
4	and the bankruptcy.
5	The second flaw in the Claimant's bid to
6	establish jurisdiction based on the First Lien
7	Lenders' alleged control is that it has not identified
8	who all of the First Lien Lenders are. It merely says
9	that they included certain entities. We don't know
10	how many other lenders there may be and what their
11	interests in the Claimant might be.
12	Third, under the Claimant's theory of
13	jurisdiction, continuous U.S. nationality is critical
14	to upholding this claim. Yet, the Claimant offers no
15	evidence of the First Lien Lenders' U.S. nationality.
16	It does not confirm whether any other unidentified
17	First Lien Lenders have or lack U.S. nationality. Nor
18	does the Claimant clarify whether the Tribunal might
19	need to pierce the veil of the First Lien Lenders, to
20	ensure their beneficial owners have U.S. nationality.
21	Canada raised these concerns in its Reply at
22	Paragraph 119, but the Claimant left them unanswered.
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903
	Page 1 100
	Page 100

Page | 98

1	Otherwise, we'll then go into the Claimant's Opening
2	Statement. So, it is now quarter to 2:00, so we will
3	have a 10-minute break until 5 to.
4	Thank you very much.
5	MR. KLAVER: Thank you.
6	(Brief recess.)
7	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Well, firstly, I just
8	want to apologize to Mr. Feldman and his team. I hope
9	I didn't give you too much of a shock when I suggested
10	we might be only having a 10-minute break before we
11	went straight into your Opening Submissions. I do
12	apologize. But hopefully now we've had our break, and
13	you are ready to start.
14	And, like we did for the Respondent, if you
15	need a couple of minutes extraI think they went two
16	or three minutes over, and obviously it's the same for
17	you.
18	MR. FELDMAN: Thank you. We expect to be
19	considerably under. We are particularly deferential
20	in this situation to Mr. Hosking because I'm happy to
21	say good afternoon, perhaps evening to everybody else,
22	but for him it is still morning, I think.

	Page 101
1	So, with due apologies, would you like me to
2	begin?
3	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: Thank you. No problem.
4	(Interruption.)
5	(Stenographer clarification.)
6	MR. FELDMAN: I'll try to stay close to the
7	microphone.
8	OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL FOR CLAIMANT
9	MR. FELDMAN: Thank you very much. I'm
10	Elliot Feldman, Baker Hostetler, representing
11	Westmoreland, and, again, good afternoon to everyone
12	except, unfortunately, for Mr. Hosking.
13	The NAFTA tribunal in Grand River v. United
14	States confronted with the dispute over jurisdiction
15	concluded that: "Investment Tribunals have declined
16	to adopt a method whereby one of the Parties carries
17	the burden of proof in matters of jurisdiction. They
18	have adopted a different approach to deciding whether
19	jurisdiction exists. Under this method, the
20	decision-maker looks at the preponderance of authority
21	for or against jurisdiction."
22	This is in our exhibits, RLA-030, Page 17,

Page | 103

breach. Canada would enjoy a complete windfall by 1 putting the company out of business. The message 2 would be that, if there were to be a breach, Canada 3 ought to breach completely, thoroughly, enough to 4 destroy the company so that it would have no recourse, 5 the very definition of a denial of access to justice. 6 7 We think such a scenario, as 8 Professor Paulsson also suggested, is perfectly 9 plausible. This scenario doesn't square with the facts here. The breach didn't cause Westmoreland's 10 11 bankruptcy. We are not arguing the contrary. The company that emerged from bankruptcy is the product of 12 13 a Type G reorganization that deliberately and specifically assured continuity of interest, and the 14 most important facts are those required by the Treaty. 15 The investment was Canadian at the time of 16 the breach, was unchanged through and after 17 18 bankruptcy, always Canadian. The owners at the time of the breach were American. They remained American 19 20 through and after the bankruptcy. 21 The Claimant, owner of the Canadian 22 investment, was American at the time of the breach and

	Page 102
1	Paragraph 37.
2	The tribunal went on to say that: "A focus
3	on burden of proof is not the correct approach."
4	Canada, however, brought the motion to deny
5	jurisdiction as a defense against Westmoreland's
6	claim, and, therefore, Canada does have a burden of
7	proving its defense. As international law prefers not
8	to deny access to justice, this Tribunal must require
9	Canada to meet its burden.
10	Let's assume, as we must for this
11	jurisdictional proceeding, that Canada did breach
12	NAFTA, a condition we expect to prove in the merits
13	phase of this Arbitration. Let's then suppose a
14	scenario that is not exactly the one here but could
15	have been. Let's suppose that Canada's breach of
16	NAFTA caused Westmoreland's bankruptcy. Finally,
17	let's suppose Canada's version of the bankruptcy, that
18	the company that emerged, albeit still American, does
19	not have continuity with the company that entered
20	bankruptcy.
21	In this scenario, as Canada would have it,
22	there would be no compensation possible for Canada's
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 104
1	at all subsequent times including when the claim was
2	made.
3	This diversity, American owners of a
4	Canadian investment, the essential requirement of the
5	Treaty and of its purpose to protect and encourage
6	foreign investment applied here at all times. No one
7	shopped the claim. No one manipulated the bankruptcy
8	in order to obtain a claim they otherwise might not
9	have had.
10	Even in a scenario where Canada could have
11	breached and driven the company out of business,
12	access to justice would have required acceptance of
13	jurisdiction. But with the facts here, denial of
14	access to justice would be extreme and unjustified.
15	The Vienna Convention requires starting with
16	the plain language of the Treaty. Although more than
17	50 times in its Memorialand I've lost track of how
18	many times this morningCanada invokes the phrase "at
19	the time of the alleged breach." That phrase does not
20	exist in NAFTA.
21	Canada wants the Treaty to say that the
22	Westmoreland, as Claimant, has to be identical to the
	B&B Reporters

	Page 105
1	Westmoreland "at the time of the alleged breach," but
2	NAFTA doesn't say so.
3	My partner Mike Snarr is going to provide
4	the detail of what the Treaty does and doesn't say and
5	explain why Canada's ratione temporis argument has no
6	place in NAFTA. He will also address the applicable
7	international jurisprudence to show that Canada finds
8	no support there for its argument, neither in NAFTA
9	nor in any other Treaty.
0	He will explain that the damages here are
1	falling mostly on the Claimant, the Westmoreland that
2	has brought the Claim, because the stream of revenue
3	to pay for land reclamation has been cut off by
4	Alberta's measures impacting most of all over the next
5	decade.
5	And, finally, he will show that there was no
7	prejudice to Canada in dismissing its defense
8	questioning jurisdiction over a claim arising from an
9	American investment in Canada.
0	My partner Paul Levine will follow Mr. Snarr
1	to explain the continuity of interest preferred in

1

2

22

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 107

international law, as Professor Paulsson has testified

international law, the applicable law, disfavors form 1 2 over substance. But Mr. Levine will add that in this case, even if form were preferred, we should prevail. 3 Westmoreland satisfies the Treaty's 4 requirements for diversity of investor and investment. 5 The instances where international tribunals have 6 7 dismissed for ratione temporis all have been concerned 8 about Treaty manipulation, shopping for claims, conditions and circumstances bearing no resemblance to 9 the case here. 10 Messrs. Snarr and Levine will both 11 distinguish those cases. Investment in Canada was 12 13 owed protection when Canada breached the Treaty, and 14 nothing ever happened or changed that should or could release Canada from those Treaty obligations. 15 16 I'm happy now to invite Mr. Snarr to continue. 17 MR. SNARR: Good afternoon, Members of the 18 Tribunal. Can you hear me all right? 19 20 Okay. I'm Mike Snarr, Counsel for 21 Westmoreland Mining Holdings. I will speak for about 30 minutes on the NAFTA Treaty text and the principles 22

in two Expert Opinions, and the continuity of interest 1 2 reserved in the Type G reorganization under the U.S. Tax Code in this case. 3 4 Canada, generally neglecting the tax implications of bankruptcy and the applicable rules, 5 would like this case to be all about a bankruptcy that 6 forfeited a claim, notwithstanding that a Type G 7 reorganization expressly preserves lender control. 8 Canada, denying the continuity of interest inherent in 9 this type of reorganization, would like to use the 10 11 bankruptcy to escape the responsibility thrust upon it by its rogue province and to deny access to justice by 12 13 celebrating form over substance. 14 Canada this morning argued that the Type G reorganization is irrelevant because U.S. tax law is 15 16 irrelevant. Yet, Canada's jurisdictional objection is 17 all about U.S. bankruptcy law, the very law even Ms. Coleman acknowledged is not the applicable law 18 here. 19 Canada likes to talk about not having things 20 21 both ways. Either domestic law is relevant or it isn't. Professor Paulsson has explained that 22 B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903 Page | 108 that emerge from the arbitration decisions that have 1 2 been briefed by the Parties. Next slide, please. 3 The Tribunal must decide first whether the 4 5 terms of the NAFTA Treaty prohibit Westmoreland's claim, as Canada has argued. If they do not, then the 6 7 Tribunal must decide whether there is a prohibition in 8 customary international law. Assuming such a prohibition exists, the Tribunal must decide the scope 9 of that prohibition and its application to the unique 10 11 facts of this case. 12 Westmoreland has explained that the 13 jurisdictional objection, as strictly and narrowly 14 articulated by Canada is not found in the language of the NAFTA Treaty terms. Applying ratione temporis to 15 16 the facts of this case, as it has been applied in other investment arbitration cases, the Tribunal has 17

Page | 106

18 jurisdiction, and Westmoreland's claim should go

19 forward.

20 There is no dispute that the elements of a 21 foreign investor having a foreign investment are 22 essential to trigger a Respondent State's foreign

	Page 109
1	investment protection obligations under NAFTA or
2	bilateral investment treaties. It is required by the
3	ordinary meaning of the terms of NAFTA and is
4	recognized by investment arbitration tribunals that
5	have considered other investment treaties.
6	This is the diversity of nationality that is
7	at the heart of foreign investment protections under
8	international law. The precondition that, in effect,
9	puts a Host State on notice that treaty obligations
10	are active and that its conduct towards the foreign
11	investment and its investor must be guided by the
12	terms of the Treaty.
13	What Canada argues in its ratione temporis
14	jurisdictional objection is not just that a foreign
15	investment and investor must exist, but that the
16	corporate form of the investor may never change from
17	what it was at the time of the breach and, by
18	extension, that the corporate form of the investment
19	may never change from what it was at the time of the
20	breach if the foreign investment and investor hope to
21	preserve the activated treaty rights to which they are
22	entitled.
	BiB Benortars

Page | 111

found in NAFTA's Chapter Eleven. You will see on the 1 2 slide here the text of Articles 1116 and 1117, but modified as shown in the text highlighted in red. 3 Article 1116, which speaks to the submission 4 5 of claims, does not say that an investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section A Claim, 6 7 provided that the investor is the same national or enterprise as it existed at the time of the breach. 8 Those words would have to be added to the 9 text as shown here. The text of Article 1117 10 similarly lacks such "at the time of the breach" 11 language. It does not say that "an investor of a 12 13 Party on behalf of an enterprise of another Party may 14 submit to arbitration under this Section A claim, provided that the investor is the same national or 15 16 enterprise as it existed at the time of the breach and that the enterprise is the same enterprise as it 17 existed at the time of the breach." 18 Moreover, the text of Article 1117 is 19 20 configured so that a claimant/investor may make a claim, not on its own behalf, as in Article 1116, but 21 22 on behalf of a foreign enterprise that it owns based

Page | 110 Canada argues that a foreign investor 1 2 company must be the same entity in its same form, regardless of whether its operations or anything else 3 4 about it might be the same. Canada presents this rule as one that 5 applies without regard to circumstances, international 6 law policies, consequences, or prejudice. One might 7 expect that a strict, absolute rule like this which 8 limits the rights of an investor and investment 9 post-breach, would be well-defined in the terms of the 10 11 Treaty such that it could just be quoted directly, or that there might be some official Treaty 12 13 interpretation articulated and agreed among the drafters, saying that the rule is embodied in a 14 particular passage of the NAFTA text. But there is no 15 16 such text in NAFTA, nor any official statement of interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to 17 that effect. 18 Next, please. 19 20 For all of Canada's references in its Memorials to the phrase "at the time of the alleged 21 22 breach," neither that phrase nor any similar to it is

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 112

1	on a breach and damages that accrue to the foreign
2	enterprise. Canada contends that investmentslet's
3	go back one slide, please. Thanks.
4	Canada contends that investments are not
5	owed obligations and that Article 1117 does not allow
6	the foreign investor who owns the investment to make
7	the claim on its behalf. But it should be noted that
8	the obligations of Articles 1102 and 1105 expressly
9	apply to investments, and Article 1135 provides that
10	any award for restitution or compensation under
11	Article 1117 is to be paid to the investment
12	enterprise, not the claimant, suggesting that an
13	investment enterprise is owed obligations, and may be
14	owed damages, provided it is owned by a foreign
15	investor who submits the claim.
16	Now, let's go to the next slide.
17	The tribunal in Waste Management II chaired
18	by Professor James Crawford wrote: "Where a treaty
19	spells out in detail and with precision the
20	requirements for maintaining a claim, there is no room
21	for implying into the Treaty additional
22	requirements"

	Page 113
1	The NAFTA drafters were capable of writing
2	temporal limitations into the Agreement when they
3	intended to do so.
4	Next slide.
5	Article 1117(2) contains a three-year
6	statute of limitation for claims made by an investor
7	on behalf of its investment enterprise, tying that
8	date to the enterprise's first knowledge of the breach
9	and damage incurred.
10	Article 1116(2) similarly contains a
11	three-year statute of limitations for claims made by
12	the investor on its own behalf.
13	Article 1108(4) shows the kind of language
14	that might have been used in Articles 1116 and 1117
15	had the NAFTA Parties intended an "at the time of the
16	breach" limitation as argued by Canada. 1108(4)
17	states: "No Party may, under any measure covered by
18	Annex 2, require an investor of another party by
19	reason of its nationality to sell or otherwise dispose
20	of an investment existing at the time the measure
21	becomes effective."
22	Next slide, please.

Page | 115

1 d 2 t

3 H 4 5 A

6 7

8 C

10

11

12 e

13

14

15 16

17 C

18

21

22

19 O: 20 C

1	formal statements of interpretation of Article 1101,
2	nor any legislative statements contemporaneous to the
3	NAFTA Parties' adoption of the Treaty, that would
4	support that view. The ordinary meaning of "measures
5	adopted or maintained by a Party relating to" is that
6	the measures must relate to the investor or the
7	investment. The only way that language of
8	Article 1101 could be read as a jurisdictional bar is
9	if there were no circumstances under which the
10	breaching measures related to Westmoreland and
11	Prairie.
12	Canada argues that the Off-Coal Agreements
13	could not relate to Westmoreland Mining Holdings
14	because Westmoreland Mining Holdings is a different
15	entity than the one that existed at the time of the
16	breach.
17	We do not agree that measures relating to
18	Westmoreland Coal Company do not or could not relate
19	to the Company emerging from the Westmoreland
20	bankruptcy, given the continuity of interest between
21	them. Yet, even if one assumed that the relation of
22	the measures to the Westmoreland Coal Company must be

Professor Paulsson wrote in his first Expert 1 2 Report that it is indeed a leap, and not a necessary inference, that the foreign investor submitting the 3 4 claim must be the same foreign investor that owned the 5 foreign investment at the time of the breach. He added: "Such a significant dispositive rule would 6 7 surely have been spelled out. Leaving it open means that the answer depends on the factual context and its 8 9 effect on the policies that underlie the Treaty." No such dispositive rule is spelled out in 10 11 NAFTA. Canada therefore invites the Tribunal to see Articles 1116 and 1117 through the lens of Canada's 12 13 interpretation of Article 1101 in order to read an "at the time of the breach" requirement into the Treaty. 14 Next slide. 15 16 To do that, the Tribunal has to ignore the fact that Article 1101 similarly lacks an "at the time 17 18 of the breach" clause and to interpret the phrase "measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to 19 investors of another Party" as imposing such a 20 requirement. 21 22 Canada offers no Free Trade Commission

Page | 114

Page | 116

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page 116
disregarded, we have made a prima facie showing that
the measures do relate to both Westmoreland Mining
Holdings and Prairie in the present.
We have explained that the Off-Coal
Agreements ensure that Prairie's mines will close no
later than 2030. The Off-Coal Agreements are measures
that continue to be maintained by Alberta as
compensation to the Albertan utilities to stop using
Prairie's coal. These payments are being provided to
the Albertan utilities in 14 annual installments that
began in 2016. The closure of the coal-fired
electricity units is being accelerated, leading to
earlier closures of Prairie's mines, increased revenue
losses, and increased coalmine reclamation costs.
These losses affect Westmoreland Mining
Holdings' investment in Prairie, stranding its
capital. Westmoreland Mining Holdings is losing and
will continue to lose revenue as a result of the
Off-Coal Agreements compelling the early mine
closures, even assuming that some of the mines hold on
until 2030. These facts as pled should be accepted by
the Tribunal pro tempore in this proceeding. Canada

	Page 11
1	may disagree with them, but to the extent there is a
2	factual dispute about them, that question should be
3	addressed in the merits phase of the Arbitration.
4	Article 1101 provides no text to support an
5	"at the time of the breach" clause, nor does any
6	interpretation of "relating to" provide a basis for
7	denying the Tribunal's jurisdiction over this claim.
8	NAFTA Chapter Eleven does have a number of
9	express proscriptive requirements: The three-year
10	statute of limitations, waivers of resolution of
11	disputes in other fora, diversity of nationality. But
12	"at the time of the alleged breach" is not one of
13	them. It is not for the Tribunal to infer additional
14	proscriptions in the Treaty text, and there is no
15	support for the view that additional proscriptions
16	were intended.
17	Next slide, please.
18	When Canada says at Paragraph 44 of its
19	Memorial that Westmoreland Mining Holdings was not a
20	protected investor when the alleged breaches and
21	resulting damage occurred because it was not
22	constituted until January 31, 2019, it presents an

Page | 119

change their corporate structures over time. Canada's 1 2 interpretation of the Treaty requires that an investor could never change its corporate form post-breach and 3 4 still maintain a claim to protection under the Treaty because a different corporate form means a different 5 person, a different investor, and, logically, the same 6 7 would have to apply to an individual who dies and whose heirs inherit ownership of the investment. 8 Canada seems to adopt the view, without 9 exception, that an investor with a different corporate 10 form or person would have no rights with respect to 11 events that had occurred previously, regardless of the 12 13 connections. 14 Next slide. That narrow interpretation of the NAFTA 15 16 Chapter Eleven Treaty requirements is not supported by the Treaty text and makes no practical sense given the 17 object and purpose of the Treaty. NAFTA was an 18 historic agreement for economic integration among 19 20 three of the world's largest economies. The 21 investment chapter was adopted in step with an emerging growth of bilateral investment treaties 22

unrealistic static view of "investment" that, for at 1 2 least two reasons, is incongruent with the Treaty's terms, object, and purpose. 3 4 First, damages do not always occur all at once and all at the time of the breach, which is why 5 the statute of limitation in Paragraph 2 of 6 Articles 1116 and 1117 distinguishes between the time 7 when an investor or investment has knowledge of the 8 alleged breach and the time when there is knowledge 9 that damage has been occurred. 10 11 Article 1101 also refers to "measures adopted" and "measures maintained," reflecting the 12 13 fact that some measures may infringe Chapter Eleven protections and cause damage for some time after they 14 were adopted. In this case, damages are being 15 16 incurred after the Westmoreland bankruptcy and will 17 continue to be incurred by Westmoreland Mining Holdings. 18 Second, the cases addressed in Professor 19 Paulsson's First Expert Witness Statement and by the 20 21 Parties in the Memorials demonstrate that is not

22 uncommon for companies with foreign investments to

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 120

Page | 118

around the world and with the objective to increase 1 2 substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties, to eliminate barriers to 3 4 trade, and to promote conditions of fair competition. 5 A static view of foreign investments, that they and their investors must be frozen in time to be worthy of 6 7 protection, would frustrate those objectives. NAFTA's 8 Chapter Eleven provided assurances from the Member States not only that fundamental norms of fairness, 9 equity, and nondiscrimination would be extended to 10 11 NAFTA-country foreign investors, but also that those standards would be enforceable through a private right 12 13 of action for the settlement of disputes. 14 The notion that such assurances and protections could be cut off because the foreign 15 16 investor changed its corporate structure through bankruptcy, even while acting in good faith and 17 without abusing the treaty's nationality requirements, 18 is capricious. It runs contrary to a State obligation 19 20 of good faith that should be a baseline presumption 21 for interpreting the ordinary meaning of a treaty's 22 terms in international law.

	Page 121
1	The requirements of a foreign investor and a
2	foreign investment are stated clearly enough in the
3	treaty text, and those express prescriptions provide
4	complete explanations for the decisions in the NAFTA
5	cases that Canada cites for its jurisdictional rule.
6	Next slide, please.
7	I'll pause here for a moment to allow the
8	Tribunal to ask any questions if it has them.
9	PRESIDENT BLANCH: James?
10	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: No.
11	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Zac?
12	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: No.
13	PRESIDENT BLANCH: No. Thank you.
14	Please continue.
15	MR. SNARR: Before looking at NAFTA cases
16	upon which Canada principally relies, it is worth
17	referring again to Professor Paulsson's First Expert
18	Report in which he cautions against treating
19	arbitration awards, let alone select passages
20	extracted from them, as legal precedents. In most
21	cases, the reader of an alleged precedent is most
22	likely to be influenced by the reasons which

	Page 123
1	There is a dispute about whether Mr. Gallo had really
2	purchased the Canadian Enterprise in 2002 through
3	Mr. Cortelluci before Ontario passed legislation in
4	2004 prohibiting the Adams Mine from being used as a
5	landfill.
6	The Gallo tribunal gave a detailed
7	recitation of facts showing there was no evidence that
8	Mr. Cortelluci truly acted as Mr. Gallo's agent in
9	2002 to acquire the mine. We refer to some of them in
10	our Counter-Memorial starting at Paragraph 52, and a
11	number of them are showing on the slide here.
12	Based on those facts, at the time of the
13	Ontario legislation in 2004, Adams Mine, the
14	investment, was owned by a Canadian company and
15	acquired by a Canadian businessman. Adams Mine was
16	just a domestic investment owned by a domestic
17	investor.
18	Next slide, please.
19	The Gallo tribunal noted that
20	Article 1101(1) limits Chapter Eleven protection to
21	measures that relate to investors of another Party and
22	investments of another Party. It wrote: "for

	Page 122
1	arbitrators say led them to the outcome for which they
2	have taken personal responsibility ex-officio. That
	is where, one reasonably surmises, they
	exhibit particular care.
	So the text of an award should not be read
	like the terms of a treaty. The factual context of a
	case, the rationale for the holding, and the
	persuasiveness for the rationale when applied in other
	contexts are critical to making valuable use of prior
	Decisions.
	Next slide, please.
	Let's look now at Gallo and Mesa Power, the
	two NAFTA cases on which Canada principally relies.
	In Gallo, the American claimant said he owned a
	Canadian Enterprise, 1532382 Ontario Inc., which owned
	the Adams Mine Site in Northern Ontario, which had
	been abandoned and was to be used as a waste disposal
	site.
	He claimed that he had acquired the
	enterprise through a Canadian agent, Mr. Cortelluci,
	who had purchased it for Mr. Gallo from another
	Canadian company, Notre Development Corporation.
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1

2

3

4

6 7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

17 18

19 20

21 22

Page | 124 Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to apply to a measure relating to an investment, that investment must be owned or controlled by an investor of another Party, and ownership or control must exist at the time the measure which allegedly violates the Treaty is adopted or maintained." That sentence reflects an appropriate interpretation of Article 1101. There must be an investor of another Party owning an investment in the host country at the time of the breach for the treaty obligations to be activated so that Chapter Eleven protections apply to the measures in question. That's not to suggest that the use of the word "and" in that statement was necessarily predetermined by the Gallo tribunal, but it is to suggest that the language of these awards has to be considered carefully and in their broader context. And as articulated there, that statement surely is correct and consistent with the terms of NAFTA. Without a foreign investor or foreign investment, in Gallo, no NAFTA foreign investment treaty protections were activated in relation to the B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1	Ontario legislation. There could be no NAFTA claim
2	without a NAFTA obligation.
3	Next slide, please.
4	The rationale for the decision was expressed
5	clearly in Paragraph 331 of the Award: "Investment
6	treaties confer rights to foreign investors which are
7	unavailable to nationals of the host country. Policy
8	reasons mandates that the privileged rights conferred
9	to the former are no abused by the latter, in
10	violation of the stated objectives of the
11	international treaty."
12	Mr. Gallo argued that he could make a claim
13	on behalf of enterprise investment under Article 1117.
14	But even under Article 1117, there was no scenario in
15	which the Treaty had been activated in relation to the
16	measures and the investment. The tribunal explained
17	that the enterprise investment could not be nursing a
18	nascent NAFTA claim if the enterprise was not under
19	the control or ownership of a NAFTA-protected person
20	when the alleged breach occurred.
21	Next slide.
22	The <i>Gallo</i> tribunal said: "In a claim under
	B&B Reporters

Page | 127

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Page | 125

Paulsson's Expert Report, is too broad for the facts 1 2 and not the actual holding or ratio decidendi of the Gallo case. Mr. Gallo was the only person claiming to 3 4 be an American investor for the alleged foreign 5 investment, and therefore "he" needed to have owned or controlled the investment at the time of the breach. 6 7 The case turned on the tribunal seeing 8 through the pretenses of a sham agency relationship between Mr. Gallo and Mr. Cortelluci that did not, in 9 fact, produce the critical elements of a foreign 10 investor owning a foreign investment at the time of 11 the breach. Hence, the Tribunal declined to hear a 12 13 contrived Treaty claim. 14 Next slide, please. In Mesa Power Group v. Canada, the American 15 16 claimant company had challenged measures that allegedly impacted four wind-farm investments that it 17 owned in Southwestern Ontario. Some of the measures 18 had occurred in September 2009, prior to the formation 19 20 of the wind farm project corporations beginning in 21 November 2009. The claimant was not able to establish 22 that it was seeking to make or had made its foreign

1	Article 1117 the investor must prove that he owned or
2	controlled directly or indirectly the 'juridical
3	person' holding the investment at the critical time."
4	The "he" in that sentence should be
5	interpreted as literally Canada would like. The Gallo
6	tribunal was not confronted with the same facts
7	presented by this case, where at the time of the
8	breach there was an American investor owning a foreign
9	investment which had activated Canada's NAFTA foreign
10	investment protection obligations, and the foreign
11	investment has, at all relevant times, continued to be
12	owned by an American investor, and the investor
13	entities have a continuity of interests between them.
14	Next slide, please.
15	Canada quotes the Gallo Award
16	saying: "Investment arbitration tribunals have
17	unanimously found that they do not have jurisdiction
18	unless the claimant can establish that the investment
19	was owned or controlled by the investor at the time
20	when the challenged measure was adopted."
21	That statement, as you will see in the
22	passage that follows on the slide, noted in Professor

Page | 126

Page | 128

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

investments prior to that time, so the tribunal concluded that those measures were not actionable in the claim, although the tribunal made clear that the pre-investment measures could be considered for the background and context of the remaining measures that were actionable in the claim. The Mesa Power tribunal explained: "There is no jurisdiction if disputed measures are not 'relating to investors' or to 'investments of an investor.' In addition to these express provisions of Chapter 11, the same conclusion arises as a general matter from the principle of nonretroactivity of treaties. State conduct cannot be governed by rules that are not applicable when the conduct occurs." So here, again, there was no foreign owned investment in existence at the time of the alleged NAFTA Chapter Eleven breach. Without a foreign investment, no NAFTA foreign investment treaty protections were activated in relation to the Ontario legislation. There could be no NAFTA claim as to measures for which there had been no NAFTA obligation.

	Page 129
1	This case is materially different from Mesa
2	Power because, as everyone agrees, there was an
3	American investor owning the foreign investment at the
4	time of the alleged breach, and the existence of a
5	foreign investor and investment had activated Canada's
6	NAFTA foreign investment protection obligations. The
7	ordinary terms of the Treaty require the existence of
8	a foreign investor and investment at the time of the
9	breach, but they do not require that the foreign
10	investor submitting the claim be the identical
11	corporate entity that was the foreign investor at the
12	time of the alleged breach.
13	Canada has cited to B-Mex v. México, but
14	that case has no analytical value to the question
15	before the Tribunal because the disputing parties
16	stipulated and agreed that the claimants had to have
17	owned the investment at the time of the breach, and
18	the tribunal accepted that stipulation and cited to
19	Gallo in support. We have already addressed the terms
20	of the Gallo decision.
21	Canada has presented cases arising under
22	investment treaties other than NAFTA in support of its

Ē

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 131
1	Where there has been a bona fide investment,
2	the corporate restructuring or transfers are taken for
3	ordinary business purposes, and there is a continuity
4	of interest, a closeness between the investor and
5	investments. Such a restructuring or transfer does
6	not divest the Tribunal of jurisdiction over an
7	investment Claim.
8	Next slide, please.
9	For example, in CME v. Czech Republic, the
10	tribunal stated: "The Respondent's view that the
11	transfer of shares deprived the Claimant of the
12	protection under the Treaty because the investment
13	changed hands from one Dutch Shareholder to the other
14	is not convincingany claims deriving from the
15	Claimant's predecessor's investment (also covered by
16	the Treaty) follow the assigned shares. If the Treaty
17	allows, as it does, the protection of indirect
18	investments, the more the Treaty must continuously
19	protect the parent company's investment assigned to
20	its daughter company under the same Treaty regime."
21	Next slide.
22	In Koch Minerals and Koch

1	objection. All the cases follow the basic requirement
2	that there must be a foreign investor and a foreign
3	investment in order for the Host State's treaty
4	obligations to be activated. None of the cases
5	supports application of the strict jurisdictional rule
6	that Canada promotes to the facts, the unique facts of
7	this case.
8	Some of Canada's cases and others that we
9	have offered for the Claimant show that tribunals have
10	held jurisdiction of claims in cases where ownership
11	of a claim or investment has been transferred from one
12	corporate entity, or one person, to another.
13	Next slide, please.
14	The key principles that emerge from the
15	arbitration awards briefed by the Parties are that a
16	transfer of ownership or corporate restructuring that
17	is a sham or an abuse of investment protection rights
18	will not be sustained. Forum shopping among
19	investment treaties is not acceptable. Claimants
20	should not be allowed to restructure in order to
21	obtain investment treaty rights that otherwise would
22	not exist for the investor and its investment.

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 132

Page | 130

1	Nitrogen v. Venezuela, the tribunal said the question
2	of "[The transfer] could have raised difficulties here
3	but for one important factor. The assignment from
4	KOMSA to KNI was an internal reorganization between
5	associated companies within the same Koch group of
6	companies. It did not introduce an unrelated third
7	party or materially change the transaction, nor could
8	it have done so given Articles 11.4 to 11.5 of the
9	Offtake Agreement. The Respondent does not challenge
10	the efficacy of the assignment under the Offtake
11	Agreement. Hence, although different in form, given
12	the different legal personalities of KOMSA and KNI,
13	the assignment produced no material economic, legal,
14	or commercial difference in substance."
15	Next slide, please.
16	In S.D. Myers v. Canada, a NAFTA case, the
17	tribunal said at Paragraphs 229 and 230: "[T]he
18	Tribunal does not accept that an otherwise meritorious
19	claim should fail solely by reason of the corporate
20	structure adopted by a Claimant in order to organize
21	the way in which it conducts its business affairs.
22	The Tribunal's view is reinforced by use of the word

	Page 133
1	'indirectly' in the second of the definitions quoted
2	above. The uncontradicted evidence before the Tribunal
3	was that Mr. Stanley Myers had transferred his
4	business to his sons, so that it remained wholly
5	within the family, and that he had chosen his son
6	Mr. Dana Myers to be the controlling person in respect
7	of the entirety of the Myers family's business
8	interests."
9	There is ample evidence in customary
10	international law that investors may undertake
11	corporate restructuring that would transfer
12	investments at Treaty claims, provided that diversity
13	of nationality is maintained and no unfair advantage
14	is obtained by the transfer in relation to the Host
15	State.
16	Next slide, please.
17	Canada's focus on the specific identity of
18	the investor runs into conflict with cases where
19	Tribunals have considered the chain of ownership
20	between the investor and its investment. The context
21	is different, but the principles are similar.
22	Professor Paulsson raised Perenco v. Ecuador

1

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 135
1	capital (rather than artificial transactions designed
2	to put ostensibly protected investors in the place of
3	investors who do not have standing under the relevant
4	Treaty.)"
5	The facts of this case do not provide a
6	sound rationale for denying jurisdiction.
7	Next slide, please.
8	We urge the Tribunal to ask: What is the
9	essence of Canada's objection?
10	Can Canada claim it had no notice that it
11	owed Prairie or its investors obligations under NAFTA?
12	Is this a case of forum-shopping among
13	investment treaties?
14	Is Westmoreland Mining Holdings manipulating
15	jurisdiction to exercise greater rights than what
16	Westmoreland Coal Company had?
17	Was the bankruptcy restructuring undertaken
18	to secure some advantage against Canada as to the
19	NAFTA claim?
20	Is Westmoreland Mining Holdings pursuing
21	damages other than those incurred by Prairie and
22	flowing up to Westmoreland Mining Holdings as its
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

1	as an example where the Bahamian corporate claimant
2	sought to invoke the France-Ecuador BIT which granted
3	standing to non-French entities if they were
4	controlled by French shareholders.
5	The claimant however was not French-owned,
6	and although its parent company was opened by French
7	shareholders, it was not owned by them when the ICSID
8	Arbitration had been initiated due to a delay in the
9	transfer shares through an inheritance. The tribunal
10	found it had jurisdiction, saying that international
11	law does not permit formalities to triumph over
12	fundamental realities.
13	It was satisfied that there was the
14	transferit was satisfied that there was the transfer
15	occurring, could have happened at any time, and the
16	reality that there was a French ownership of the
17	shares to support jurisdiction.
18	Next slide, please.
19	Professor Paulsson explained: "[A]rbitrators
20	applying international law are disinclined to put form
21	over substance when they ascertain whether Claims are
22	timelyand arise from genuine investments of at-risk
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 134

	Page 136
1	investor?
2	Is there a material, prejudicial difference
3	to Canada whether Westmoreland Mining Holdings or
4	Westmoreland Coal Company pursues the NAFTA claim?
5	Would this case open the floodgates for
6	other claims?
7	Has Alberta relieved Prairie and
8	Westmoreland Mining Holdings of the costs and burdens
9	to reclaim the coal mines now that Westmoreland Coal
10	Company is no longer the parent company?
11	The answer to all of these questions is an
12	unequivocal no. Canada's jurisdictional objection is
13	all form and no substance. Prairie is the same
14	investment that existed at the time of the breach. It
15	was owned by a foreign investor, Westmoreland Coal
16	Company. Canada's NAFTA investment protection
17	obligations were activated at the time of the breach
18	when the measures were adopted.
19	The measures continue to be maintained by
20	Alberta as Off-Coal AgreementsOff-Coal Agreement
21	payments are continuing to be made.
22	Canada owed obligations to Prairie under
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 137
1	Articles 1102 and 1105, and it continues to owe them
2	as Prairie is owned by Westmoreland Mining Holdings.
3	Westmoreland Coal Company transferred its
4	interest in Prairie and its own NAFTA Claim to
5	Westmoreland Mining Holdings while Westmoreland Mining
6	Holdings was its direct wholly-owned subsidiary.
7	Westmoreland Mining Holdings is the investor parent of
8	Prairie who is being damaged by the measures. The
9	former first priority secured lienholders of
10	Westmoreland Coal Company became the shareholders of
11	Westmoreland Mining Holdings as a result of the
12	bankruptcy. And they, along with Prairie, would be
13	the appropriate beneficiaries of any Award.
14	The Tribunal should find, based on the
15	international law and unique facts of this case, that
16	it has jurisdiction of Westmoreland Mining Holdings
17	claim.
18	Mr. Levine will speak to the issues of the
19	transfer of the investment and the claims, the
20	Westmoreland restructuring, and the continuity of
21	interest among Westmoreland Coal Company, Westmoreland
22	Mining Holdings, and Prairie Mines.

Page | 139

be applying? 1 2 MR. SNARR: Yes. We would say that the principles that emerge from the cases where you do see 3 4 that there is a recognition of jurisdiction or an allowance of a transfer or restructuring, that these 5 are the principles that would guide that. So, that 6 7 there has to have been an actual bona fide investment. 8 I mean, this is the principle of the investment and that has to be made in order to 9 activate the Treaty and take advantage of the 10 dispute-resolution provisions. And then, when there's 11 a transfer between companies that have a continuity of 12 13 interest, a closeness between them, that that kind of 14 a transfer does not divest the Tribunal of 15 jurisdiction over the Claim. PRESIDENT BLANCH: And when you talk about 16 the continuity of interest, it is said against you by 17 Canada that continuity of interest is not a concept 18 that comes in NAFTA cases, or in academic treatises on 19 20 NAFTA or even in investor-State, generally. 21 Are you able to point us to anything where 22 continuity of interest is--has been determined or

	Page 138
1	And that concludes my portion of our
2	presentation.
3	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you, Mr. Snarr.
4	Just before we move on, James or Zac, do
5	either of you have any questions? No.
6	I've got one question for you, Mr. Snarr,
7	and I mightit may be that this is going to be
8	answered by Mr. Levine, in which caseand by all
9	means, you don't need to answer it now.
10	Can I just take you back to Slide 17?
11	MR. SNARR: Ricky, if you bring up Slide 17,
12	please.
13	PRESIDENT BLANCH: The third bullet, is this
14	the test that you would say is applicable in
15	determiningI think everybody agrees, and the
16	Claimant would agreethat a contrived claim is not
17	admissible. So, it's working out what is the test for
18	determining whether there is admissibility when the
19	claimant is a different party from the investor at the
20	time of the challenged measures.
21	So, I was just trying to work out, is this
22	third bullet what you say the test is that we should

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 140

argued in other cases, or can you explain what you 1 2 mean by "continuity of interest"? MR. SNARR: Yes. This is really an 3 4 interpretation of the cases where--referring to some of the cases that I mentioned like CME, S.D. Myers. 5 There is a closeness of relationships. There are 6 7 ties. That you can think of a--in the context of a 8 corporation. A corporation has a bundle of rights. and you have another corporate entity, but there is 9 some sharing of rights, some commonality between them. 10 So, this is distinct from a situation where 11 12 you would have a company trying to transfer to another 13 company with which there is no connection, no ties, a 14 completely separate company that would be coming in. Or in the case of a familial relationship that 15 16 there--this connection of family members, if the family and the business is in S.D. Myers. 17 It is hard to imagine that, if an investor 18 died, and the heirs of the investor inherited whatever 19 20 rights that the investor had in the investment, it is 21 hard to imagine that there would be a rule that it 22 says, that's too bad, you don't inherit those rights.

	Page 14
1	That claim is extinguished upon the passing of the
2	parent.
3	PRESIDENT BLANCH: That's very helpful.
4	Thank you.
5	Just before we move to Mr. Levine, would
6	everybody mind if we took a five-minute break? I just
7	hear somebody at my door, and I can do it just running
8	down to let somebody in. I'm really sorry. That is
9	terribly unprofessional.
10	MR. SNARR: That is quite all right as far
11	as we are concerned. Thank you.
12	MR. FELDMAN: That is fine with us. Thank
13	you.
14	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Excellent.
15	(Brief recess.)
16	MR. LEVINE: May I proceed?
17	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Please do. And I
18	apologize. Thank you.
19	MR. LEVINE: No problem. Thank you.
20	Good day, Members of the Tribunal. As my
21	colleagues Mr. Feldman and Mr. Snarr mentioned, my
22	name is Paul Levine.

Page | 143 actual form of the transaction. 1 Canada says that Claimant's arguments 2 "disguise the market-based nature of the transaction." 3 But it is undisputed that Westmoreland Mining Holdings 4 5 was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Westmoreland Coal Company at the time. Substantially all of 6 7 Westmoreland Coal Company's assets, including the 8 Canadian assets at dispute here in the NAFTA claim, 9 were transferred to Westmoreland Mining Holdings. The law of assignments permits for this type 10 11 of transfer of interest, which Canada does not contend was done as an abuse of process. 12 13 This type of reorganization is not what the ratione temporis objection was designed to prevent. 14 We think two useful scenarios are in order 15 to demonstrate these issues: In the first scenario, 16 17 Westmoreland Coal Company, like here, goes bankrupt 18 during the pendency of the NAFTA proceedings, and the secured creditors executed debt-for-equity swap, so 19 20 that the secured creditors trade their debt in whole 21 or part to become the new equity holders of 22 Westmoreland Coal Company.

	Page 142
1	Canada argues that Westmoreland Coal Company
2	and Westmoreland Mining Holdings are "distinct
3	entities." In so doing, Canada, through its
4	bankruptcy attorney, denies the continuity of interest
5	between Westmoreland Coal Company and Westmoreland
6	Mining Holdings.
7	The owners of Westmoreland Mining Holdings
8	are the secured creditors who invested \$700 million of
9	debt into Westmoreland Coal Company, secured by
10	Westmoreland Coal Company's assets. Those were the
11	assets that the secured creditors ultimately took
12	possession of through Westmoreland Mining Holdings.
13	Notwithstanding this continuity of interest,
14	Canada and its bankruptcy attorney regurgitate the
15	record of the bankruptcy proceeding to adopt a
16	hyper-technical, form-over-substance argument that
17	requires its bankruptcy attorney to contradict her own
18	prior statements.
19	Canada, while arguing this Tribunal must
20	strictly analyze the bankruptcy to find that
21	Westmoreland Coal Company and Westmoreland Mining
22	Holdings are supposedly distinct, also denies the
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 144
1	Would there be jurisdiction in this case?
2	The answer undoubtedly is yes. Canada, as it states
3	in Paragraph 104 and Footnote 198 of its Reply
4	Memorial appears to agree that jurisdiction would be
5	proper in this scenario. There, Canada references the
6	Lone Pine case where there was a debt for equity swap
7	and Canada did not challenge jurisdiction.
8	In the second scenario, Westmoreland Coal
9	Company, which was a Delaware corporation, decides
10	during the pendency of the NAFTA proceedings to become
11	a limited liability company in Delaware for whatever
12	reason. The Company finds an LLC form to be more
13	advantageous, or LLC form provides certain tax
14	advantages, or let's say that Westmoreland Coal
15	Company wants to become a limited liability company in
16	Texas because Westmoreland Coal Company finds the
17	Texas business culture more advantageous.
18	So, Westmoreland Coal Company transfers its
19	assets to a new entity. Westmoreland Mining Holdings.
20	Whether that be in Delaware or Texas, with all the
21	same equity holders as in Westmoreland Coal Company,
22	would there be jurisdiction in this scenario?

	Page 145
1	Next slide, Ricky.
2	According to Canada, there would be no
3	jurisdiction. As Canada says in its Memorial, the
4	Claimant is not the same as Westmoreland Coal Company,
5	and NAFTA Chapter Eleven does not allow two
6	enterprises to be the same investor of a Party. The
7	Claimant was constituted in 2019. Westmoreland Coal
8	Company was constituted more than 100 years earlier in
9	1910. The Claimant is a limited liability company.
10	Westmoreland Coal Company is a corporation. The two
11	entities cannot be the same enterprise.
12	Even today, now, Canada today still offers
13	differing views on this point. Earlier this morning,
14	in Mr. Douglas' presentation, he statedand this can
15	be found at linePage 13, Line 15 of the realtime
16	Transcript-"in its Rejoinder, the Claimant proffered
17	examples of changes to corporate form, which they
18	allege would negate jurisdiction under Canada's
19	interpretation of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven.
20	But that is not Canada's position, and you
21	are not being asked to address all possible scenarios
22	today, just the case before you."

	Page 147
1	to take control of Westmoreland Coal Company through
2	the use of a new corporate vehicle, Westmoreland
3	Mining Holdings?
4	Now, these scenarios underscore the
5	weaknesses of Canada's objection. Canada does not
6	claim that it was deprived of an investment in Canada
7	by an American investor. Prairie has always been an
8	American investment in Canada.
9	Next slide.
10	Canada does not claim that the secured
11	creditors had no stake in the outcome of Westmoreland
12	Coal Company. The secured creditors undoubtedly had a
13	substantial stake. They had invested \$700 million
14	into the outcome of Westmoreland Coal Company and
15	expected to get a return on that investment.
16	In fact, Canada's bankruptcy attorney,
17	Ms. Coleman, calls the secured creditors
18	"stakeholders." The entire point of the bankruptcy
19	was to ensure that the secured creditors received
20	payment for their interest in Westmoreland Coal
21	Company. Indeed, the secured creditors had the
22	highest priority of all the pre-bankruptcy debt.

1	But later in their presentationand I
2	believe it was Ms. Zemanshe statedand this is at
3	Page 22, Line 20, it begins: "It is this series of
4	events that bring us here today and to our moment to
5	pause on the most fundamental fact of this
6	Jurisdictional Phase. It is undisputed that the
7	Claimant made an investment in Canada on
8	March 15, 2019. On that date, the Claimant became the
9	owner of the Canadian enterprises. It held these
10	enterprises in the manner you see on the screen.
11	Prior to March 15, 2019, the Claimant did not have an
12	investment in Canada. Prior to January 31, 2019, the
13	Claimant did not exist."
14	Now, to us, the answer in this scenario
15	would be, yes, jurisdiction would exist. Canada's
16	formulation, thus, produces an absurd result: The
17	form has changed, but the substance remains the same.
18	So, the question for this Tribunal is, if
19	the first scenario allowing a debt-for-equity swap is
20	permissible, and the second scenario, allowing for a
21	change of company form is permissible, than are the
22	secured creditors allowed to swap their existing debt

Page | 146

	Page 148
1	Canada's argument exploits the bankruptcy
2	reorganization, a proceeding designed to protect value
3	for the secured creditors \$700-million-plus investment
4	in Westmoreland Coal Company, which led to the secured
5	creditors taking over Westmoreland Coal Company
6	through a new entity, which they did so by using their
7	preexisting stake in Westmoreland Coal Company.
8	Beyond defending a NAFTA Arbitration, Canada
9	does not claim any harm, prejudice, or unfairness.
10	Canada does not say advancement of the claim would be
11	inequitable.
12	Next slide, please.
13	Professor Paulsson in his Report says that
14	this type of restructuring should not defeat
15	jurisdiction.
16	"It should surprise no one that investments
17	that lead to Treaty-based arbitration against States
18	tend to be troubled businesses that often require
19	restructuring as a way of mitigating the adverse
20	consequences of the difficulties encountered. Given
21	the goal of promoting the inflow of investments, it
22	should be obvious that restructuring ought to minimize
	B&B Reporters

	Page 149
1	the prejudice suffered, rather than to provide an
2	excuse for denying Treaty protection."
3	Next slide, please.
4	There are three essential points in this
5	argument: First, the transaction structure preserved
6	the continuity of interests through a valid
7	assignment.
8	Second, U.S. federal law recognizes there
9	was a continuity of interests between Westmoreland
10	Coal Company and Westmoreland Mining Holdings and,
11	third, the bankruptcy process ensured there was a
12	continuity of interests between Westmoreland Coal
13	Company and Westmoreland Mining Holdings.
14	Before I go to the first topic, are there
15	any questions at this point?
16	PRESIDENT BLANCH: James? No. And Zac?
17	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: I had some questions,
18	but perhaps I'll wait until the end of the next
19	segment, in case I am preempting something, so I'll
20	reserve for the moment.
21	MR. LEVINE: Thank you.
22	So, the first topic is the investment claims

	Page 151
1	Canada view the final structure. They are identical.
2	Westmoreland Mining Holdings owns Westmoreland Mining
3	LLC, which comprises the U.S. assets. Westmoreland
4	Mining Holdings also owns the Canadian component,
5	including Prairie Mines & Royalty.
6	Next slide, please.
7	According to Ms. Coleman, Westmoreland Coal
8	Company, thus, received 100 percent of the membership
9	interests in Westmoreland Mining Holdings as
10	consideration in both the U.S. acquisition and the
11	Canadian acquisition. As described below, these
12	membership interests were ultimately distributed to
13	the First Lien Lenders.
14	So, Ms. Coleman agrees that Westmoreland
15	Coal Company owned 100 percent of Westmoreland Mining
16	Holdings before those membership interests were
17	transferred to the secured creditors.
18	Next slide, please.
19	Accepting what Canada's Expert opined about
20	the transaction, this slide shows that Westmoreland
21	Coal Company owned Westmoreland Mining Holdings.
22	Next slide.

1	may be assigned. And if we could go to the next
2	slide, please.
3	This is the structure of Westmoreland Coal
4	Company prior to the transaction. Westmoreland Coal
5	Company is broadly divided into its U.S. and Canadian
6	components in this simplified diagram.
7	Next slide, please.
8	Now, here we are focusing solely on the
9	Canadian component of Westmoreland Coal Company. As
10	you can see, Westmoreland Coal Company owned Prairie
11	Mines & Royalty through a group of companies,
12	including Westmoreland Canada Holdings.
13	Next slide, please.
14	Now, as a result of the bankruptcy
15	transaction process described in the description of
16	transaction steps, that was attached to the Bankruptcy
17	Plan of Reorganization, which is the operative
18	document that controls how the bankruptcy is going to
19	conclude, Westmoreland Mining Holdings becomes part of
20	the ownership chain of the Canadian component.
21	Next slide, please.
22	This slide depicts how both Claimant and
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 150

And on this point, there is no dispute.
Both Parties agree that Westmoreland Coal Company was
at this point the 100 percent owner of Westmoreland
Mining Holdings.
Next slide.
I want to go back to the original
pre-transfer structure to show the transfer to make an
additional point.
Next slide.
Here we see that Westmoreland Mining
Holdings, as everyone agrees, becomes the wholly owned
subsidiary of Westmoreland Coal Company. Westmoreland
Mining Holdings is also in the ownership chain of
Prairie Mines & Royalty.
Ricky, could you click it again, please.
Now, this is the key instance in the form of
the transaction. Now, Canada argues that this
Tribunal should ignore this form because the
transaction happened almost virtually simultaneously
or that the secured creditors created Westmoreland
Mining Holdings. But Canada repeatedly refers to
Westmoreland Coal Company as "distinct" or

	Page 153
1	"unaffiliated."
2	Given Canada's jurisdictional objection that
3	prefers the form, you have to respect the form of the
4	transaction, including the fact that Westmoreland
5	Mining Holdings was owned by Westmoreland Coal Company
6	at the time of the transfer, and then all the
7	attending consequences of that fact.
8	Next slide, please.
9	The final step in the transaction is that
10	the secured creditors take ownership of Westmoreland
11	Mining Holdings. Now, they did not just take a
12	collection of assets. What these stakeholders
13	received in exchange for a portion of their
14	\$700 million-plus investment in Westmoreland Coal
15	Company is the membership interest of Westmoreland
16	Mining Holdings, which holds the collateral that the
17	secured creditors were entitled to take as a result of
18	their debt interests.
19	Now we can go to the next slide. I want to
20	highlight two additional Canadian arguments.
21	First, Canada's states do not look at the
22	identity of the owners of Westmoreland Mining

the opposite is true; Canada contends that an innocent 1 2 restructuring somehow defeated jurisdiction. Next slide. 3 Now, one of Canada's other arguments is that 4 5 this transaction was a pure sale of assets, including the NAFTA claim. First, this was not an ordinary 6 7 sale. The secured debt creditors "credit bid" by 8 paying with their existing secured debt that Westmoreland Coal Company could not repay. The 9 secured creditors, as Ms. Coleman states in 10 Paragraph 43 of her Expert Report, were the only 11 stakeholders allowed to execute this type of credit 12 13 bidding. In effect, the secured creditors used their 14 investment in Westmoreland Coal Company to make the 15 purchase. 16 Second, the sale agreement stated that the secured creditors were buying the membership interest 17 of Westmoreland Mining Holdings. Section 2.09 of the 18 Agreement provides: "Notwithstanding anything 19 20 contained herein to the contrary, the Closing and the 21 other transactions contemplated to occur at 22 Closing...shall be effected in accordance with the

Holdings. It makes this point repeatedly. 1 2 Canada's states look only at the form of the transfer, the same form that Canada attempts to deny 3 4 elsewhere, assuming arguendo that Canada's statements 5 are correct, the form of the transfer is enough. Now, we would argue that Westmoreland Coal 6 Company and Westmoreland Mining Holdings have a 7 continuity of interest, as evidenced by the continuous 8 involvement in both companies of the highest priority 9 stakeholders, the secured creditors who traded their 10 11 preexisting interest in Westmoreland Coal Company for the new membership interest of Westmoreland Mining 12 13 Holdings. But under either rubric, Canada's or ours, jurisdiction would still be proper. 14 And, Ricky, if you could click it again, 15 16 please. 17 Second, Canada does not contend the restructuring was an abuse of process. Canada does 18 not contend that the transaction was structured in a 19 way to create jurisdiction where it would not 20 21 otherwise exist. As Professor Paulsson noted in his Report,

Page | 154

22

Page | 155

	Page 150
1	Description of Transaction Steps."
2	How the transaction was conducted does
3	matter. Indeed, as we cited in our Rejoinder
4	Memorial, Delaware law would prevent this provision
5	from being read out of the Agreement, as Canada seeks
6	to do.
7	Once again, the form must be respected.
8	Next slide.
9	Another Canadian argument is that the
10	Bankruptcy Court, in its Final Order approving the
11	Plan, found that the secured creditors were a
12	good-faith purchaser and that the secured creditors in
13	Westmoreland Coal Company were at arm's length. But
14	that finding ensures that the Bankruptcy Court does
15	not apply a more rigorous analysis to review the
16	bankruptcy to ensure there would be no insider
17	self-dealing, as Ms. Coleman notes at Footnote 103 of
18	her First Expert Report.
19	In the next footnote, she states that this
20	insider analysis does not apply to the intermediate
21	transaction steps where Westmoreland Coal Company
22	transfers assets to Westmoreland Mining Holdings.



	Page 15'
1	Regardless, Canada twists this finding in
2	ways never envisioned by the Bankruptcy Court and
3	directly contradictory to other rulings by the
4	Bankruptcy Court. In that same order, the Bankruptcy
5	Court ruled that: "[n]otwithstanding anything to the
6	contrary in this Plan or Confirmation Order, the NAFTA
7	Claimis not being released" That is, the
8	Bankruptcy Court went out of its way to ensure that
9	its final order did not extinguish the NAFTA claim
10	through the bankruptcy process. Canada's argument
11	seeks to do by implication what the Bankruptcy's Court
12	sought explicitly to preserve.
13	The Bankruptcy Court also found that the
14	form of the transaction, as contained in the
15	description of the transaction steps found in the
16	Supplement to the Bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization,
17	was found to be an integral part of Court's Order
18	approving that Plan. Again, the Bankruptcy Court
19	understood that the continuity between Westmoreland
20	Coal Company and Westmoreland Mining Holdings was a
21	necessary part of the transaction.
22	Before I go on to some analysis of some of

Page | 159 Our position on that would be that the new 1 2 purchaser did not have any interest in the prior iteration of the Westmoreland Coal Company. 3 Westmoreland Coal Company, the eventual owners of 4 Westmoreland Mining Holding, were those secured 5 creditors who had the \$700 million-plus investment in 6 7 there. So this new investor is a new entity that does 8 not have this continuity of interest, as Mr. Snarr 9 described earlier, such that we think that that would be, by itself, an appropriate exercise of 10 11 jurisdiction. 12 ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Okay. So the--there is 13 a fundamental distinction, and that is based upon the status of the secured creditor throughout the 14 investment cycle, if we can put it that way. But does 15 that go into a difficulty, then, that a major 16 financial institution which lends a lot of money to 17 18 different people, or different companies, would typically be a secured creditor as well? Does that 19 20 mean that, for investment treaty purposes, that major financial institution would potentially be able to 21 22 bring a claim on behalf of all the various enterprises

1	the cases, does the Tribunal have any questions at
2	this point?
3	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Perhaps I'll ask a
4	question now, then.
5	QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL
6	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Going back to the way
7	in which the purchase occurred and during the
8	bankruptcy process, just hypothetically suppose the
9	Stalking Horse bid didn't work out because another
10	bidder turned up; an American company turned up to bid
11	for the assets, and that American company purchased
12	the assets. Would your position be that that American
13	company would have a viable NAFTA claim if it
14	purchased the NAFTA claim as part of the assets? Or
15	would that purchaser who turned up, who wasn't the
16	Stalking Horse bid, would they be in a different
17	position?
18	MR. LEVINE: Okay. So, first, let me
19	justthis obviously is not the factual scenario that
20	occurred here.
21	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Of course.
22	MR. LEVINE: We have distinguished that.

Page | 158

	Page 160
1	that it has a secured interest in?
2	MR. LEVINE: Well, that's going to depend on
3	that particular factual scenario, and who that major
4	financial investor is, and how their downstream
5	investors are. That positiongiven what's there, I
6	don't know if there's enough of a connection between
7	that and major financial investor into all the other
8	stuff without additional facts for me to
9	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Fair enough.
10	Is there a distinction? I know it's a
11	distinction, that we've seen in the Reports and that's
12	been noted, between a debt investor, who obviously
13	doesn't bear any enterprise risk, and an equity
14	investor that does. So, whilst the secured creditor,
15	clearly, under the documents recording the security
16	interest, in certain circumstances may be able to do
17	various things, but it doesn't bear any enterprise
18	risk. Is that a problem in this analysis, or you say
19	it doesn't matter?
20	MR. LEVINE: We would say it doesn't matter.
21	When you make a \$700 million debt investment into a
22	company, you do expect to get some return for that

	Page 161
1	funding. If you look at corporations and you say,
2	well, there's two types of investments: You have the
3	equity investors, and then you also have the debt
4	investors. And so those debt investors are hoping to
5	get a return from the company through the company
6	doing well. That's the nature of how debt is. And
7	so, those debt investors are looking to get a return
8	on those funds. And so, while there's different
9	interests that go along with the debt versus the
10	equity, the credit holders, they do have a stake in
11	the success of that company. I would hazard to say
12	that the creditors would prefer to be repaid back on
13	their loan schedule as opposed to execute a bankruptcy
14	and move through those things. But that's business.
15	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Okay. But if
16	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Can I stop you for a
17	second. Can I stop just a second. We lost the
18	Transcript when you were just about to ask your second
19	question, and I just want to make sure that it is
20	being recorded, even if it's not beingactually
21	coming up on the live screen because I don't want to
22	lose any of this.

Page | 163

successor liabilities," well, if there was a 1 debt-for-equity swap and the secured creditors became 2 the equity holders of Westmoreland Coal Company, there 3 would be--there would be no claim there either 4 5 provided all the claims were released. And usually bankruptcy courts, When they release parties from a 6 7 bankruptcy, through a Plan of Reorganization, it 8 starts off with we're going to execute with an 9 automatic stay and prohibit further cases from proceeding; and at the end of it, there's a permanent 10 11 injunction against those preexisting prior liabilities. 12 13 So, when Canada said says there is no successor liability, well, that is tied to the 14 purchase--that's tied to these assets here and what 15 they go with, but if there was a debt-for-equity swap, 16 we would end up at the same point. 17 18 ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Sorry, you're talking about a debt/equity swap in context of bankruptcy. 19 MR. LEVINE: Correct. Correct. 20 ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Yeah. Because in a 21 22 normal debt/equity swap, you would step into the shoes

	Page 16:
1	(Comments off the record.)
2	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Zac, sorry, over to you.
3	Back to your questions.
4	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Okay. Now, where were
5	we? So, we were talking about the difference between
6	equity and debt and investors.
7	Here is, perhaps, another distinction.
8	Whether you can bring counterclaims in investment
9	arbitration is a bit of a fraught question. But
10	assuming you can, just for present purposes, if a
11	counterclaim were brought in relation to events that
12	occurred around about the same time as the alleged
13	breach, wouldn't the Claimant say: "Well, hang on.
14	We are not liable for whatever WCC did during that
15	time because there is no successor liability here"?
16	Wouldn't that be the Claimant's position?
17	MR. LEVINE: I would say if that happened in
18	this scenarioright?and let's just go back to what
19	a bankruptcy does and just start from the beginning
20	there.
21	In the bankruptcy process, liabilities are
22	discharged. So, when Canada says: "There's no

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 16
1	of the equity, and you'd be liable; right? I mean,
2	you would bear
3	(Overlapping speakers.)
4	MR. LEVINE: Go ahead, I apologize.
5	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: So you wouldn't be
6	personally liable, but you would have an equity stake
7	in a company that retains its liability?
8	MR. LEVINE: If there was a straight equity
9	swap outside thelike the confines of the bankruptcy,
10	I think that potentially is correct, depending on how
11	you structure that transaction and whether theall
12	the equity holders want to deal with the results on
13	those claims and how you deal with that contractually.
14	But what I would say is, in this instance,
15	you couldn't have had this credit bidding through this
16	process to waive the successor liability without the
17	bankruptcy either. So, you know, you need a finding
18	from the Bankruptcy Court to insulate you from that, I
19	believe. So, divorcing that hypothetical from the
20	bankruptcy process is very hard to do.
21	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Understood.
22	You said at some point that the Claimant
	BEB Deportors

	Page 16
1	took control over WCC. Is that strictly correct?
2	Because it took control of assets belonging to WCC.
3	WCC, as far as I understand, still exists. It hasn't
4	been extinguished yet as a corporate entity.
5	So, is that the strictly correct way of
6	explaining this, or
7	MR. LEVINE: Well, I'll get to that in a
8	second with respect to the restructuring support
9	agreement and, we would say, once you get into the
10	bankruptcy process. And Westmoreland Coal Company
11	says, "We can't pay you back anymore. We need to
12	figure out how to work out our debt"; that, as
13	Ms. Coleman's own writings and speeches say, they sign
14	away everything. It'sthey are made an offer they
15	can't refuse because the credit holders can pretty
16	much just take. And so now you are trying to find out
17	what's the best way to make this situation work for
18	everything.
19	So, I think at that point the creditors are
20	taking control of Westmoreland Coal Company, and they
21	are just trying to figure out a way through the
22	bankruptcy process to say, "How do we reorganize this

Page | 167 issue. As you can see here, the tribunal there was 1 2 interested in measures that took place in 1996. If we go to the next slide, CME Media 3 4 Enterprises, who is not the claimant, acquired its 5 investment in 1994 and 1996. In 1997, claimant acquired the investment from the parent company. 6 7 And if we go to the next slide, the tribunal 8 found this structure was proper. First, CME Media Enterprises, claimant's predecessor, qualified as an 9 investment; and, second, the tribunal found that the 10 right assigned by CME Media Enterprises to its 11 daughter company must also be protected. And I don't 12 13 need to read the quotes there. They're on the screen 14 for the Tribunal, and we've cited them in our Brief. Next slide. 15 16 Another case where assignment was permissible was Autopista v. Venezuela. The transfer 17 18 there was between a Mexican company to a United States company, both of which were owned by a common Mexican 19 20 parent. That transfer did not defeat jurisdiction, even though México is not a party to the ICSID 21 Convention. Canada states in its Reply Memorial that 22

company so that we can get the maximum value?" 1 2 And so, I would say they take control at that point. And then that allows the creditors to 3 4 then say, "Let's take the good parts that we want, and 5 we could have done it through the bankruptcy process, through a debt-for-equity swap, but do this in a very 6 efficient, quick way so we don't have to be saddled 7 with this bankruptcy for a longer period of time." 8 ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Thank you very much. 9 That was very, very helpful. Thank you. 10 11 MR. LEVINE: Any additional questions? PRESIDENT BLANCH: James? 12 13 ARBITRATOR HOSKING: No. Not for me, thanks. 14 PRESIDENT BLANCH: Please go ahead, 15 16 Mr. Levine. 17 MR. LEVINE: Okay. So I believe I'm on now what's Slide 44 in my notes. So, Ricky, could we 18 please turn to the next slide. 19 All right. Mr. Snarr talked some about this 20 21 case, and so I will go through it very briefly. This is CME v. Czech Republic. These are the measures at 22

> B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

> > Page | 168

Page | 166

the measures took place after the assignment to the 1 2 United States entity. We've reviewed the Jurisdictional Decision, and we don't see any evidence 3 4 in there of when the measures actually took place. 5 think the Tribunal would have to look at the merits decision to find out when the measures took place, 6 7 which Canada did not cite. 8 Professor Paulsson explains why Autopista should apply here, and he states: "The core 9 similarity relevant for jurisdictional purposes is 10 11 that, like Venezuela, Canada knew that Prairie was held by a U.S. investment vehicle. The Autopista 12 13 Tribunal's analysis remains relevant because, in both 14 cases, a legitimate restructuring caused no prejudice to Venezuela and, in this case, to Canada." 15 16 The next case--and Mr. Snarr also talked about this--was Koch Minerals v. Venezuela. That 17 involved the transfer from Koch Minerals Sárl to Koch 18 Oil Marketing and then on to Koch Nitrogen Sárl. The 19 20 holding in that case was that the assignment did not affect the transaction. I believe Mr. Snarr actually 21 22 read this Paragraph 6.70, so it's there on the screen.



	Page 16
1	I don't want to read it again.
2	But we would say the same rationale applies
3	here too. Although you are talking about different
4	legal personalities, this was a transfer by form
5	between companies in the same chain. There is not
6	some unrelated third parties because the secured
7	creditors had a significant interest in Westmoreland
8	Coal Company.
9	The transaction was not changed. Prairie
10	still has operations in Alberta as it did before. We
11	would say there are no material economic, legal, or
12	commercial differences in substance.
13	Next slide, please.
14	This is what Professor Paulsson says. It
15	talks about in his Expert Report about these cases:
16	"The passages quoted from these cases show that
17	arbitrators applying international law are disinclined
18	to put form over substance when they ascertain whether
19	claims are timely. In the present case, the
20	assignment of rights or its equivalent appears to be
21	inherent, - subject to the Tribunal's assessment of
22	the facts - in the restructuring affected via the

	Page 171
1	that a couple of times, including just a moment ago.
2	Is there a particular legal significance to
3	the lack of prejudice, and is there a case that you
4	can point us to where that's been taken into account
5	in the context of the jurisdictional analysis?
6	MR. LEVINE: I don't mean to be squirrely on
7	this answer, but I would defer to Mr. Snarr more on
8	this question. Would it be okay if he answers that
9	question at the conclusion of my presentation? Not to
10	give you an avoidance of an answer, but I think he's
11	dealt more with those issues
12	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: Okay.
13	MR. LEVINE:than I have.
14	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: Fine by me if it's fine
15	with the President. Thank you.
16	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Absolutely.
17	MR. LEVINE: I appreciate your indulgence,
18	Mr. Hosking.
19	Any further questions?
20	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I think, please, go ahead
21	with the next topic.
22	MR. LEVINE: Well, the next topic I want to
	B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

	Page 170
1	investor's recourse took protection under the relevant
2	bankruptcy law."
3	I've only read the italicized portion on
4	this slide.
5	Before I move to the next topic, are there
6	any other additional questions?
7	ARBITRATOR DOUGLAS: Just one very small
8	point. I think the Autopista case was a contract
9	case. I'm not sure if that makes any difference to
10	either party's views or not, but that is, perhaps, one
11	important point to come back on; that it is not an
12	investment treaty arbitration. It was an arbitration
13	under a Concession Agreement but submitted to ICSID.
14	I'm not sure if that changes anything from your
15	position or the other party's position.
16	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I think James had a
17	question.
18	ARBITRATOR HOSKING: Yeah, I just have a
19	quick question, if I may.
20	Given that in Claimant's view, we are not in
21	the abuse of process-type cases, what is the relevance
22	of there not being any prejudice? You've mentioned

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 172

1	discuss today is Type G reorganizations. Canada in
2	its Memorials says almost nothing about Type G
3	reorganizations, with Ms. Coleman, who is presented as
4	a bankruptcy Expert, calling this "a distinct inquiry
5	of whether Westmoreland Mining Holdings is an
6	unrelated third-party purchaser of Westmoreland Coal
7	Company's assets." We think she's wrong.
8	Next slide, please.
9	There are three essential points for a
10	Type G reorganization, and they are up on this screen.
11	First, tax attributes ordinarily remain with
12	the original company, but parties can opt out of this
13	ordinary role by selecting intentionally what's known
14	as a Type G reorganization, and to do so, there must
15	be a continuity of interest between the original and
16	new entity. The Type G reorganization roles thus
17	reflect the substance of the transaction, recognizing
18	that the entity starting the bankruptcy and the entity
19	ending the bankruptcy has such a continuity of
20	interest that they should she treated as the same.
21	Next slide.
22	This is a quote from 26 U.S.C. Section

	Page 173
1	368(a)(1)(G), which is the Internal Revenue Code, that
2	provides for reorganizations involving a transfer by a
3	corporation of all or part of its assets to another
4	corporation in a U.S. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. And this
5	was clearly the type of reorganization that was
6	selected intentionally in the Plan of Reorganization
7	and the other documents, including an actual
8	transaction document which we've exhibited, the
9	Contribution and Distribution Agreement.
10	Next slide, please.
11	The Treasury regulations describing this
12	type of transaction provide that a Type G
13	reorganization affects only a readjustment of
14	continuing interest in property under modified
15	corporate forms. And this regulation recognizes that
16	the form may be different, but the interest is
17	continual.
18	Next slide, please.
19	The regulations also provide that:
20	"Continuity of interest requires that, in substance, a
21	substantial part of the value of the proprietary
22	interests in the target corporation"here, which

	Page 175
1	that original organization?
2	So, I think it's probably best answered by
3	the next slide, actually, of all things, if we turn to
4	Slide 55.
5	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Please do. I'm sorry for
6	interrupting because I may
7	(Overlapping speakers.)
8	MR. LEVINE: Yeah. It says: "'Creditor's
9	claim as proprietary interest' A creditor's claim
10	against a target corporation"so, that claim being
11	the debt held in the target corporation"may be a
12	proprietary interest in the target corporation if the
13	target corporation is in a [Chapter 11 of the U.S.
14	Bankruptcy Code] type case. In such cases, if any
15	creditor receives a proprietary interest in the
16	issuing corporation in exchange for its claim, every
17	claim in that class of creditors is a proprietary
18	interest in the target corporation immediately prior
19	to the potential reorganization"
20	So, what that is saying is that the
21	creditors' debt holdings in Westmoreland Coal Company
22	is that proprietary interest. That's the interest in
	B&B Reporters

1	would be Westmoreland Coal Company"be preserved in
2	the reorganization."
3	That is, do the interests in the reorganized
4	entity remain the same as the original entity?
5	Next slide.
6	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Mr. Levine, sorry, I'm
7	going to do what I specifically said I wouldn't do.
8	I'm really sorry, but could we go back to the previous
9	slide?
10	MR. LEVINE: Sure.
11	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I just want to make sure
12	I understand.
13	So, is this looking more at thewhen it
14	says "the value of the proprietary interests in the
15	target corporation," what exactly does that mean?
16	MR. LEVINE: My understanding of thatand
17	I'm not a tax lawyer, but we have one here who can
18	answer the question, if I do flub thisis that the
19	value of the proprietary interest in the target
20	corporation, meaning: Are you going to retain what's
21	in the original organization and carry it through to
22	the end using some interest that you already had in

Page | 174

	Page 176
1	the target corporation.
2	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you.
3	MR. LEHRER: This is John. May I interrupt
4	for one second?
5	MR. LEVINE: Yeah, go ahead. I'm
6	(Overlapping speakers.)
7	MR. LEHRER: Yeah. Just to be clear, so
8	this test is focused on, essentially, the equity
9	ownership and, you know, continuation there. There is
10	a separate test which also must be met focusing on a
11	continuing asset ownership as well. So, it's the
12	combination of those two things that is going on, the
13	focus being on the equity ownership and what is
14	appropriate for continuing this continuity.
15	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Thank you.
16	MR. LEVINE: If we could turn to the next
17	slide, please.
18	This is from a U.S. Treasury Department
19	Decision, and it states: "The final regulations
20	provide that, in certain circumstances, stock received
21	by creditors may count for continuity of interest
22	purposes both inside and outside of bankruptcy
	B&B Reporters

	Page 17
1	proceedings The final regulations treat such senior
2	claims as representing proprietary interests in the
3	target corporation."
4	And so, what these rules do is they give
5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	effect to the substance of the transaction, that the
6	secured creditors have a substantial interest in a
7	debtor entity, and that a bankruptcy reorganization
8	should not break the chain of continuity between
9	Westmoreland Coal Company and Westmoreland Mining
10	Holdings.
11	Before I move on to the next topic, are
12	there any further questions?
13	PRESIDENT BLANCH: No, thank you.
14	MR. LEVINE: I wonder if Mr. Snarr is
15	available and if this would be a good time to answer
16	Mr. Hosking's prior question.
17	MR. SNARR: Yes, I think I can do that. Is
18	the mic working now? Okay. Good.
19	So, we are trying to find rules of
20	international law hereexcuse methat apply to,
21	really, a unique set of facts. We don't have anything
22	in the text of NAFTA that speaks expressly to this.

Page | 179

1 text.
2 Well, we are dealing here with the absence
3 of a provision that we are trying to find the source
4 of law that is the root of this question, and Canada
5 has cited NAFTA, and we've looked at the text, and it
6 is not contained in the text.
7 So, we are trying to divine from the cases,

8 the investor-State awards, what are the international 9 law principles that apply here? And in looking at the 10 international law principles, looking at the cases 11 where an abuse of the Treaty has not been allowed or 12 there's been forum-shopping, we have to take from 13 that: Why were those cases decided the way that they 14 were?

And so, we have to get at the rationale of 15 16 it. And the rationale seems to be that there is a principle of good faith and fairness that comes into 17 play with respect to restructuring and the timing of 18 claims. And so, when we talk about, is there any 19 20 prejudice here on the part of Canada, we raised it twice in our Briefs and I haven't seen anything yet 21 22 from the Government of Canada to suggest that they are

1	In fact, as I discussed, there is text in NAFTA that
2	suggests that there is not the strict rule intended
3	that Canada has argued. So, we look to the text of
4	NAFTA to see what we can find. If there were a strict
5	express statement in NAFTA, then you might have a
6	different perspective on how that rule should be
7	applied because, with the language being expressly
8	contained in NAFTA, the Parties on each side, the
9	Respondent and the Claimant, are on notice about the
10	application of a strict rule.
11	Let's take the diversity of nationality
12	rule. I think that is certainly clearer in the NAFTA
13	text that that applies, and it is clear in
14	investor-State treaties. So, that rule and the
15	principle of retroactivity of treaties is usually a
16	pretty hard line.
17	Now, you can imagine, perhaps, an extreme
18	circumstance where a respondent State decides to
19	confer nationality on the claimant and therefore
20	disrupt the diversity of nationality. And maybe in
21	that situation, you would say, given that strict rule,

22 we won't apply it as strictly as it's contained in the

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

Page | 180

Page | 178

prejudiced by whether it would be Westmoreland Coal 1 2 Company versus Westmoreland Mining Holdings. We are getting to the issue of fairness and 3 good-faith principles with respect to the operation of 4 5 the dispute-resolution provisions in the Treaty, and the connection of those procedures to what is an 6 7 investment, an undisputed investment in Canada of a 8 company, an enterprise owning and operating those mines. So, I think that prejudice ties to the 9 international principles that we're culling from these 10 cases, and we are trying to find out what the contours 11 are of them in deciding this question. 12 13 And as Professor Paulsson states in his 14 Expert Report, that this is a case that may be a case of first impression, and unless there are strict 15 16 provisions contained in the terms of the Treaty as you do the international law analysis, then that opens the 17 situation up for consideration on a case-by-case 18 basis. And the equities of this case, we believe, 19 20 strongly favor us and jurisdiction being found for the 21 claim. 22 ARBITRATOR HOSKING: Okay. I appreciate

	Page 181
1	your answer. Thank you very much.
2	Sorry, Mr. Levine. I hope I didn't throw
3	you off.
4	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I'm not sure we can hear
5	you, Mr. Levine.
6	MR. LEVINE: There we go. There's two mute
7	buttons I have to press to make this thing work.
8	After 18 months, you would think I would have figured
9	out how to use Zoom, but apparently not.
10	So, if we could turn to the final topic.
11	And the next slide is that the "Bankruptcy Preserved a
12	Continuity of Interests."
13	Next slide, Ricky.
14	The secured creditors had loaned over
15	\$700 million to Westmoreland Coal Company with the
16	expectation of being repaid, somehow. And when
17	Westmoreland Coal Company defaulted on those
18	obligations, the secured remedycreditors' remedy was
19	the collateral they had, and they could have exercised
20	on that collateral once there was a default. But,
21	instead, they executed additional documents: The
22	bridge loan, the restructuring support agreement, and

Page | 183

other documents. And, normally, these are documents 1 2 that the debtor could put together on their own, and, in this case, that reverse the ordinary course of 3 4 events 5 Second, the bankruptcy process was to be completed quickly. The secured creditors obviously 6 7 valued efficiency and did not want to be tied up in 8 bankruptcy for a long time. They've already had their debt defaulted on. 9 Next slide. 10 Now, as we've mentioned earlier, the secured 11 creditors could have done a debt-for-equity swap 12 13 through the bankruptcy process, but, instead, they 14 used the reorganization process, that is, as Ms. Coleman explains in her own writings, the way 15 16 bankruptcy gets conducted. As she says: "A typical Section 363 sale involves participation by existing 17 lenders who are undersecured and often have 18 'everything,' a debtor in possession, by or with the 19 20 consent of existing lenders and the debtor's 21 management. These parties have substantial control over the terms of the price and sale, 22

2 If we could turn to the next slide. We've laid these out in our Memorials, but 3 4 these agreements gave a number of indicia of control 5 over to the secured creditors. There's approved budgets, there's financial metrics, there's weekly 6 reporting obligations, approval rights over 7 revenue-generating contracts longer than six months. 8 A number of these are detailed in our Appendix page to 9 the initial Memorial. 10 11 If we could go to the next slide, please. But among the important ones here is the 12 13 control given by the restructuring support agreement of the bankruptcy process to the secured creditors. A 14 restructuring support agreement is an agreement that 15 16 ensures the debtor entity cedes the control of the 17 bankruptcy to the secured creditors. And in this case, that agreement had two principal effects. 18 First, the secured creditors had approval 19 rights over all the key bankruptcy documents: The 20 21 Plan: the Plan Supplement where the transaction was formally structured; the sale agreement; and numerous 22 B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903 Page | 184 especially...where...the obtainable price is well 1 2 below the amount of the secured debt." And that is exactly what happened here. The 3 secured creditors exchanged their debt for the same 4 5 assets they could have had acquired through the debt-for-equity swap. 6 7 Next slide, please. 8 Now, before I move on to this, I just want to say: Canada implies that we do not dispute what 9 10 Ms. Coleman opines about because we chose not to 11 cross-examine her. And that, of course, is not the standard in the Procedural Order. If that were the 12 13 standard, Canada's choice not to cross-examine 14 Professor Paulsson would lead to the same way of earn. 15 We don't, of course, contend that's actually the case. 16 What we do dispute is Ms. Coleman's conclusions. The remainder of her Opinion repeats a 17 lot of what's in the factual exhibits and what's in 18 documents that we feel, as U.S. attorneys, we can 19 20 address without the need for a further expert.

the debtor-in-possession financing agreement.

1

Page | 182

22 interview, which we transcribed at C-046--and we



	Page 185
1	provided the interview video in our filingsis that
2	thishow this bankruptcy got conducted is how
3	bankruptcies get done these days. In this excerpt,
4	conducted with MandA.TV, she stated there's a real
5	shift of power and a real shift of control in the
6	bankruptcy case to secured creditors who extend that
7	credit.
8	What she's saying is, you get into
9	bankruptcy and you don't have ability to fund your
10	operations, you essentially accept more funding in
11	exchange for turning over your rights to those
12	creditors.
13	If we go to the next slide.
14	She's also written about this shift of power
15	and shift of control and the effect it has on
16	preparing the bankruptcy documents.
17	And she said: "Without first getting
18	debtor-in-possession lender consent, the debtor cannot
19	do anything outside the ordinary course of business.
20	For example, the debtor is no longer free to seek to
21	assume or reject contracts. It cannot propose an
22	incentive plan to retain critical management players

Page | 187

equity in Westmoreland Coal Company as a result of the 1 2 bankruptcy, that would not have defeated jurisdiction. So, using their control of the bankruptcy 3 4 and using the outstanding debt they were owed, the 5 secured creditors used the new corporate entity to do the same thing. They did flow through a transaction 6 7 that made Westmoreland Coal Company the parent of 8 Westmoreland Mining Holdings. And they did so in a way that United States federal law finds would 9 preserve a continuity of interest. 10 So, if we could go to the final slide. 11 This is what Professor Paulsson said in his 12 13 Second Report: "What matters is the ultimate economic 14 reality; does the recovery pursued ultimately and legitimately seek reparation of the harm done to 15 16 protected investors who put their capital at risk? Canada does not address the rationale for this 17 18 proposition, but simply repeats that a claimant who was not an investor when the dispute arose has no 19 20 standing." 21 In conclusion, Claimants have demonstrated 22 that jurisdiction exists here, and Canada's objection

	It cannot sell or decline to sell its assets. But
2	most important, it cannot propose its own plan without
3	lender approval, and it cannot obtain approval of the
4	plan over the opposition of the debtor-in-possession
5	lenderor that of any other creditor to whom the
6	debtor-in-possession lender extends its protection"
7	And, basically, the secured creditors
8	control the material aspects of the Company.
9	If we could go to the next slide.
10	We have highlighted these two cases in our
11	Rejoinder Memorial, and we've put some quotes up here
12	from them. And I don't want to belabor these points
13	because they are in the filings, but we think these
14	cases are illustrative of what happened here, that
15	there may be a change in form, but that change in form
16	does not serve to defeat jurisdiction.
17	And if we could to the next slide, please.
18	Which brings me back to where we started.
10	
19	If Westmoreland Coal Company could have changed its
	If Westmoreland Coal Company could have changed its corporate form from a corporate entity to a limited
19	

Page | 186

Page | 188

B&B Reporters 001 202-544-1903

fails to demonstrate that jurisdiction does not exist. 1 2 We thank you for your time, and we are prepared to answer any further questions the Tribunal 3 4 may have. PRESIDENT BLANCH: What I'd like to propose 5 is that we take something just like a 5- to 10-minute 6 7 break so that the Tribunal Members can just work out 8 if we have questions to raise, any questions to raise now, which may be for Claimants, or it may be points 9 that we suggest that the Parties might want to address 10 11 tomorrow. We will let you know as soon as we're ready to come back into the main Hearing. So, please, I 12 13 would ask that nobody runs away very far. 14 Anneliese, could you get the three of us and vourself back into the Tribunal breakout room? 15 SECRETARY FLECKENSTEIN: Yes. One second. 16 (Brief recess.) 17 PRESIDENT BLANCH: The Tribunal thanks the 18 Parties. Those Opening Submissions were really 19 20 helpful, very clear, so thank you so much. And the 21 PowerPoints are really helpful too. 22 You've been so clear that actually we have

	Page 18
1	no further questions for you, and we don't actually
2	have any specific questions for you to consider for
3	the Rebuttals tomorrow. We have every confidence that
4	the Parties will pick out anything they want to cover
5	in the Rebuttals.
6	So, on that, I propose to close the
7	Proceedings for today, unless there is any
8	housekeeping.
9	Firstly, Mr. Feldman, is there anything
10	further on Claimant's side for tonight?
11	Mr. Feldman, I'm afraid we can't hear you.
12	MR. FELDMAN: Can you hear me now?
13	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Yes, we can.
14	MR. FELDMAN: Sorry. I used to teach and
15	always worry at the end of a class when a class had no
16	questions, and if I was really that clear, that you
17	really think so. So my teaching instinct is coming
18	out from this, but okay. We will try to anticipate
19	what you are thinking about and try to answer it
20	tomorrow.
21	PRESIDENT BLANCH: I suspect, as a teacher,
22	you should feel slightly more comforted because I'm

Page | 191

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Dawn K. Larson, RDR-CRR, Court Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were stenographically recorded by me and thereafter reduced to typewritten form by computer-assisted transcription under my direction and supervision; and that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in this proceeding, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation.

Davon Larson

	Page 190
1	not sure that we asked many, if any, questions to
2	Canada; whereas, I think Claimant got a few. So, I
3	can absolutely assure you, we really do feel very,
4	very well briefed.
5	MR. FELDMAN: Thank you.
6	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Mr. Douglas, is there
7	anything further housekeeping from Canada?
8	MR. DOUGLAS: No, there is nothing further
9	from Canada. Thank you, President Blanch.
10	PRESIDENT BLANCH: Well, I hope everyone
11	gets at least a bit of break before we meet again
12	tomorrow, and I look forward to that.
13	Thank you.
14	MR. FELDMAN: Thank you very much.
15	MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you very much.
16	(Whereupon, at 2:41 p.m. (EDT), the Hearing
17	was adjourned until 9:30 a.m. (EDT) the following
18	day.)